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There is a growing need to understand and identify overarching organizational
requirements for cybersecurity defense in large organizations. Applying proper
cybersecurity defense will ensure that the right capabilities are fielded at the right
locations to safeguard critical assets while minimizing duplication of effort and taking
advantage of efficiencies. Exercising cybersecurity defense without an understanding of
comprehensive foundational requirements instills an ad hoc and in many cases
conservative approach to network security. Organizations must be synchronized across
federal and civil agencies to achieve adequate cybersecurity defense. Understanding what
constitutes comprehensive cybersecurity defense will ensure organizations are better
protected and more efficient.
This work, represented through design science research, developed a model to understand
comprehensive cybersecurity defense, addressing the lack of standard requirements in
large organizations. A systemic literature review and content analysis was conducted to
form seven criteria statements for understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense.
The seven criteria statements were then validated by a panel of expert cyber defenders
utilizing the Delphi consensus process. Based on the approved criteria, the team of cyber
defenders facilitated development of a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense
Framework prototype for understanding cybersecurity defense. Through the Delphi
process, the team of cyber defense experts ensured the framework matched the seven
criteria statements. An additional and separate panel of stakeholders conducted the
Delphi consensus process to ensure a non-biased evaluation of the framework.
The comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework is developed through the data
collected from two distinct and separate Delphi panels. The framework maps risk
management, behavioral, and defense in depth frameworks with cyber defense roles to
offer a comprehensive approach to cyber defense in large companies, agencies, or
organizations. By defining the cyber defense tasks, what those tasks are trying to achieve
and where best to accomplish those tasks on the network, a comprehensive approach is
reached.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Introduction
Large organizations have struggled to secure networks through a growing dependency
to conduct operations on them. Kiper (2008) describes “a Company, Agency, or Large
Organization” as CALO. CALOs are comprised of thousands or tens of thousands of
personnel in its workforce. CALOs incur diverse cybersecurity defensive operational
needs for several reasons. CALOs rely heavily on outside associated or international
agencies as well as the Internet, which introduces security risks. Additionally, the scope
of “mega” organizations size incurs trusts and interdependency with similar and smaller
organizations, introducing even more security risks (Kiper, 2008)
Asti (2017) argued that small and medium-sized organizations face different
challenges than CALOs. He explained that merely due to the size and scope of CALOs
cybersecurity defense is more critical to stakeholders. Kiper (2013) contended CALOs
conduct hundreds of more business processes in comparison to smaller organizations
which is also salient to cybersecurity defense criticality. CALOs often manage smaller
organizations that may have different operational functions. Challenges often arise when
CALO statues, regulatory guidelines, and operation procedures do not capture
comprehensive cybersecurity defense requirements for subordinate organizations (Kiper,
2013). Also, CALOs consist of a diverse workforce that may include a multitude of job
families, various levels of experience, and globally located offices. Factors that make

2

cybersecurity defense more challenging compared to a smaller organization (Kiper, 2008,
2013).
CALOs lack of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense not only affects
operations but acquisitions of cyber defense technologies. CALOs often unnecessarily
compartmentalize cyber defense along operational funding lines, resulting in overlapping
defense methodologies. This type of organizational patchwork incurs millions and in
some cases billions of wasted funding (S. J. Shackelford, Proia, Martell, & Craig, 2015).
The global financial crisis of 2007 caused many nations to look at how, why, and where
they spend funds across federal agencies. The complacency and overspending previously
seen in many civil and government organizations have resulted in gross wastes of
resources, negligent acquisition practices, and a culture of overcompensation that can no
longer be accepted. CALO accountability is driving organizations to look at efficient
means to defend networks. Although some CALOs are profit-driven organizations, some
government agencies are driven primarily by public interests to include national security.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is a prime example of a government CALO that
struggles with understanding what comprehensive cybersecurity defense is. The DOD
remains in a constant battle to protect information, military maneuvers, equipment, and
personnel that rely heavily on cyber systems. The operational implications of an
inadequately defended network in the DOD could impact the safety of soldiers, sailors,
and marines on the battlefield. In some cases, a poorly protected system could mean the
difference between life and death (LTG A. Crutchfield, PACOM Deputy Commander,
personal communications, May 10, 2016; Kim, Trimi, & Chung, 2014).
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Government CALOs are also challenged with budget constraints, leaving Information
Technology Acquisitions (ITA) heavily scrutinized (Manifesto, 2013). Senior
government leaders are aggressively attempting to streamline programs, create
efficiencies, and forego unnecessary costs for cyber defense. Saving the needed resources
and ultimately balancing those resources with the associated operational security
requirements is difficult to manage if stakeholders are not fully cognizant of the
comprehensive cybersecurity defense requirements (Hua & Bapna, 2013).
Threats are also a significant factor in cyber defense. To understand how to defend
CALO networks, adequate threat analysis of what to defend is salient to understanding a
comprehensive approach. Cyber threat information includes indicators of compromise
such as tactics, techniques, and procedures used by threat actors as well as suggested
actions to detect, contain, or prevent attacks, and the findings from the analyses of
incidents (Johnson, Badger, Waltermire, Snyder, & Skorupka, 2016). By exchanging
cyber threat information within a sharing community, CALOs can leverage the collective
knowledge, experience, and capabilities to gain a complete understanding of the threats
the organization may face. With a comprehensive understanding of cyber defense,
organizations can make threat-informed decisions regarding defensive capabilities, threat
detection techniques, and mitigation strategies. By correlating and analyzing cyber threat
information from multiple sources, an organization can also enrich existing information
and make it more actionable. Threat information can also be improved by independently
confirming the observations of other community members through the reduction of
ambiguity and errors. Organizations that receive threat information and subsequently use
this information to remediate a threat confer a degree of protection to other organizations
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by impeding the threat’s ability to spread (Burger, Goodman, Kampanakis, & Zhu, 2014;
Johnson et al., 2016). Additionally, sharing of cyber threat information allows
organizations to detect campaigns that target particular industry sectors, business entities,
or institutions. CALOs that share cyber threat information can improve their security
postures as well as those of other organizations (Johnson et al., 2016).
Research suggests a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity that considers CALO
business or mission objectives, psychological and social factors, governance, economics,
risk management, and technology is needed to capture comprehensive cybersecurity
requirements (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Donaldson, Siegel, Williams, & Aslam, 2015b;
Tisdale, 2015). To achieve a comprehensive approach to CALO cybersecurity defense,
an understanding of what is comprehensive cyber defense is required.

Problem Statement
There is no common framework for clearly understanding what constitutes
comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs. This lack of understanding causes an
inability of current cybersecurity frameworks to capture comprehensive organizational
security requirements sufficiently. Cybersecurity frameworks are fragmented, vary in
effectiveness, and a comprehensive approach is needed (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum,
Otoom, & Abu Ali, 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Donaldson, Siegel, Williams, &
Aslam, 2015a; Tatar, Çalik, Çelik, & Karabacak, 2014; Tisdale, 2015). Frameworks
created for specific functions often utilize generalized frameworks such as NIST and
ISO/IEC 2700 to ensure more effective cybersecurity, but optimal cyber defense is
difficult to achieve without a clear understanding of what comprehensive cybersecurity
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defense is (Vijayan, 2017). Most technical cybersecurity solutions fail to consider cost,
operational tradeoffs, and the ability of adversaries to adapt to vulnerabilities.
Currently, no comprehensive cybersecurity requirements are imposed on the entire US
critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity regulations do exist for specific sectors, leaving the
status quo a complicated patchwork of often ambiguous state and federal regulations
overlaying applicable common doctrines (S. J. Shackelford et al., 2015). This study did
not intend to solve obligatory cybersecurity for the entire US but rather to improve
understanding of the multi-varied cybersecurity defense requirements for civil and
government CALOs.
In the effort to achieve cybersecurity objectives, organizations often develop
reactionary cyber defense methodologies. The personnel trained, tools used, and methods
adopted by many CALOs are based on a “buy first ask questions later” culture. Along
with politics driving federal agencies towards a leaner, more agile common off the shelf
(COTS) development practices, a comprehensive framework that matches strategic
objectives to detailed requirements is needed (Karyda, Mitrou, & Quirchmayr, 2006;
Lachow, 2016; Manifesto, 2013).
There are many information technologies (IT) and frameworks used for general
process improvement and network security. Although most are beneficial in deriving,
common best practices developed over time, few captures a comprehensive approach that
can be tailored to meet objectives on a CALO operational level (Atoum & Otoom, 2016).
Frameworks developed over the years by popular commercial and government
organizations help identify cybersecurity requirements. Many of these frameworks have
compliance application concepts that are not comprehensive enough to derive specific
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cyber defense requirements for CALOs (Acuña, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et
al., 2015a; Tisdale, 2015). Donaldson, Siegel, Williams, and Aslam (2015b) argued that
frameworks such as ISO 2700/27002, NISP-SP800-53, NIST Cybersecurity Framework,
PCI DSS, HIPPA Security Rule, HITRUST Security Rule, and NERC CIP provide
segmented approaches to cybersecurity. Donaldson et al. (2015b) proposed that mapping
different cybersecurity frameworks could result in significant improvements for more
practical operational applications. He further argued that many of the cybersecurity
frameworks established over the past two decades provided only compartmentalized
security approaches, making them difficult to achieve full spectrum cyber defense in
CALOs. Atoum (2014) and (2016) also contended the need for a more comprehensive
approach to cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity challenges in CALOs have been compounded by poor acquisitions
practices over the years, creating stove-piped security architectures with standard security
requirements. Donaldson (2015b) and Vijayan (2017) both argued that many of the
popular security frameworks have overlapping security approaches and guidelines. The
variation of security practices by separate organizations with common mission objectives
creates unknown vulnerabilities, security risks and implies the need for understanding
what exactly is considered comprehensive. A comprehensive, requirements driven
framework is needed to understand CALO common security objectives and to identify
security gaps (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Donaldson et al., 2015a; Vijayan, 2017). Many of
CALO’s incur security risks due to segregated acquisitions, organizational structures,
policies, and poor change management practices. The scope of this work addresses
cybersecurity defensive measures explicitly.
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Dissertation Goal
The goal of this work was to conduct design research towards the development of a
Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) artifact to address the lack of
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs. To approach the
research problem, a systemic literature review of current cybersecurity frameworks was
conducted to outline the gaps in a comprehensive approach to cyber defense. A
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework to facilitate understanding of CALO
cybersecurity was developed through design science and iterative evaluations of various
frameworks. The CCDF identifies gaps in cybersecurity, risk management, and
cybersecurity defense acquisitions. The CCDF captures operational cyber defense
requirements based on CALO stakeholder needs towards the more practical use of
security controls and compliance, ultimately providing better defense against cyberattacks.
The CCDF leverages current de facto and de jure frameworks or standards to offer a
comprehensive approach to driving cybersecurity defense requirements in large
companies, agencies, or organizations. By defining the tasks, what those tasks are trying
to achieve and where best to accomplish those tasks on the network, a comprehensive
approach may be reached (Lt Col Perez, Willarvis Smith, DISA Pacific Operations
Division, personal communications, August 1, 2016).
Frameworks developed over the years by popular commercial and government
organizations help identify cybersecurity requirements. Traditional frameworks such as
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, ISO 2700 and NIST SP 800-53 provide a general
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approach to cybersecurity but are not comprehensive enough to derive requirements for
use throughout CALOs (Atoum et al., 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Donaldson et
al., 2015a; Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015).

Research Questions
1. What Criterion does the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive
defensive cybersecurity framework for CALOs?
2. In what ways does the CCDF meet the established criteria for a comprehensive
defensive cybersecurity framework for CALOs?
3. What future areas of research may be explored in understanding a more comprehensive
approach to cybersecurity defense?

Relevance and Significance
There are many general frameworks and security processes in use to date. Although
beneficial, they do not address what constitutes comprehensive organizational
cybersecurity defense based on CALO strategic objectives. Most frameworks address
general control and compliance for organizations without consideration to the scope, size
and operational context of cybersecurity defense (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al.,
2014; Donaldson et al., 2015a). This work studied understanding what is considered
comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs and how to meet the goals of
optimizing the organizational cyber defense environment.
Understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense is essential to identify the
specific requirements of organizations based on mission objectives and to ensure those
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requirements are meeting cybersecurity needs. Development of a CCDF based on
understanding cyber defense objectives not only examines security gaps but identifies
interdependencies and overlapping requirements driven from traditional stove-piped
security architectures (Kelic et al., 2013; Tisdale, 2015).
Atoum et al. (2014) contended that current cybersecurity frameworks defending
against cyber-attacks are fragmented and vary widely in effectiveness. A holistic
implementation framework synonymous with a comprehensive approach was presented
although untested and did not map organizational strategy to cyber defense capabilities
and tools. Atoum et al. (2014) were based on practical experience, not industry best
practices, and national standards. Information security enforcement on the national level
inherently affects security implementation from a global point of view and is salient for
several reasons. First, to ensure early detection of likely threats and mitigate risks related
to government information systems and critical infrastructures of the commercial
connections tied to those systems must be considered. Also, decision-makers must be
enabled to take necessary actions when needed. With an understanding of comprehensive
oversight, decisions become more explicit and interdependent stakeholders are aware of
what is happening during an attack. Lastly, organizations must be able to implement
security solutions that involve vast numbers of stakeholders, including private entities,
government, and civilian. Atoum (2014) and (2016) failed to define constructs and
criteria for a holistic or comprehensive cybersecurity approach. Research established that
comprehensive approaches to cybersecurity are highly problematic (Donaldson et al.,
2015a; Oltramari, Ben-Asher, Cranor, Bauer, & Christin, 2014)).
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Oltramari et al. (2014) described cybersecurity as a complicated, multi-layered
security challenge for all entities which includes digital information and humans that
operate in cyberspace. Cybersecurity has become a problem that increasingly demands
scientific understanding in theoretical and empirically validated models (Oltramari et al.,
2014). This report addressed cybersecurity from a defensive approach and explored the
construction of a CCDF artifact to understand what is intended by “comprehensive”
cyber defense and the criteria for the said artifact. The CCDF facilitated the research gap
based on clearly defined criteria of cyber defense and provided opportunities for future
work towards cyber offense, cyber response and other disciplines defined in cyberspace
(Acuña, 2016; Donaldson et al., 2015a; Matania, Yoffe, & Mashkautsan, 2016).
A significant implication of relevancy for this research is the emergence of cyber
warfare on the national level and the establishment of CYBERCOM as a combatant
command in 2017 (Clark, 2018). Action officers, Senior Executives, and General
Officers have taken steps to support a comprehensive requirements framework by
funding several conferences of global DOD partners at Fort Meade Maryland and Scott
Air Force Base Illinois to support a comprehensive approach that will have enforceable
authorities to implement (Clark, 2018). Federal and civil CALOs are attempting to
integrate cyber defense infrastructures to create security and monetary efficiencies. To
achieve this, the DOD and other CALOs must understand what comprehensive
cybersecurity defense entails.
Understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense is not exclusively a federal issue
as civil CALO’s struggle with defining a comprehensive approach. Donaldson et al.
(2015b) argued that many of the commercial cybersecurity frameworks developed over
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the past 20 years only provide a compartmentalized approach to cybersecurity and
suggested research towards mapping security frameworks for a comprehensive approach.
Donaldson (2015b) argued frameworks used for controls or compliance purposes are
especially suited for that purpose and not adequate for a comprehensive cybersecurity
program.
Comprehensive security requirements prepare CALOs against Advanced Persistent
Threats (APT). APT actors continually demonstrate the capability to compromise
systems by using advanced tools, customized malware and zero-day exploits that antivirus, defense signatures, and patching cannot detect or mitigate (Hutchins, Cloppert, &
Amin, 2011). APT represents well-resourced and trained adversaries that conduct multiyear intrusion campaigns targeting highly sensitive economic, proprietary, or national
security information (Hutchens et al., 2011). Through intelligence-driven response,
network defenders can achieve an advantage over the aggressor for APT caliber
adversaries. Responses to APT intrusions require an evolution in analysis, process, and
technology. It is possible to anticipate and mitigate future intrusions based on knowledge
of the threat (Hutchens et al., 2011). Modern APT actors require CALO’s cyber defense
requirements to be met to avoid loss of credibility, money or in some cases, life (Atoum
et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015).
Government and many other CALO projects fail in part due to constant re-work as
security, technology, and general lack of understanding causes IT projects to go far
beyond their expected end date (Manifesto, 2013). Stakeholders lack an understanding of
complex systems including security requirements often causes extended contract times.
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Security is often re-worked or incorporated into a project later than required, sometimes
at the cost of the overall project (Charette, 2013; Manifesto, 2013).
A CALO example is the Defense Information Systems Organization (DISA). DISA has
more than 3800 sites facilitating more than 1700 circuits. DISA's user base includes 1.97
million DOD personnel with 1.3 million collaborative users which include international,
civilian organizations, and other federal agencies (Montemarano, 2014).
The motivation for this work considers factors of existing and potential growth of
"mega-organizations" such as DISA. For an effective cyber defense, the CCDF should
capture overlapping requirements and provide a comprehensive approach to achieve
strategic objectives. The CYBERCOM Director, charged with defending the DOD’s
networks claimed that in its current posture, the DOD has a global network that is undefendable (Clark, 2018). This problem is not exclusive to the DOD organizations but the
industry as well. In 2009 it was reported that losses due to cyber-crime reached 560
million according to the Department of Homeland Security (Goel, 2011; Kiper, 2013).

Barriers and Issues
One major obstacle was creating a comprehensive approach to the many internal and
external cyber security domain interdependencies. As previously mentioned in the
introduction, CALOs often manage smaller organizations that may have different
operational functions. Aligning stakeholder cyber defense to a CCDF model was
challenging. National governments and commercial sector leaders have struggled to
understand and adequately scope cyber requirements due to CALOs size (Clark, 2018;
Matania et al., 2016; Vijayan, 2017).
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Another barrier in this was the releasable information to the academic public.
Studying CALOs becomes problematic as some of the information in cyber defense may
be confidential. CALOs may be reluctant to release information due to privacy, security,
or embarrassment. This research was open source, and DISA is one CALO that has
cooperated with this work for academic research.
This work was based on defensive cybersecurity. A common pitfall in research
specific to cybersecurity is to properly scope the work (Donaldson et al., 2015a; Hiller &
Russell, 2013). Offensive friendly or malicious hacking, network operations in general
and other areas of security are beyond the scope of this work. This researcher must define
terms and the scope of this work to address the defensive cybersecurity framework
requirements problem adequately.
Finally, it was challenging to conduct the gap analysis between existing and required
cyber defense capabilities. Many cyber defense tools have multiple functions so getting
reliable subject matter experts (SME) who understand cyber defense methodologies and
security frameworks well enough to provide adequate criteria for a comprehensive
framework was challenging. Also, as this process created efficiencies, subject matter
expert panelist may have been compelled to defend traditional practices based on
personal experience and job security.
One major problem in design science is the evaluation process. Henver, March, Park
and Ram (2004) argued that rigorous evaluation methods are complicated to apply in
design science research. The use of a design artifact on a single research project may not
generalize to different environments. Petter and Vaishnavi (2008) contended challenges
in the evaluation process and proposed an assessment framework for patterns in any
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domain where the design artifact is created. For this reason, new approaches are regularly
utilized in combination with IS design science.

Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
It was assumed that CALO’s had members in their organization conducting cyber
defense. To ascertain the criteria for the CCDF, an expert panel was used. It was also
assumed that personnel selected to this panel would be experts in the cybersecurity field
and have a working knowledge of security frameworks. Experts from the federal and civil
workforce were gleaned to comprise the scope of this work (Ellis & Levy, 2010).
Participants of the study included federal and civil CALO stakeholders to measure
artifact effectiveness. It was assumed that stakeholders were sincere in their efforts to
complete assigned tasks honestly and were familiar with at least one security framework
in frequent use. Furthermore, it was assumed that based on the defined terms provided by
the researcher, participants understood the scope of this work to address the defensive
cybersecurity requirements problem. Finally, it was assumed that CALOs shared
pertinent information to support this work in achieving a more comprehensive approach
to defensive cybersecurity.
Limitations
Specific internal and external factors beyond the researcher’s control could have
possibly impacted the validity of this study. The requirements collected by the expert
panel to establish the CCDF criteria were based on the opinions of the members of the
panel. Expert members were drawn from industry and government, cybersecurity Chief
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Information Security Officers (CISO), Network Defenders with more than ten years of
experience, Chief Information Officers (CIO), Military Commanders, Federal Senior
Executive Service Members (SES), and Senior Military Officers. Expert panel opinions
may not have been universally representative of all CALO experts, therefore, may not
represent optimal requirements or criteria for the artifact. Volunteers for this study could
have withdrawn at any time negatively impacting test results. The product testing may
not truly reflect the effectiveness of the artifact in meeting the established criteria (Ellis &
Levy, 2010).
To minimize limitations for this work and ensure the reliability and validity of
employed methodologies, the Delphi process was utilized as an accepted consensusbuilding process. Approved instruments of the Nova Southeastern University Internal
Review Board (IRB) was used to evaluate the criteria (Ellis & Levy, 2010).
Delineations
Ellis and Levy (2010) contended that environmental factors inherently impacted
design and developmental research studies. Design research is volatile due to the rapid
changes in technology. As recently as December 2017, the NIST cybersecurity
framework was updated, providing more insight towards a comprehensive approach to
cybersecurity. The scope of this work was limited to defensive measures of
cybersecurity, towards understanding a comprehensive approach. Defensive measures
include those actions to defend CALOs from internal and external malicious or
unintentional cyber events. This work was not intended to address aggressive measures in
cybersecurity or network attacks. Furthermore, this work was not intended to address
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how CALOs employ the artifact independently. Future studies may involve work
between CALO’s.

Definition of Terms
Artifact: An artifact is a construct, model, method or instantiation built to address
unsolved problems in information systems research. Artifacts are built and evaluated
through the design-science research methodology (Hevner et al., 2004).
Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF): for this work, A CCDF is
defined as a security model that addresses a CALO’s stakeholders specific defensive
cybersecurity needs according to operational requirements.
Cyber or Cyberspace: Cyber entails all of the globally interconnected information
systems tied into the global information grid we know as the Internet. The cyber domain
encompasses the global information economy, the international exponential growth of
social networking, National Defense Systems (NDS), the entire civil telecommunications
infrastructure, all bands of wireless networks, electronic health systems, and critical
infrastructure systems such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
just to name a few (Dukes, 2015; Ericsson, 2010; House, 2009).
Cyber Defense: Cyber defense focuses on preventing, detecting and providing timely
responses to attacks or threats so that no infrastructure or information is altered. With the
growth in volume as well as the complexity of cyber-attacks, cyber defense is essential
for most entities in order to protect sensitive information as well as to safeguard assets
(Dukes, 2015; Tirenin & Faatz, 1999).
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Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity or digital security entails the security of digital information
which includes the entire digital wired and wireless infrastructure of a country, CALO, or
smaller organization. The infrastructure includes power grids, water and sewage,
government networks, financial systems, educational systems, and personal Internet endusers. The purpose of cybersecurity is to contribute to preserving the organizational,
human, economic, technological, and informational resources in which a nation is
equipped in order to achieve its objectives (House, 2009). Cybersecurity encompasses the
protection of information technology through the application of technical and social
competencies (Dukes, 2015; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016).
Design Science: Design science research methodology produces a new artifact that
provides a technology-based solution to a relevant problem with significant impact and
research contribution (Hevner et al., 2004). The design process is a sequence of activities
by experts which produces the innovative product or artifact. The evaluation of the
artifact then provides feedback information and a better understanding of the problem to
improve the quality of the artifact and design process (Henver et al., 2004)
Security Framework: A security framework is defined as a model of how to make logical
sense of relationships among several factors that have been identified as salient to the
problem (Sekaran & Bougie, 2003).
Information Security Framework: For this work, an Information Security Framework is a
series of documented processes that are used to define policies and procedures around the
implementation and ongoing management of information security controls in an
enterprise environment (Granneman, 2013).
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Requirements: The term requirements for this work references the tools and capabilities
to perform CALO defensive cybersecurity according to stakeholders’ organizational
needs (Luiijf, Besseling, & De Graaf, 2013).
Stakeholders: Stakeholders are defined as Chief Executive Officers, Chief Information
Systems Security Officers or CALO designated information owners for this work (Luiijf
et al., 2013).
Summary
This report addresses the lack of understanding CALOs cybersecurity defense to
capture comprehensive organizational security requirements. Current cybersecurity
frameworks are fragmented, vary in effectiveness, and a comprehensive approach is
needed (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006;
Donaldson et al., 2015a, 2015c; Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015).
Cybersecurity frameworks exist for specific sectors, resulting in a complex patchwork
of often ambiguous state and federal regulations overlaying applicable common doctrines
(S. J. Shackelford et al., 2015). The report is targeted at improving understanding
comprehensive cybersecurity defense for civil and government CALOs.
The goal of the current study was to conduct design research towards the development
of a CCDF artifact to understand a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity defense
better. Through design science and iterative evaluation of various frameworks, this
research developed a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs that
identified gaps in cybersecurity, risk management, and cyber security tools acquisitions.
The remaining chapters of this report will cover a systematic review of the literature
the methodology used to conduct the study, and the results of the study. Lastly, the

19

conclusion, implications, recommendations, and the summary will be presented. Chapter
two provides a review of the cyber domain, cyber defense challenges in CALOs, cyber
construct challenges, and federal and commercial security frameworks. The frameworks
are compared and analyzed to explain contributing factors to the problem. Practical
relevance is included to describe frameworks in existence to date and how they work
along with how this work will contribute to the body of knowledge. Chapter three
outlines the methodology in the study which includes the research questions, expert
panel, other participants and how the research will be conducted. The results of the study
are presented in chapter 4 and the conclusions, implications, recommendations, and
summary are provided in chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature

Introduction
Security frameworks developed by reputable commercial and government
organizations provide guidance to help implement cybersecurity. Many of these
frameworks have general applications but are not comprehensive enough to derive clear
requirements for organizational needs (Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 2015b;
Koong & Yunis, 2015; Lorhmann, 2014; Oltramari et al., 2014; Wiander, 2007). This
literature review explores security frameworks and their use in government and industry
to understand their benefits and limitations. A review of CALOs and the challenges of
understanding context to achieve optimal cybersecurity is also explored to ascertain what
exactly is comprehensive cybersecurity defense.
Cybersecurity is a dynamic field with many research challenges. A systemic literature
review was required for a clear understanding of known pitfalls in information systems
(IS) research. A systematic approach is utilized based primarily on the work of Levy and
Ellis (2006). The authors provide researchers clear guidance on how to conduct doctoral
level work, where to find adequate peer-reviewed journals, and how to synthesize and
analyze data for publication.
Researchers argue that organizations require a more comprehensive approach to
cybersecurity defense (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh,
2006; Donaldson et al., 2015a; Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015) but this problem is
unattainable without a clear context and criteria of what is considered comprehensive. A
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common problem in cyber or IT security related research is defining the taxonomy
(Kolini & Janczewski, 2015). Defined terms based on sound peer-reviewed literature is
critical in conducting research (Dr. Jay Nunamaker, HICSS Doctoral Consortium Mentor,
personal communications, January 2, 2018). For this work, a security framework is
defined as a model of how to make logical sense of relationships among several factors
that have been identified as salient to the problem (Sekaran & Bougie, 2003). The term
requirements for this work references the tools and capabilities to perform CALO
defensive cybersecurity according to stakeholders’ organizational needs. Stakeholders are
defined as Chief Executive Officers or designated information owners. Comprehensive
Cybersecurity Defense Framework for this work is defined as a security model that
addresses CALO’s stakeholder's specific defensive cybersecurity needs according to
operational requirements.
Federal or international organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) are seminal
in standardized framework development (Hammond, Curran, & Leithauser, 2013; S. J.
Shackelford et al., 2015; Shen, 2014). Additional frameworks are created by large
commercial IT organizations such as Microsoft, Oracle, Lockheed Martin, Cisco, and
others. Although beneficial, no one framework addresses comprehensive organizational
requirements based on strategic guidelines. Most frameworks explain best practices on
how to conduct cybersecurity but fail to capture an understanding of comprehensive
cyber defense (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 2015c;
Lorhmann, 2014; Wiander, 2007).
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When organizations have a comprehensive oversight, decisions become clearer and
interdependent stakeholders are aware of what is happening during an attack. For some
CALO’s, decision-making is a matter of life and death. Organizations must be able to
implement security solutions that involve vast numbers of stakeholders, including
internal and external government and commercial entities (Atoum et al., 2014; Center for
History and New Media, n.d.; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Fukushima & Sasaki, 2016;
Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015)
This literature review encompasses four major areas regarding the problem of
understanding what constitutes a comprehensive approach towards a CALO
cybersecurity defense framework. The first section outlines the cyber domain. An
understanding of what to defend is salient as understanding the deliberation of
comprehensive cybersecurity defense. The cyber domain includes all the information
instruments of national power. The second section outlines the unique challenges of
cyber defense in Companies, Agencies or Large Organizations (CALO). CALO’s
internal and external interdependencies, size and scope challenges and diversity are
salient to the need for a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity defense. The third
section is a review of the literature that describes the varying cyber domain constructs,
taxonomies and terminology that impedes not only CALOs but also smaller organizations
from achieving optimal cyber defense. Common language challenges between CALOs
combined with the need to share cyber defense responsibilities create gaps in cyber
defense. Finally, the fourth section reviews the literature of significant security
frameworks and their use in government and industry to understand their benefits,
limitations, and gaps. The four major topics constitutes a foundation for the proposed
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research addressing the problem and culminate multiple domains necessary to ensure
depth of the literature review.

The Cyber Domain
The cyber domain encompasses the global information economy, the international
exponential growth of social networking, National Defense Systems (NDS), the entire
civil telecommunications infrastructure, all bands of wireless networks, electronic health
systems, and critical infrastructure systems such as supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems just to name a few. In short, cyber entails all of the
interconnected information systems tied into the global information grid we know as the
Internet (Andrews, Lipson, & Fisher, 2011; Ericsson, 2010; House, 2009; Huang, Craig,
Lin, & Yan, 2016; Luo, 2016).
The purpose of cybersecurity is to contribute to preserving the organizational, human,
financial, technological, and informational resources in which a nation is equipped in
order to achieve its objectives (Dukes, 2015). The government, working with CALO’s
must take an active role in operating cybersecurity policy and infrastructure to facilitate
standardized requirements. It must balance an active role with a concerted campaign to
protect industry's ability to innovate in the creation of new platforms and applications
while ensuring cybersecurity. It must do this while preserving citizens' confidence that
cyber security policy will protect their civil liberties as well as the cyber infrastructure.
Government and civic leaders must form internal and international partnerships with
other nations, and technical standards bodies to efficiently secure cyberspace (Andrews et
al., 2011; DSS, 2016; Luo, 2016). Information in the cyber domain is one of the most
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critical assets of a society, and the protection and defense of information is a crucial
consideration in national security strategy. Whatever the name is given, information
technologies security (ICT security), cybersecurity or digital security entails the security
of digital information in an interconnected world. Initiatives to secure the cyber domain
could mean the difference in the safety and sovereignty of a state, the security of critical
infrastructures, public safety, economic security, and even protection of human life
(Haggard & Lindsay, 2015; House, 2009; Sadhukhan, Mallari, & Yadav, 2015). To
proactively achieve this goal, security in a country or organization must reduce
vulnerability and threats, limit damages or dysfunctions that might be induced by a
security breach, and be robust enough for a nation to go back to normal state after a
cyber-attack (Koong & Yunis, 2015). To optimize national security objectives, cyber
security must have comprehensive cyber requirements, policy, infrastructure, education,
and be able to meet the international challenges of the global information grid.
Cyber includes the entire digital wired and wireless infrastructure of the US such as;
power grids, water and sewage, government networks, financial systems, educational
systems, and personal Internet end-users. Government and organizations are
overwhelmed in creating an all-encompassing cyber policy baseline (White House,
2009). The compartmentalized nature of US policy between federal, state, and local
organizations creates an atmosphere of cyber vulnerability, facilitating latent decisionmaking and isolated cyber defense postures (Ericsson, 2010; S. Shackelford & Bohm,
2015). There are salient concerns about the ineffectiveness of current US approaches to
protect cyberspace. In a December 2008 report, it was argued that America’s failure to
protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the Obama
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administration (Fielder, Li, & Hankin, 2016). This problem is compounded by various
organizational requirements to protect interdependent information sharing between
CALO’s.
Monetary and intellectual property loss from having no comprehensive approach to
protecting cyberspace results in devastating losses versus the costs of implementing and
enforcing standards and policy (House, 2009). Initial systems and equipment on the
Internet were designed for efficiency and not security, and many legacy systems are now
connected to the modern information grid. The results of not modernizing current
equipment for security can be catastrophic. For example, the Electrical Grid Delayed
Hacker Insertion in 2010 was suspected during the 2011 Honolulu major power outage
costing millions. Security experts noted that Oahu’s power grid system did not have
adequate fail-safe information protection to avert hacker ownership of the power grid,
which made it not only difficult to identify the culprit, but made them helpless during the
event, and post investigation (Haggard & Lindsay, 2015). Upgraded systems with an
integrated security baseline policy could keep critical assets secure and maintain
efficiencies between cyber partners.
The President of the United States (POTUS) along with Congress both agree that
cyber warfare is at the forefront of the US as an instrument of national power.
CYBERCOM has been named a combatant command as of August 18, 2017. This
elevation takes CYBERCOM from under the purview of US Strategic Command, making
it a fully unified combatant command (Clark, 2018). In the finalized National Defense
Authorization Act that passed House and Senate conference committees, the legislation
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish a unified combatant command for cyber
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operations forces. What this designation means in practical terms is greater scope in
global campaign planning, funding, authorities, personnel, and policy (C4ISR, 2016;
Clark, 2018).
To fully benefit from consolidated cyberspace, all parties must understand that making
progress on cyber security requires that we address a myriad of both technical and
nontechnical factors that work to prevent governments, corporations, and even
individuals from securing their systems (Henver et al., 2004). Oltramari et al. (2014)
argued the cyber domain creates unique challenges to organizations due to its
combination of human and machine elements whose complex interactions occur in a
global communications network. Oltramari et al. (2014) conducted developmental
research and proposed an ontology to improve the situational awareness of cyber
defenders and facilitate operational decision-making. Oltramari et al. (2014) theorized
with regard to human and human computer interaction the most important step in
understanding a complex new domain such as cyber is terminological definitions,
classification entities, and phenomena. The authors further argued that terms are often
misused and mischaracterized. Oltramari et al. (2014) conducted an ontological analysis
of several well-known ontologies through peer-reviewed research and produced a
descriptive ontology for linguistic and cognitive engineering model to be further tested.
The variation of security practices by separate organizations with common mission
objectives creates unknown vulnerabilities and security risks. Although cybersecurity
regulatory and acquisitions between CALO’s may not be feasible, independent CALO
cybersecurity requirements based on organizational stakeholders’ needs may be achieved
for a more comprehensive approach to cybersecurity. A comprehensive, requirement-
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driven framework is needed to understand CALO’s common security objectives and to
identify security gaps (Charette, 2013; Donaldson et al., 2015c; Manifesto, 2013). This
section explained the complexity of the cyber domain and puts into perspective the scope
of the problem of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense in CALOs.

Cyber defense in Large Organizations
CALOs incur considerable challenges, as they are comprised of thousands or tens of
thousands of personnel. Additionally, the scope of CALOs requires trusts and
interdependency with similar and smaller organizations, introducing significant security
risks (Kiper, 2008). Challenges in cybersecurity are not simply technical but social as
well. Safa et al. (2016) conducted a novel approach to understand employee compliance
with information security policies though Social Bond Theory (SBT). SBT describes how
individuals, who have stronger ties to organizations, engage in less deviant behavior. This
is salient to CALOs as the larger the organization the more challenging to scope
organizational involvement, commitment and personal norms (Safa et al., 2016). Safa et
al. (2016) argues involvement theory requires the effective sharing of information
security knowledge to increase information security awareness. Safa et al. (2016)
developmental research resulted in an information security compliance with
organizational policies model. The data collected was by means of Liker scale and
questionnaires from four different CALOs who had established information security
policies. A total of 416 questionnaires were emailed to participants yielding 302
responses. Safa et al. (2016) used a diverse demographic distribution methodology to
capture adequate social norms found in CALOs. The results of Safa et al. (2016) revealed
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that information security knowledge sharing has strong effects on one’s attitude towards
compliance with information security policies. The Safa et al. (2016) findings further
showed significant positive relationships between information security collaboration in
CALOs with a positive attitude towards compliance with security policies. Safa et al.
(2016) research implies a behavioral aspect of cybersecurity should be considered in
constructing a model of understanding what comprehensive cyber defense means.
Asti (2017) argued that small and medium-sized organizations face different
challenges than CALOs. He explained that merely due to the size and scope of CALOs
cyber defense is more critical to stakeholders. Kiper (2013) contended CALOs conduct
hundreds of more business processes in comparison to smaller organizations. This is also
salient to cyber defense criticality. CALOs often manage smaller organizations that may
have different operational functions. Challenges often arise when CALO statues,
regulatory guidelines, and operation procedures do not capture comprehensive cyber
defense requirements for subordinate organizations (Kiper, 2013). Also, CALOs consist
of a diverse workforce that may include a multitude of job families, various levels of
experience and globally located offices, factors that make cyber defense more
challenging compared to a smaller organization (Kiper, 2008, 2013).
Asti (2017) conducted a survey to identify cybersecurity challenges in small and
medium sized businesses (SMBs). To determine the scope of SMBs Asti (2017)
conducted a survey of 31 participating enterprises. Respondents to the survey who
belonged to a business of more than 500 employees were removed from the sample size,
which left 22 respondents. Asti (2017) then administered an online survey with the final
sample size of 22 SMBs. The survey showed that the top challenges were finances to pay
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talent, regulatory compliance and professionally available talent. As a result, inadequate
information technology (IT) and cybersecurity staffing, 64% of respondents were
unaware if a successful cyber-attack had taken place. The significant challenge SMBs
face is their security posture and knowing if they have been targeted against a cyberattack. Asti (2017 p.4) data corroborated with the Ponemon Institute Research Report
which asked “What challenges keep your IS security posture from being fully effective?”
and 67% of respondents reported insufficient personnel. The data from the survey further
identified 55% of respondents have only one IT employee dedicated to cybersecurity.
About 40% of SMBs report security events verbally, 30% report events through
scheduled meetings, and 30% do not report events at all. Asti (2017) research on SMBs
provided salient background and survey information to adequately scope CALOs and
address expert panel inquiries.
Contrary to Asti (2017), Kemper (2017) research contended IT decision-makers invest
heavily in cybersecurity to combat current and future threats in large organizations.
Kemper (2017) examined the state of cybersecurity among CALOs and how they address
internal and external security risks. Kemper (2017) interviewed 304 IT decision-makers
at companies with more than 500 employees, 77% of the respondents worked in
companies with over 1,000 employees, and 70% of the respondents held positions above
the manger level. The survey found required security software and how data was backed
up to be the most important elements of cybersecurity policies. The survey also
concluded that large organizations experience phishing attacks 57% more than any other
forms of cyber-attacks, Trojans and Malware followed with 47%, password attacks were
37%, denial of service attacks were 29%, and finally unpatched software exploits were
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25%. Additionally, the survey found 52% of IT decision-makers view security policy
enforcement as “moderate” opposed to “strict” (47%). Kemper (2017) further concluded
94% of most large organizations have security policies in place but 36% implemented
policies as recent as three to five years, 27% from six to nine years, and 24% had
cybersecurity policies in place more than ten years. As more CALOs invest in
cybersecurity and communicate policy to employees and customers, simplifying cyber
defense through common constructs may close the gap between CALOs and partnering
medium and smaller organizations.

Cyber Doman Construct Challenges
There are many challenges with understanding common language in the cyber
domain. Varying cyber domain constructs, taxonomies and terminologies impede optimal
cyber defense. The Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Working Group
utilized authoritative sources to resolve US national differences between constructs used
by the DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), and Civil Agencies (e.g. NIST), enabling all
three to use the same glossary. The CNSS glossary allows consistent terminology in
documentation, policy, and processes across the aforementioned communities. The
glossary began in 2010 with 29 references and has grown to 150 in the current 2017
version (Dukes, 2015). To study criteria for a comprehensive cyber defense approach,
understanding national and international CALO cyber construct challenges is salient to
CCDF developmental research.
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Manjikian (2017) argued there was a lack of clarity regarding cyberwarfare
terminology. The exploratory research presented six reasons for the development of
competing terms and concepts. Manjikian (2017) contended obstacles to the development
of a universal lexicon for cyberwarfare included cyber terminology confusion between
legal, academia, defense, intelligence, and social sciences. The study found terms such as
cyber deterrence, cyber threat, and cyber deception all had different meanings. The
variations of cyber constructs may create jurisdictional challenges. Additionally, the
study found varying definitions of the same terms between agencies within the US
government. The Department of Homeland Security, US CERT and, National Cyber
Security Strategy defined the term “cyber threat” differently. Manjikian (2017) further
argued varying international constructs further complicate cyberwarfare. Russia’s and
China’s view of cyber threat and cybersecurity included a much broader psychological
definition of the terms that included information warfare compared to the US approach.
Giles and Hagestad (2013) argued the failure to reach agreement on fundamental
principles affecting cyberspace was indicative of the fact that despite increased
willingness during 2012 by the USA, UK, and other nations to engage with Russia and
China on cybersecurity issues, engagement remains difficult in the absence of commonly
agreed upon concepts of what constitutes cybersecurity. Giles and Hagestad (2013)
substantiated Manjikian (2017) argument of Russia’s and China’s more psychological
approach to cybersecurity compared to western democracies. Giles and Hagestad (2013)
contended definitions of such terms as cyber conflict, cyber war, cyber-attack, and cyber
weapon used by the US, UK, Russia, and China do not coincide, even where official or
generally recognized definitions exist in each respective language.
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Giles and Hagestad (2013) conducted a case study to illustrate fundamental
incompatibility between terms and concepts between the US, UK, Russia, and China.
The study found that translated common terms such as information space, information
warfare, information weapon, information security, cyber warfare, cyberspace,
cybersecurity, and network warfare varied widely. While western definitions were based
primarily on national interest, Chinese and Russian terms included “the world’s
population”, a global definition. The Chinese view “information space” as a domain, or
landscape for communicating with the world’s population. The Russian definition of
“information space” corresponds with China and includes human information processing
or cognitive space. Giles and Hagestad (2013) concluded Russia and China pose
considerable cyber threats to western countries and allies. Understanding Russian and
Chinese cyber terminology is salient to understanding what exactly comprehensive cyber
defense is and building adequate cyber defense frameworks to protect CALOs.
Jarvis and Macdonald (2014) conducted exploratory research on how terrorism
researchers use and view cyber lexicon. Jarvis and Macdonald (2014) conducted a survey
on the concept of cyberterrorism from researchers working in 24 countries across six
continents. The research focused on how cyberterrorism related to adjacent concepts such
as hacktivism, cybercrime, and cyberwar. Additionally, how familiar, frequently used,
and useful were the aforementioned concepts among the global research community. The
survey was distributed to over 600 terrorism researchers based on a sample of individuals
who published within the four most prominent cyberterrorism journals between January
2009 and January 2013.
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The survey listed 12 cyber-related terms. Respondents were asked if they were
familiar with certain cyber terms, were certain terms useful, would they avoid certain
terms and if certain terms overlapped. The findings showed that cyberwarfare,
information warfare and cybercrime were the most familiar terms. By contrast, 30% of
respondents were unfamiliar with the terms, cyber militarism, and cyber dissidence.
Cyber militarism and cracktivism was a rarely used term and least likely of all 12 to be
employed by those familiar with the term. Cracktivism is a combination of crack and
activism. “Cracking” is in relation to breaking into a computer by manipulating the
security code and activism would be for means of political gain. Twenty-two percent of
respondents familiar with the term cracktivism reported using it and 5% reported using
cyber militarism. This work is salient because it addressed specifically cyberterrorism
demographics and favored constructs relational to cyberterrorism. Understanding cyber
lexicons may be based on SME’s discipline and scope of knowledge. Understanding of a
comprehensive approach will require a broad demographic across civil and federal
organizations.

Security Frameworks
Brief History of Security Frameworks
Backhouse, Hsu and Silva (2006) adopted the circuits of power theoretical framework
taken from social sciences developed by Clegg (1989) and applied it to understanding the
creation and development of the first standard and framework in information security
management. Backhouse et al. (2006) theorized the alliances developed between industry
and government resulted in a de jure international standard. An informal group of UK

34

security chiefs sparked the process which led to BS7799, the British standard that later
became the international standard 17799. Backhouse et al. (2006) contended the
influence of power and politics in setting and shaping the evolution of de jure standards.
The authors further argued decisions on design and implementation of security standards
were reached based on political influence and power mechanisms instead of a more
objective, economical means. De jure standards are recognized by authoritative national
or international bodies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
or the International Standards Organization (ISO). Standards approved by the said
authorities, while non-regulatory, hold important objective and economic powers within
their realm, although social relationships and the factors which lead to decisions to
implement these standards are ignored (Backhouse et al., 2006).
Backhouse et al. (2006) conducted a case study on the Department of Trade and
Industry in the United Kingdom based on the BS7799 standard. Backhouse et al. (2006)
findings concluded that the creation of standards requires alliances between government
and industry to be fully adopted. The research also found that authors of standards must
be recognized by their organizational field as legitimate and should be able to relate to
those organizational members in power positions. Finally, institutionalization of the
standard was strengthened if compliance was required in additional pieces of legislation.
Expensive certifications were regarded without value simply for social integration but
reinforced during bilateral relations in which one group has to comply with a second
group in order to conduct business. Backhouse et al. (2006) study is salient to
understanding the dynamics which influence how CALOs approach consensus at various
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levels and the internal and external influencing factors that drives decisions and
consensus building.
ISO/IEC 17799/2700
Saint-Germain (2005) argued that ISO/IEC 17799 provided a framework for ensuring
business continuity, maintaining legal compliance and achieving a competitive edge. The
author argued ISO/IEC 17799 as the most comprehensive framework of the time
compared to frameworks with no path to industry and federal certification. Certifications
enable organizations to comply with increasing demands from financial institutions and
insurance companies for security audits. Organizations often struggle with security issues
as part of their efforts to comply with a variety of regulatory requirements, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA).
Figure 1 depicts the ten domains of the BS17799 framework along with the
organizational and operational alignment (Weldon, 2015). Competitive frameworks such
as, Control Objectives for Information and (Related) Technology (COBIT), Guidelines
for the Management of IT Security (GMITS) (ISO 13335), Information Technology
Infrastructure Library (ITIL), Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE) and System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model
(SSE-CMM) offered no certification. The Common criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(ISO 15408) did offer an in-industry certification. ISO 15408 focuses on the technical
aspects of information systems (IS), and ISO/IEC 17799 focuses on the organizational
and administrative aspects of security. ISO 15408 and 17799 are complementary (Koong
& Yunis, 2015; Saint-Germain, 2005).
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Wiander (2007) argued that although the ISO/IEC 17799 standard was commonly
viewed as a necessary element in IS management, there was no empirical evidence of its
usefulness in practice. The author studied analysis and implementation experiences of
four organizations that implemented the framework. Wiander (2007) conducted semistructured interviews resulting in some positive and negative findings. Competitive
advantage was one of the positive findings along with an increased understanding of
information security in all personnel groups and a broader scope from the technical to
Figure 1. Ten Domains of ISO/IEC 17799 (Weldon, 2015).

corporate aspects of security. Negatively, the costs and increased amount of work to
implement the framework were mentioned. Also, difficulties deploying the standard and
readability were criticized. It was also argued by participants of the study that the
standard did not directly affect the quality of the end product of service (Wiander, 2007).
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ISO/IEC 17799 continued to develop to include risk management and incident
management additions in 2005 (Agrawal, 2017; Nowak, 2015). The standard was
renamed ISO/IEC 27002 and subsequently revised seven times with the current version
ISO 27016 (Nowak, 2015). The revisions included British standards 7799-1, guidance for
the implementation of IS management, metrics, accreditation for organizations,
internal/external audits, security controls, international standard and general guidelines
(Nowak, 2015).
The ISO 2700 series primary application is based on certification which brings salient
benefits beyond simple compliance. In 2006 there were 6,000 certifications globally, and
the number was predicted to increase to 20,000 in 2017 (Nowak, 2015). Nowak (2015)
concluded empirical research conducted by the Rotterdam School of Management,
Erasmus University, analyzed 12 companies in China and Europe surveyed 645 responses
from businesses worldwide that ISO 2700 had a significant positive effect on increasing
information security in an organization. Eighty-seven percent of respondents concluded
that ISO 27001 had a “positive” or “very positive” outcome on their information security
and 78% reported an increased ability to meet compliance requirements (Nowak, 2015).
Although certification brings rigor and formality to the implementation process to
improve security, smaller organizations fail to invest in the costly certification process
(Agrawal, 2017). Agrawal (2017) and Asti (2017) concluded that smaller organizations
tend not to invest heavily in cybersecurity where Nowak (2015) and Kemper (2017)
contend that CALOs invest heavily.
Although there are relevant benefits to certifications and compliance standards, none
of the ISO 2700 updates addresses organizational size, scope, and applicability for
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operational stakeholders needs for cyber defense. General best practices and compliance
standards constitute conservative approaches that will continually change as cyber
defense continues to evolve to more advanced attacks (Acuña, 2016; Donaldson et al.,
2015b). More importantly, it remains difficult to apply certification or control
cybersecurity frameworks in CALOs without the proper context of terms to address a
comprehensive approach to cyber defense. A clearer understanding of comprehensive
cyber defense based empirical research may bring behavioral and social variables to
improve CALO security postures not seen in traditional frameworks.
Defense in Depth and Defense in Breath
One of the fundamental philosophies of security is the defense in depth model;
overlapping systems designed to provide security even if one of them fails (Chandra,
Challa, & Pasupuletti, 2017; Fielder et al., 2016; Luo, 2016). An example is a firewall
coupled with an intrusion-detection system (IDS). Defense in depth provides security
because there's no single point of failure and no single assumed vector for attacks. Also
known as the Castle Approach, security controls are placed throughout an information
technology (IT) system. The idea behind the defense in depth approach is to defend a
system against any particular attack using several physical and virtual independent
methods. This tactic was conceived by the National Security Agency (NSA) as a
comprehensive approach to information and electronic security (Schneier, 2015). Defense
in depth does not address the operational level found in the ISO framework as well as
social and behavioral aspects of cybersecurity.
Defense in depth was derived originally from a military strategy that sought to delay
rather than prevent the advance of an attacker by yielding space to buy time. The
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placement of protection mechanisms, procedures and policies are intended to increase the
dependability of an IT system where multiple layers of defense prevent espionage and
direct attacks against critical systems (Kewley & Lowry, 2001; Kuipers & Fabro, 2006;
Lippmann et al., 2006). In terms of computer network defense, defense in depth measures
should not only prevent security breaches but buy an organization time to detect and
respond to an attack to reduce and mitigate the consequences of a breach (Cleghorn,
2013; Corrin, 2015).
Corrin (2015) theorized the federal government’s job of securing, and defending
networks have gotten more complex, so officials are looking for increasingly high-tech
tools to carry out the mission. The integration of cloud, mobility and a vast number of
sensors producing volumes of data all make for an intricate and complicated operational
picture of government and civic organizations’ cyber defense. That means taking a
defense in depth strategy to network security, layering methods from the network
perimeter to the access points where the network touches the public Internet or the
commercial cloud to the devices used to connect. Traditional cyber security is directed
towards device protection and perimeter defenses relying on threat signatures, but that is
no longer sufficient against adversaries that can evade signature-based detection
(Hutchens et al, 2011). For example, the DOD connects to industry and the world through
Internet access points (IAP). Thus a more comprehensive approach is needed to protect
the DOD (Acuña, 2016). Other CALO’s connect to the internet through demilitarization
nodes, proxies or other avenues which filter external information between the Internet
and internal CALO traffic (Panda, Abraham, & Patra, 2012).
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There are several variations of the defense in depth framework, but the concept is the
same, to win the cyber battle by attrition. The attacker may overcome some barriers but is
unable to sustain the attack for an extended period of time. The Oracle Corporation
established a popular seven-layer version which includes the Data, Application, Host,
Internal Network, Perimeter, Physical and Policies, Procedures, and Awareness displayed
in figure 2 (Chappelle, 2011).
Figure 2. Defense in Depth Layers (Schreier, 2011).

The data layer entails database, content, information rights and message security.
Application layer contains federation or trust management, Authentication, Authorization
Auditing (AAA) and coding practices. The host layer defines the operating systems,
desktop protection, and patching. The internal network and perimeter layer share
transport layer security firewalls, network address translation, denial of service,
messaging parsing and validation. Aggregate protection and enterprise network defense is
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primarily conducted at this layer. The physical layer is not traditionally an IS function as
fences, walls, guards, locks, and facility access control fall under facility management
and physical security. Finally, policies, procedures, and security awareness encompass
data classification, password management, software review, and policies (Chappelle,
2011; Corrin, 2015). One disadvantage of layering many heterogeneous networks is the
large administrative overhead resulting in administrators becoming overwhelmed; this
could potentially allow security responsibilities to slip, opening the door to security
threats. Also, defense in depth must be appropriately deployed to be useful. Improperly
deployed defense in depth architecture weakens the human components and makes the
system difficult to maintain (Cleghorn, 2013; Corrin, 2015). Defense in depth provides
CALO’s a guide on where to conduct cybersecurity but fails to deliver the expected
attack approaches by the attacker. A more useful framework should provide common
attack behaviors for a more predictive cybersecurity defense model.
The defense in breath methodology attempts to overcome defense in depth
shortcomings. The founding principle of defense in breath is layering various security
technologies in common attack vectors to ensure attacks missed by one technology are
caught by another. In practice, defense in breadth is comparable to installing several
variations of virus protection software on a single computer (Cleghorn, 2013). Cleghorn
(2013) empirical research contended that defense in breath creates more problems than it
solves by adding different applications in single layers and adds to the administrative
overhead problem already found in defense in depth. Ultimately, applying defense in
depth correctly in heterogeneous networks provides considerable defense against
modern-day zero attacks and Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) (Cleghorn, 2013;
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Corrin, 2015; Lippmann et al., 2006). Cleghorn (2013) concluded through comparative
analysis that defense in depth is more utilized due to its time and tested competencies in
CALO networks. The study further concludes depth is to be more scalable, adaptable and
heterogeneous. Defense in breath’s main attribute was redundancy and layered approach
which in CALO networks makes it costly.
Fielder et al. (2016) proposed a simulation of defense in depth comprising attackers
and defenders with minimal resources. The objective of the simulation was identifying
appropriate deployment of specific defensive strategies such as defense in depth and
critical component defense. Fielder et al. (2016) argued that through the development of
optimal defense strategies, it is possible to identify when specific defensive strategies are
most appropriate; where optimal defensive strategy depends on the kind of attacker the
system is expecting and the structure of the network.
Fielder et al.’s (2016) simulation involved an Industrial Control System (ICS), a
standard architecture that utilizes the defense in depth model. An ICS plays a crucial role
in supervising industrial processes and production. Disruption of an ICS could lead to
disastrous damage to water, electrical, environmental and human health systems. The ICS
was traditionally a self-contained system, which has evolved to become increasingly
interconnected with IT systems and other complex networks. Felder et al. (2016) argued
that APT account for 55% of attacks against ICSs, thus the need to have an optimal
defensive strategy. The most well-known example of an ICS APT attack is Stuxnet in
2010. The Stuxnet attack was introduced by a removable flash drive that eventually
infected 100,000 hosts across 155 countries (Fielder et al., 2016).
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Fielder et al. (2016) utilized a case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of the ICS
security management. The case study involved attacks on one target, multiple targets,
greedy attack versus defense in depth and systematic attack versus component defense.
Fielder et al.’s (2016) work shows through the use of Particle Swarm Optimization that
more effective deployment and use of cyber defense tools could be achieved. Fielder et
al. (2016) argued that system-wide defense in depth is viable in protecting the system
from greedy attackers, where lower-level common attacks are generally used. However,
defense in depth is less capable of defending against more sophisticated attacks.
Defense in depth can be more effective when utilized with other frameworks to
capture stakeholder operational critical assets and security controls. Chandra et al. (2017)
contended the combination of multiple security mechanisms, technologies, security
procedures, and policies should be used with defense in depth for adequate cyber defense.
NIST Cybersecurity Framework
The National Institute of Standards and Technology presented a US governmentordered, cybersecurity framework. This framework provides a structure for the nation's
financial, energy, healthcare and other critical systems to better protect their information
and physical assets from cyber-attack. NIST provides a common language for industry
and government to address and manage cyber risk based on business needs, without
placing additional regulatory requirements (Lorhmann, 2014; Scofield, 2016). Scofield
(2016) contended that NIST adaptability makes it applicable to a broad range of
operating environments and potentially the de facto industry standard to manage
cybersecurity risks. In 2013 President Obama issued order 13636 that directed NIST to
work with government and private industry representatives to create guidelines to help
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critical infrastructure organizations keep their online platforms safe. The NIST
Cybersecurity Framework was developed in 2014 to answer order 13636 (Keller, 2013;
Lorhmann, 2014; Scofield, 2016).
To develop the framework and gain a clear understanding of the current cybersecurity
landscape, NIST consulted hundreds of security professionals in the government and
industry. Several workshops were attended including more than 3000 individuals, and
organizations contributed to the framework (Scofield, 2016; S. J. Shackelford et al.,
2015; Shen, 2014). The NIST framework references several specified compliance and
certification frameworks to include, NIST 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for
Information Systems and Organizations, COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and
Related Technologies, ISO/IEC 2700 versions, and CIS CSC (Computer Information
System, Critical Security Controls) (Vijayan, 2017).
NIST provides serval ways to use the framework. The NIST framework includes a
basic review of cybersecurity practices, improvement of existing security,
communicating cybersecurity requirements and revising cybersecurity practices (Shen,
2014).
The framework begins by utilizing the five core NIST Cybersecurity Framework
functions; Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover. Identify: This function
develops the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems,
assets, data, and capabilities. This step is not solely cyber defense-driven but necessary to
understanding the scope of the network in question. Critical assets are identified and
prioritized according to strategic objectives. Identifying what you are going to protect
must be known to protect it. This function includes asset management, strategy, business
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environment, governance, risk assessment and risk management. Protect: This function
develops and implements the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical
infrastructure services. The protect function supports the ability to limit or contain the
impact of a potential cybersecurity event. Examples include access control, awareness
and training, data security, information protection processes and procedures, maintenance
and protective technology. Detect: This function develops and implements the
appropriate activities to timely identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event. Examples
of this function include anomalies and events, security continuous monitoring and
detection processes. Respond: This function develops and implements the appropriate
activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event. Examples include
response planning, communications, analysis, mitigation, and improvements. Recover:
This function develops and implements the appropriate activities to maintain plans for
resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a
cybersecurity event. Examples include recovery planning, improvements, and
communications (Scofield, 2016; Shen, 2014).
Along with a rigorous risk management approach to tiers in Cybersecurity, NIST
offers a continuous improvement process. Cybersecurity is evolving, and it is not a onetime destination. The NIST mapping describes the roles of various decisions required
from the organization at different levels. This Framework offers an excellent guide to
begin to understand cybersecurity complexity and ongoing challenges (Lorhmann, 2014;
Scofield, 2016). In December 2015, NIST issued a request for information (RFI) asking
for public feedback on a possible update to the framework and what topics it might need
to include. NIST also asked questions on the future governance of the framework,
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including what is the right balance between industry and government ownership of the
framework going forward to ensure maximum positive effect (Scofield, 2016).
NIST provides a general and regulator guide for CALO’s to manage risks although
admits to requiring tailoring to meet organizational needs (Vijayan, 2017). Further
research is needed to operationalize NIST guidance to apply risk management to
cybersecurity requirements practice.
Shackelford and Bohm (2015) explored the NIST framework in comparison with
ongoing Canadian efforts to secure vulnerable critical infrastructure against cyber threats.
Shackelford and Bohn’s (2015) comparative research analyzed regulatory approaches
between United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Australia. Shackelford and Bohn (2015) noted the Canadian government reported a
cyber-attack in 2011 that forced the Finance Department and Treasury Board, Canada’s
leading financial agencies to disconnect from the Internet. In total, more than 40 million
global cyber-attacks were reported in 2014, representing a nearly 50% increase over the
previous year. Shackelford and Bohm (2015) contended an increasing interdependency of
cybersecurity policy between neighboring nation states, specifically Canada and the
United States. In response to the increased number of cyber-attacks, the U.S. and
Canadian government have created a number of national and bilateral initiatives to
enhance North American cybersecurity. In 2012 the Cybersecurity Action Plan between
Public Safety Canada and the Department of Homeland Security reflected electrical
exports from Canada to the U.S. totaled nearly 60 million megawatt-hours or roughly 2%
of total U.S. consumption. Shackelford and Bohm (2015) further argued 75% of surveyed
IT executives in 27 countries stated that they detected one or more attacks and 41%
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characterized such attacks as “somewhat highly effective”. Understanding the
interdependencies and the criteria for a comprehensive approach to cyber defense and
partnerships between organizations of different countries would be beneficial (Donaldson
et al., 2015a; Shackelford & Bohm, 2015).
Shackelford and Bohm (2015) argued that attacks are not exclusive to critical
government infrastructures but private sectors. A 2012 Verizon data breach investigation
report found that 174 million records were compromised in 2011, the second highest
since the company began tracking breaches in 2004.
The NIST Framework does not create any binding obligations for the private sector
and has no means of enforcing those who adopt it. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework
widespread adoption has begun to impact civil CALOs. In 2015, the Whitehouse
announced that Itel, Apple, Walgreens, and Bank of America had incorporated the NIST
Framework into their cybersecurity efforts (Shackelford & Bohm, 2015).
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain is a model for incident response teams, digital
forensic investigators and malware analysts to work in a chained manner. This
framework is heavily used by the federal government and industry (Burger et al., 2014;
Hutchins et al., 2011; Yadav & Rao, 2015). The Cyber Kill Chain is designed to provide
network defenders a means of modeling and analyzing the offensive actions of a cyberattacker. Understanding the Cyber Kill Chain is essential for cybersecurity analysts and
is the framework utilized by most of the federal government (Hutchins et al., 2011;
Yadav & Rao, 2015). Cyber Kill Chain knowledge can help one think along the same
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lines of that of an attacker. Each phase of kill chain in itself is a vast research area to
tackle and analyze (Burger et al., 2014; Yadav & Rao, 2015).
The Cyber Kill Chain provides a framework to break down the complicated attack into
mutually non-exclusive stages or layers. Such a layered approach enables the analysts to
tackle smaller and more manageable problems at the same time, and it also helps the
defenders to subvert each phase by developing defenses and mitigation for each of the
phases (Yadav & Rao, 2015).
The Cyber Kill Chain breaks down a cyber-attack into the following seven stages;
Reconnaissance, Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and
Control, and Actions on Objective (Yadav & Rao, 2015). Reconnaissance: Research,
identification, and selection of targets, often represented as crawling Internet websites
such as conference proceedings and mailing lists for email addresses, social relationships,
or information on specific technologies. Weaponization: The tailoring of malware, such
as a virus or worm, to one or more vulnerabilities identified by reconnaissance. Targeting
of public hosted web applications or the social engineering of users via emails with
malicious links or files, coupled with an exploit using an automated tool (weaponizer)
may also be included. Increasingly, client application data files such as Adobe Portable
Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office documents serve as the weaponized
deliverable. Delivery: Transmission of the weapon to the targeted environment. The three
most prevalent delivery vectors for weaponized payloads by APT actors, as observed by
the Lockheed Martin Computer Incident Response Team (LM-CIRT) for the years 20042010, are email attachments, websites, and USB removable media (Yadav & Rao, 2015).
Exploitation: After the weapon is delivered to victim host, exploitation triggers intruders'
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code. Most often, exploitation targets an application or operating system vulnerability,
but it could also more directly exploit the users themselves or leverage an operating
system feature that auto-executes code. Installation: Installation of a remote access Trojan
or backdoor on the victim system allows the adversary to maintain persistence inside the
environment. Command and Control (C2): Typically, compromised hosts must beacon
outbound packets to an Internet controller server to establish a C2 channel. APT malware
primarily requires manual interaction rather than conduct activity automatically. Once the
C2 channel establishes access inside the target environment, the attacker has obtained
control of the targeted keyboard. Actions on Objectives: Only now, after progressing
through the first six phases, can intruders take measures to achieve their original
objectives. Typically, this objective is data exfiltration which involves collecting,
encrypting and extracting information from the victim environment; violations of data
integrity or availability are potential objectives as well. Alternatively, the intruders may
only desire access to the original victim box for use as a hop point to compromise
additional systems and move laterally inside the network (Yadav & Rao, 2015).
The Cyber Kill Chain facilitates the fusion of intelligence-based cybersecurity.
Currently, reactionary based network defenses coupled with organizational complexities
cause preventable attacks to propagate. Customary signature-based defense is no longer
adequate against APT. APT actors continually demonstrate the capability to compromise
systems by using advanced tools, customized malware and zero-day exploits that antivirus, defense signatures, and patching cannot detect or mitigate (Hutchins et al., 2011).
APT represents well-resourced and trained adversaries that conduct multi-year intrusion
campaigns targeting highly sensitive economic, proprietary, or national security
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information (Hutchens et al., 2011). Conventional incident response methods fail to
mitigate risks posed by APT actors because they make the assumption that responses
should happen after the point of a compromise and the compromise was the result of a
fixable flaw in the system. Through Intelligence driven response, network defenders can
achieve an advantage over the aggressor for APT caliber adversaries. Responses to APT
intrusions require an evolution in analysis, process, and technology. It is possible to
anticipate and mitigate future intrusions based on knowledge of the threat (Hutchens et
al., 2011).
Hutchens et al. (2011) conducted a case study illustrating the benefits of the Cyber
Kill Chain. Through analysis of the Kill Chain and robust indicator maturity, network
defenders successfully detected and mitigated an intrusion leveraging a zero day
vulnerability. All three intrusions leveraged a common APT Targeted Malicious Email
(TME) delivered to a limited set of individuals. The Email contained a backdoor, which
potentially initiated outbound communications to a C2 server. Hutchens et al . (2011)
case study identified specific command lines in computer lab experiments depicting the
TME through each phase of the Cyber Kill Chain for all three TME events.
Kim et al. (2014) conducted comparative analysis research on big data from Japan,
South Korea, the U.K., and the US. The research compared two sectors in terms of goals,
missions, decision-making, decision-making processes, decision actors, organizational
structure, and strategies. Kim et al. (2014) analysis revealed roughly 91% of intrusions
are the result of insider’s intentional or unintentional negligence, which is an inherit
cybersecurity responsibility. With an overwhelming amount of cyber-attacks going
undetected until the event happens, a comprehensive approach is needed to address
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today’s dependency on the Internet and underlining security issues. Current networks are
overwhelmed with more than 200 million viruses a year. The commercial sector has a
considerable risk of monetary loss, production shut down and embarrassment.
Government organizations may be driven by different motivations that are non-profit but
in some cases, a matter of life and death. Cyber-attacks may be non-kinetic (non-violent)
or kinetic, causing direct or indirect physical damage as seen in the Stuxnet case
involving overheating of Iranian nuclear centrifuges (House, 2009). The Cyber Kill
Chain explains the behaviors of an attack or attackers movement from the beginning to
end of the event but fails to identify where to conduct cybersecurity.
Sadhukhan, Mallari and Yadav (2015) contended there are many research articles that
describe the cyber kill chain in detail but argued there is work needed to provide a
common process model with the capability to map attack methodologies as well as
security defenses. Sadhukhan et al. (2015) argued work is needed to provide defense
practitioners more practical procedures to determine where attackers are at each stage.
Sadhukhan et al. (2015) provided a model which mapped technical aspects of a cyberattack thread and similar defenses to each phase of the cyber kill chain. Technical
components of cyber defense tools were identified in each thread depicting where
defenders should find an attacker to understand how far along the kill chain the attack
was. Although the cyber kill chain depicts the actions and behavior for better
understanding attackers, additional frameworks such as NIST and other compliance
frameworks are needed to establish trusts to employ operational use between commercial
and government CALOs (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et al.,
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2015b). Even through combined frameworks, network defenders cannot achieve
comprehensive cyber defense without understanding then clearly defined constructs.
Specified Frameworks
Certain cybersecurity frameworks are designed to address specific security needs of
industry, such as PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard), HIPPA
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996), HITRUST (Health
Information Trust Alliance), and NERC CIP (North American Electric Reliability
Corporation critical infrastructure protection).
PCI DSS is a set of security controls that are required to be employed by all certified
entities that utilize credit cards (Donaldson, 2015b). PCI certified parties must recertify
annually by independent assessors to continue to process credit card transitions
internationally. PCI DSS controls do not address overall cyber defense but more
specifically defenses that are applicable to credit card transactions. Some examples of
PCI DSS controls are: maintain a firewall to protect cardholder data, encrypt credit card
transitions, restrict access to cardholder data, and regularly test security systems and
processes (Donaldson, 2015b). Donaldson (2015b) theorized while PCI DSS ensures
some level of control over CALOs ability to ensure secure transactions, sustaining an
overall effective cyber defense requires a far more comprehensive approach.
HIPPA and HITRUST are frameworks pertaining to health care security. HIPPA
established national standards for the use and protection of electronic health records.
HIPPA safeguards include administrative, physical, technical, organizational and policies
to ensure the protection of healthcare providers, insurance plans, patients, and drug
dispensers. HITRUST is the standard security framework which certifies all
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organizations that create, access, store, or exchanges personal health and financial
information. HITRUST was informed by other significant frameworks such as HIPPA,
PCA, and NIST (Donaldson, 2015b). Like the traditional categorical frameworks,
HITRUS and HIPPA lack overall cyber defense to adequately prevent cyber-attacks
(Donaldson, 2015b).
NERC-CIP is a non-for-profit regulatory authority with the mission of ensuring
reliable bulk power system in North America. NERC is a federally designated Electric
Reliability Organization that develops and enforces reliability standards and requirements
for planning and operating the collective bulk power system. NERC standards have been
accredited by the American National Standards Institute and cover elements such as
resource and demand balance, transmission, personnel and training, emergency
preparedness and the design and maintenance of facilities, including nuclear power
facilities (Donaldson et al., 2015b).
The Department of Homeland Security Resilience Review (CRR) Framework is nocost, voluntary, non-technical assessment to self-evaluate operational resilience and
cybersecurity capabilities within an organization's critical infrastructure (Donaldson,
2015b). The CRR focuses on enterprise assets and understanding how resources are
allocated to ten domains identified by the framework. The ten domains include asset
management, controls management, change management, incident management and risk
management just to name a few. The CRR is referenced in the NIST Cybersecurity
framework just as 800-53 although there is no detailed guidance on how these
frameworks work in concert (Donaldson, 2015b; Vijayan, 2017).
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Donaldson (2015b) argued frameworks created for specific functions often utilize
generalized frameworks such as NIST and ISO/IEC 2700 to ensure more effective cyber
security but optimal cyber defense is difficult to achieve without a clear understanding of
what comprehensive cyber defense is. Donaldson (2015b) further theorized that CALOs
which use multiple frameworks for cyber defense often have overlapping security
guidelines which may be beneficial in some cases but problematic when weighing costs
and compatibility (Donaldson et al., 2015b; Scofield, 2016).
Cybersecurity Framework Pros, Cons, and Comparisons
Atouum et al. (2014) conducted developmental research to propose a holistic
cybersecurity framework. Atoum et al. (2014) contended cybersecurity frameworks
defending cyber-attacks are fragmented, vary widely in effectiveness and do not achieve
optimal cybersecurity. The authors theorized a combination of the best qualities from
general framework is beneficial in achieving broad comprehensive cybersecurity.
Enforcing information security on the national level inherently affects security
implementation from a global point of view, which is salient for several reasons. First, to
ensure early detection of likely threats and mitigate risks related to government
information systems, critical commercial infrastructures tied to those systems must be
considered. Secondly, to enable decision-makers to take necessary actions when needed,
a comprehensive understanding of organizational requirements based on strategic or
mission objectives is needed. Atoum et al. (2014) argued most countries defend their
cyberspace by first formulating a cybersecurity strategy (CSS). The CSS has three
continuous processes: strategy formulation, strategy implementation, and strategy
evaluation. Atoum et al. (2014) proposed a holistic national cybersecurity implementation
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framework (HCS-IF) that fits into the strategy implementation process. The HCS-IF
suggested a set of adaptable security controls, solution, entities, tools, techniques, and
mechanisms to oversee CSS implementation. The HCS-IF framework for security
requirements elicitation and analysis was based upon the construction of a context for the
system and satisfaction arguments for the security of the system. One starts with an
enumeration of security goals based on assets in the system. These goals are used to
derive security requirements in the form of constraints. The system background is
described using a problem-centered classification; this context is then validated against
the security requirements through the construction of a satisfaction argument. The
satisfaction argument is in two parts: A formal argument that the system can meet its
security requirements and a structured informal argument supporting the assumptions
expressed in the formal argument. The construction of the satisfaction argument may fail,
revealing either that the security requirement cannot be satisfied in the context, or that the
context does not contain sufficient information to develop the argument. In this case,
designers and architects are asked to provide additional design information to resolve the
problems (Atoum et al., 2014). Atoum et al. (2014) contended the approach was
problematic in nature and may not provide a complete comprehensive solution to CSS
due to the complexity of generalizing cybersecurity at the national level. The HCS-IF
design was mainly based on literature review and practical experience.
Atoum (2014) outlined the core components of the framework as the
CSS, requirements solicitation, strategic moves, controls, security objectives, and
implementation repository. The HCS-IF essentially facilitates transforming the cybersecurity level from the current state to the future state. Atoum (2014) validated the HCS-
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IF through a comparison of six other national level frameworks through the systems
security engineering model. Although specific frameworks were not addressed, Atoum
(2014) argued achievement over general management security frameworks.
The HCS-IF model converts organizations CSS goals into detailed security
requirements but does not delineate the scope between CALO’s or smaller organizations
with different cyber defense challenges. Kiper (2008) argued the scope and size of
organizations directly impacts its business processes, which challenges HCS-IF use on a
national level as contended by Atoum (2014). Additionally, Atoum (2014) does not
address criteria of a comprehensive national approach but contends the need for the CSS
to be part of a comprehensive solution in developing a cybersecurity framework at the
national level. The comparison of HCS-IF to general management security frameworks
based on practical experience requires further study of the most prudent frameworks.
Table 1 depicts nine major frameworks comparisons. The table explains the type of
framework, a brief description, pros and cons of use, article findings, and contributing
details.
Table 1. Major Frameworks Comparisons
Security
Framework
(FW)

ISO
27001/27002
thru 27016
version

Type
of FM

Cert/Comp
Framework

Brief description

Provides a
general model to
following setting
up and operating
an Information
Security
Management
System (ISMS).

Pros

International,
widely used
for general
ISMS
requirements

Cons

Articles

Main
Contributions

1. Consistently
changes to
adapt to
international
standards and
security
challenges.

(Agrawal,
2017;
Nowak,
2015;
Sussy et
al., 2015;
Wainder,
2007,
Wainder,
2008)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks. 2.
Requires better
understanding
of
effectiveness
based on
organizational
size and scope.
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Table 1. Major Frameworks Comparisons (continued).

NIST SP80053 revision

Defense in
Depth

Cyber Kill
Chain

NIST
Cybersecurity
Framework
2014

Privacy
Controls

Control
Frame
work

Procedural
Frame
work

Risk Mgt
Frame
work

Provide a
catalog of
security and
privacy
controls for
federal
information
systems to
protect
organizational
operations,
assets and
individuals
from threats.
One of the
basic
philosophies of
security is
defense in
depth;
overlapping
systems
designed to
provide
security even if
one of them
fails.

Breaks down
complicated
attacks into
mutually nonexclusive
stages or
layers.

Provides a
prioritized,
flexible,
repeatable,
performancebased approach
to enterprise
security.

Mandated
controls for
the U.S.
federal
government

Provide
layered
defense
outside
IT/Cyber
norms.
Widely used
by
commercial
and
government

1. Does not
cover
international
controls (Safe
Harbor ect.).
2. Overlaps
with NIST
Cybersecurity
Framework

1. Costly to
implement.
2. Can be
redundant
with other
control
frameworks

1. Enables the
defenders to
tackle smaller
and easier
problems at
the same
time. 2. helps
the defenders
to subvert
each phase by
developing
defenses and
mitigation for
each of the
phases

Difficulty to
apply and
understand
depending on
CALO
organizational
structure

1. Heavily
vetted by
federal and
commercial
organizations.
2. Adaptable.

1. Does not
cover
international
controls. 2.
Overlaps with
NIST 800-53,
COBIT,
ISO/IEC 2700
versions, and
CIS CSC.

(Donaldson
, 2015a;
Vijayan,
2017)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks. 2.
Requires better
understanding
of
effectiveness
based on
organizational
size and scope.

(Chandra et
al., 2017;
Chappelle,
2011; Luo,
2016)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks. 2.
Requires better
understanding
of
effectiveness
based on
organizational
size and scope.

(Burger et
al., 2014;
Hutchins et
al., 2011;
Yadav &
Rao, 2015)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks. 2.
Requires better
understanding
of
effectiveness
based on
organizational
size and scope.

(Donaldson
, 2015a;
Vijayan,
2017)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks. 2.
Requires better
understanding
of
effectiveness
based on
organizational
size and scope.
3. Mandated by
presidential
order for
federal use.
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Table 1. Major Frameworks Comparisons (continued).

1. No costs. 2.
Can be
independently
conducted or
DHS support.

1. Overlaps
with NIST and
800-53, and
ISO/IEC 2700
versions. 2.
Does not entail
guidance on
how to use
with
complimentary
frameworks.

(Donaldson
, 2015a)

(Donaldson
, 2015a)

(Donaldson
, 2015a)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks.

(Donaldson
, 2015a)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks.

(Donaldson
, 2015b)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks.

Selfassessment
Framework

Focuses on
enterprise
assets and
understanding
how resources
are allocated to
ten domains of
identified by
the framework.

Control
Framework

The council is
an
independent,
expert, not-forprofit
organization
with a global
scope
committed to
security of the
Internet.

Provides
international
control
framework.

1. Overlaps
with NIST
800-53 and
Cybersecurity
Frameworks
and IISO/IEC
2700 versions.

Payment
Card
Industry
Data
Security
Standard
PCI DSS
version 3.0

Req and
Cert
Framework

Provides a
minimum set
of
requirements
for protecting
cardholder
data.

Provides
international
requirements.

Does not
provide
enterprise
security

HIPPA
Security
Rule

Req,
standards
and control
Framework

Provides
national
requirements

Does not
provide
enterprise
security

Provides
national
requirements

Does not
provide
enterprise
security

Department
of Homeland
Security
Cyber
Resilience
Review
(DHS CRR)

Counsel on
CyberSec
Critical
Security
Controls
(SANS 20)

HITRUST
Common
Security
Framework

Control
Framework

Establishes
national
security
standars for the
use and
protection of
electronic
health records.
Established a
Common
Security
Framework
(CSF) that can
be used by all
organizations
that create,
access, store or
exchange
sensitive
and/or
regulated data.

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks. 2.
Requires better
understanding
of
effectiveness
based on
organizational
size and scope.
3. Mandated by
presidential
order for
federal use.
1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks. 2.
Requires better
understanding
of
effectiveness
based on
organizational
size and scope.
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Table 1. Major Frameworks Comparisons (continued).

NERC CIP
version 5

Regulatory
Framework

Non-for-profit
international
authority that
ensures the
reliability of
the bulk power
system in
North America.

Provides
international
regulations.

Does not
provide
enterprise
security

(Donaldson
, 2015b)

1. Requires
more study in
use with
complimentary
frameworks.

Donaldson (2015b) hypothesized mapping cybersecurity frameworks at the enterprise
or CALO level is an important part of making an organization’s cybersecurity complete
and demonstrating that completeness to outside observers. Donaldson (2015b) argued
that specialized frameworks who crosswalk their cybersecurity program against an
external framework may generate ideas for strengthening CALOs cybersecurity posture.
The author further argued specialized frameworks designed security controls or
compliance are not generally designed for running a comprehensive cybersecurity
program.
Donaldson (2015b) conducted comparative analysis of 13 major commercial and
government frameworks based on 11 organizational functional areas: Cybersecurity
policy, staffing and expertise, budgeting, resource allocations, technology, capabilities,
controls, processes, operations, auditing, and reporting. Based simply on the research and
Donaldson’s (2015b) proposed framework, there was confusion over exactly what the
term “IT security control” meant. Donaldson (2015b) contended further investigation is
required in clearly defining enterprise constructs for effective use of cybersecurity
frameworks for CALOs and global enterprises.
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Summary
The cyber domain is a complex myriad of interconnected networks with human and
technological risk factors (Oltramari et al., 2014). A comprehensive approach is needed
to effectively defend the cyber domain (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014;
Tisdale, 2015). As Oltramari et al. (2014) study indicated, understanding the human and
computer interaction is salient in understanding cyber terminological definitions,
classification entities, and phenomena. The authors further argued that cyber terms are
often misused and mischaracterized. There has been little work in understanding the
scope of cyber and terms that appear casual yet weigh heavily on building a credible
cyber defense strategy.
Defending cyber in large organizations or CALOs is relevant towards a CCDF as
indicated by the motivating factors and investments placed on CALOs comparative to
smaller organizations (Asti, 2017; Kemper, 2017). Safa et al. (2016) generally argued
while Oltramari et al. (2014) more specifically contended in CALOs, social interaction
plays a significant role in sharing, communicating, and implementing sound security
practices. Manjikian (2017) and Oltramari et al. (2014) research argued contending
obstacles to the development of a universal cyber lexicon and both works presented the
case for future opportunities in developments to solidify constructs and clarify confusion.
Giles and Hagestad (2013) argued the lack of agreements internationally creates further
challenges from the language barriers indicated between the western countries, Russia,
and China. The authors further argued the difference of a more in-depth psychological
aspect to cyber in China and Russia, although from research of western countries none of
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the existing frameworks addressed psychological warfare (Donaldson et al., 2015a;
Scofield, 2016; Shen, 2014).
There are many information technologies (IT) and cybersecurity frameworks in
existence for general process improvement and network security. Although most are
beneficial in deriving general best practices developed over time, few capture a
comprehensive approach that can be tailored to meet objectives on an operational level.
Understanding a comprehensive functional approach that drives requirements-based
methodology to ensure proper acquisition practices, tool efficiency, effectiveness, and
training to meet specific cybersecurity organizational goals is needed (Atoum et al., 2014;
Tisdale, 2015). Additional work is also needed close the gap between cybersecurity
frameworks and applicability at the organizational level. Traditional frameworks do not
address the interdependency of external organizations, psychological, social, and
associated risks. A better understanding of what is a comprehensive cyber defense is
needed.

62

Chapter 3
Methodology

Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology used to address the following research
questions:
1. What criteria does the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive
cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs?
2. In what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a comprehensive
cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs?
3. What future areas of research may be explored in understanding a more comprehensive
approach to cyber defense for CALOs?
The subsequent sections of this chapter explain design science research and why it
was appropriate to address the research questions in this study. The approach section will
provide a detailed step-by-step description of how the study was conducted which
included the establishment of the CCDF criteria, artifact development, evaluation, and
communication of the artifact. The hardware, software, and personnel resources used to
complete the report will be presented. Finally, a summery for the chapter will be
presented.
An IS design science research study was conducted to address the research questions.
Design science supports a problem-solving approach that shifts perspective between the
design processes and artifacts to address a complex problem. The design process is a
sequence of activities by experts, which produces an innovative product or artifact. The
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evaluation of the artifact then provided feedback information and a better understanding
of the problem to improve the quality of the artifact and design process (Henver et al.,
2004; Kurtz, 2015; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2007). Henver et al.
(2004) argued that communications of the artifact must be presented for technical and
managerial audiences. The primary steps in design science were derived from Peffers et
al. (2007) and Ellis and Levy (2010). Peffers et al. (2007) developed an all-encompassing
design science approach that could be commonly accepted in the IS community. The
methodology for this work was derived from synthesizing several respected IS design
science authors. Of particular note, the Henver et al. (2004) work has been seminal in the
development of design science IS research and heavily cited in modern design science IS
research work (March & Storey, 2008; Peffers et al., 2007; Venable, Pries-heje, &
Baskerville, 2016; Winter, 2008). Peffers et al. (2007) and Ellis and Levy (2010)
provided a consensus approach which was essential to ensure a standard design science
research methodology. This work addressed the research questions as displayed in figure
3 utilizing the design science approach. The approach section and following subsections
will explain the design science process and research questions relationships in details.

Figure 3. Design Science and Research Questions relationships
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Approach
The following approach encompasses the detailed required steps used to complete the
study. The goal of this work was to conduct design research towards the development of
a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) artifact to address the lack
of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs. To approach the
research problem and motivation for this work, a systemic literature review was
conducted as outlined in Chapter 2 to identify the gaps in a comprehensive approach to
cybersecurity defense. A content analysis was conducted to analyze the existence and
frequency of concepts in the literature review and construct the foundational
recommended activities and questions to serve as the starting point for the expert panel.
The content analysis provided objective development to baseline the CCDF criteria based
on the literature review (Coakes & Coakes, 2009). The content analysis further allowed
the researcher to put cyber defense criteria into meaningful categories, which were
further validated by cyber defense experts. The research was comprised of two Delph
Panels. The first team of cyber defense experts completed two Delph processes, the first
process to refine the criteria for the CCDF based on the literature review and content
analysis, and the second process to ensure the prototype met the established criteria. The
second team was comprised of cybersecurity stakeholders to evaluate the CCDF
developed by the cyber defense expert panel. The cyber defense expert panel conducted
several rounds to develop a criterion and facilitate the development of the artifact for a
comprehensive cybersecurity defense model (Yousuf, 2007). Based on the information
derived from the expert panel during criterion development, the researcher developed the
artifact through a systems development prototyping methodology. Evaluation of the
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CCDF prototype was conducted through several rounds of evaluation from the cyber
defense expert panel and a separate stakeholder panel to avoid bias of the criterion
(Yousuf, 2007). Through design science, the proposed research developed a
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework to facilitate understanding of CALO
cybersecurity. Figure 4 outlines the general approach used and includes the research
approach, desired products from the approach, design science steps, and the associated
research questions used in this study. The following subsections describe the design
science approach and address one or more of the three research questions in each of the
design sciences steps.

Figure 4. Research Process

Problem Identification and Motivation
The first step in design science is to identify the problem and motivation for the work.
The problem of no standard framework for clearly understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity defense for CALOs was substantiated through rigorous research. The
motivation for the work as identified in chapter one argued that understanding
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comprehensive cybersecurity defense is essential to identify the specific requirements of
organizations based on mission objectives and to ensure those requirements are meeting
cybersecurity defense needs. Development of a CCDF based on particular mission
objectives not only examined security gaps but identified interdependencies and
overlapping requirements driven from traditional stove-piped security architectures
(Kelic et al., 2013; Tisdale, 2015).
Atoum et al. (2014) contended that current cybersecurity frameworks defending
against cyber-attacks are fragmented and vary widely in effectiveness. Atoum et al.
(2014) presented a holistic implementation framework, synonymous with a
comprehensive approach, but did not test nor map organizational strategy to capabilities
and tools. To address the problem, the research question of what criteria does the CCDF
artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework
for CALOs was explored. Ellis and Levy (2010) contended that the lack of a product or
tool that could potentially alleviate a troublesome situation constitutes a research-worthy
problem applicable to design and development research.
Developmental problem solving through IS design science was the methodology for
this work. This work complements adequate research contributions to the body of
knowledge. Henver et al. (2004) argued that proper design research is based on the
novelty, generality, and significance of the designed artifact. The artifact may enable the
solution of an unsolved problem by either extending the knowledge base or applying
existing knowledge in new innovative ways. The development of the CCDF artifact
through the evaluation of existing frameworks, literature review, and content analysis
facilitates growth in cyber defense. Also, as IS design science being relatively new,
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creative development and use of new evaluation methods provide contributions to design
science. Proper design science research produces interests in both technology and
management focused audiences (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010).
As previously indicated in figure 4, the literature review represented the foundation of
the problem and was seminal in addressing research question one, “What criteria does the
CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense
framework for CALOs?” The literature review was an iterative process, and research was
included throughout the design science steps. Based on the cyber domain, CALOs,
construct challenges, and security frameworks identified in the literature review, a
content analysis was conducted to analyze and synthesize the research to provide the
initial questions and pilot artifact for phase I of the first expert panel.
Define Objectives for a Solution
The second step in design science is to define the objectives for a solution. Henver et
al. (2004) argued that the development of technological-based solutions to significant and
relevant business problems is a critical step in design science research, achieved by
pioneering artifacts aimed at solving complex problems. Ellis and Levy (2010) argued
that the objectives for any research effort are captured in the research questions
underlining the study. The objectives of this study were anchored to research question
one, “What criteria does the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a
comprehensive defensive cybersecurity requirements framework for CALOs?”. To
address all concurrent research questions, criteria had to be set for the cyber defense
expert panel. This section addresses the criteria for expert panel members, recruitment of
the panel members, what was provided to start the Delphi processes, what was expected
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from panel members for each round, what was done with the returned data from panel
members, and how consensus was reached (Yousuf, 2007).
Skulmoski, Hartman and Krahn (2007) argued four requirements considerations for an
expert participant. First, knowledge and experience with the issue under investigation.
For the study of cybersecurity, members of the panel had at least ten years of experience
in the cybersecurity field and more specifically experience with cybersecurity
frameworks. A second requirement was the capacity and willingness to participate in the
study. Members also had sufficient time to participate in the Delphi process. Finally, all
experts were required to have effective communications skills (Skulmoski et al., 2007).
Rayens and Hahn (2000) argued that a typical Delphi sample size may range from 10 to
30 participants based on the complexity of the study. The more complex the study, the
more challenging to reach a consensus which requires more experienced, qualified and
fewer panel participants.
The researcher for this study utilized a panel of 10 participants. A systematic review
of the literature continued throughout the dissertation process and supported the panel
rounds. The requirements collected by the expert panel to establish the CCDF criteria
were based on the opinions of the members of the panel, foundational research, and
content analysis. Expert members were drawn from industry, government, and academia.
Professional and academic cybersecurity experts included Chief Information Security
Officers (CISO), Network Defenders, Security Officers, and Analysts. Panel members
were recruited through networked affiliations of LinkedIn, Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) Doctoral Consortium, Association for
Information Systems (AIS), National Defense University (NDU), the Department of
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Defense (DOD), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), National Security Agency (NSA), ManTech International, Lockheed
Martin, and other affiliations known by the researcher. Stakeholder panel members were
screened based on Skulmoski et al. (2007) criteria stated above and required to concur to
the informed consent agreement in Appendix A.
Recruitment of panel members was in the form of email and Facebook Messenger
(Appendix B) to each prospective participant. A total of 50 emails to cyber professionals
yielded two 10-member teams (20 total), the first to build the criteria and develop the
artifact and the second to test and evaluate the artifact. The initial recruitment email went
out to 25 cyber experts and entailed a one-page description of the research, anonymity
details, the team process, the time required for the study (1 hour per week and research
dates), and motivation for the work. Once the panels were full, the remaining participants
were notified and requested to be back-up for any panel member shortfall contingencies.
The motivation of the work was vital for the recruitment process. Articulating the
importance of the problem and panel members contribution to solve the problem yielded
positive results for recruitment (Yousuf, 2007).
Once the first ten panel members were selected, a description of the research
(Appendix C), the problem statement, and goals, were provided to the panel participants
before providing the process steps for starting the Delphi rounds. Pertinent questions
were allowed and responded to in the form of emails and Facebook Messenger,
whichever preferred by individual participants. The anonymity of panel members was
strictly adhered to by identifying participants in code names (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, etc.)
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and centralizing communications through the research Principle Investigator (D. S.
McKay & Ellis, 2014).
The Delphi team process (Appendix D) entailed an overview of what was provided to
team members and what was expected in return. Development of a criterion was based on
the literature review and content analysis (Appendix E and F). An explanation of what
was expected for each round after Round 1 included a matrix (Appendix G) for responses
to the initial questions to panel members and the development of the artifact. The
comment response matrix (Appendix H) facilitated by the researcher included the
returned comments from panel members with analysis, similarities, and responses based
on the cumulative results of comments (D. S. McKay & Ellis, 2014). The documents
provided to panel members were explained in practical terms versus academic to ensure a
clear understanding of what was expected between all parties. Panel members were given
“cyber” code names. A few of the participants chose their cyber suffix, but all
participants remained anonymous.
Design and Develop the Artifact
The third step was to design and develop the artifact which answered research
question two, “In what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs?”. Henver et al. (2004)
contended design is a process. IS design science was derived from engineering research
and descriptive of the rigorous approach to the design process. The iterative loop of
continually building to achieve optimal results is critical to the design process. The
Delphi method used throughout this research was inherently iterative (Skulmoski et al.,
2007; Yousuf, 2007). Heuristic strategies produce functional designs that can be

71

implemented in organizations on a broad spectrum. Ensuring a process and evaluation of
each phase in the process provided a context for additional research aimed at fully
exploring and improving the phenomena (Henver et al., 2004). For this reason, a systems
development approach was utilized to develop a CCDF prototype.
Nunamaker, Chen and Purdin (1990) described that building a prototype model must
be based on meaningful research conducted in the literature review, functionalities of
system components, and defined interrelationships. The CCDF prototype sampled in
Appendix I was based on the researcher’s literature review, content analysis, and
feedback conducted during the Delphi process. This process allowed consensus
evaluation during the development stage and future evaluation in academia and industry
to answer research question three. The scale model (Appendix I) was presented to the
expert Delph panel before voting as sampled in Appendix J during Phase II. The Delphi
procedure ensured optimal development of the artifact based on expert option from
federal and civil cyber defenders during phase II of the process. The expert panel agreed
that the three primary frameworks in the model was a good base to measure against the
criteria areas. The expert panel unanimously agreed, the ITIL framework depicted in
Appendix I be removed from the prototype, ITIL only represented service management
processes, not cyber defense (McNaughton, Ray, & Lewis, 2010). A separate stakeholder
panel further evaluated the CCDF after the prototype was refined through consensus by
the expert panel.
Demonstrate and Evaluate the Artifact
The fourth and fifth design science steps are to demonstrate and evaluate the use of the
artifact to solve one or more instances of the problem. The demonstration and evaluation
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of the artifact answered research question two on how effectively the artifact met the
approved criteria and did the proposed model meet the goal of the research, providing a
CCDF for CALOs. To address the research question, the effectiveness of the CCDF was
evaluated first by the expert cyber defenders during phase II of the Delphi process and by
the second team of CALO stakeholders which included Chief Executive Officers, Chief
Information Officers (CIO), Military Commanders, Federal Senior Executive Service
Members (SES), and Senior Military Officers. Stakeholders were comprised of federal
and civil leadership for effective representation of CALOs. The second 10 person
stakeholder panel met the same criterion established by Skulmoski et al. (2007) with the
exception of a required informed consent by all ten panel members. First, knowledge and
experience with the issue under investigation were required. For the study of
cybersecurity stakeholders, members of the team had at least ten years of experience as
information owners or stakeholders of CALO defended networks. Panel members had a
capacity and willingness to participate in the study. This second requirement was more
difficult to sustain since senior staff members had demanding schedules. Stakeholders
were also required to have sufficient time to participate in the Delphi process. Finally, all
panel members were required to have effective communications skills (Skulmoski et al.,
2007). A Likert scale consensus was required with the same criteria as the first panel of
expert cyber defenders. The consensus was reached once all panel members agreed with a
CCDF average score between 4 “Highly Effective” and 5 “Most Effective”, based on a 5
point Liker scale (D. S. McKay & Ellis, 2014). The second research question was
answered after the expert panel established the criteria and after the artifact was
developed by the researcher with the assistance of the cyber defense expert panel.
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Research question two was further addressed in the fourth and fifth steps of the design
science methodology as evidenced by the continual evaluative stance throughout the
developmental research process. Responses to panel comments were in the form of a
comment response matrix similar to Appendix H.
The stakeholder panel addressed the evaluation of the artifact based on the agreed
upon criteria, preliminary model and feedback from the initial rounds. The evaluation
was based on a five-point Likert scale: 1 meaning “Least Effective,” 2 meaning “Slightly
Effective,” 3 meaning “Effective,” 4 meaning “Highly Effective,” and 5 meaning “Most
Effective.” Peffers et al. (2007) explained that demonstrations might include experiments,
simulations, case studies, proof, or other appropriate activities. In many cases,
demonstrations entail several methodologies to adequately capture that the artifact does
what is claimed (Petter, Khazanchi, & Murphy, 2010). The Delphi process used
throughout this research provided an evaluative approach from experts and stakeholders
in the cybersecurity field during the construction of the artifact and the evaluation of the
CCDF proof of concept (Erffmeyer, Erffmeyer, & Lane, 1986; Okoli & Pawlowski,
2004).
Peffers et al. (2007) explained that the evaluation of the artifact should measure how
well the artifact supports a solution to the problem. Demonstration and evaluation could
take many forms such as comparison of the artifact’s functionality with the solution
objectives, quantitative performance measures such as budgets, items produced, and the
results of satisfaction surveys, customer feedback, or simulations. Theoretically, an
evaluation could include any empirical evidence or logical proof. The evaluation of this
work was fused in the development of the artifact through expert panel member iterations
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and a separate panel of cybersecurity stakeholders “customer feedback” to evaluate the
CCDF artifact. Panel member documentation and communications were based primarily
on previous work (D. McKay, 2012; D. S. McKay & Ellis, 2014).
The first demonstration conducted was during the second phase of the first panel of
experts. The initial demonstration was a 20-minute narrated walkthrough of the proposed
CCDF prototype based on the agreed criteria. Expert panel members were asked to rate
the prototype based on the criteria and provide recommendations for improvements. The
second, and final 25-minute presentation was for stakeholders to evaluate the prototype
based on the expert panel’s work. Further practical evaluation will be accomplished by
post-dissertation publication in academia through conferences and other publication
opportunities.
Communication of the Artifact
The sixth and final step in design science is the communications of the artifact.
Communications include the importance of the problem, the utility, and novelty of the
artifact, the objectivity of its design, and the effectiveness of researchers and the public
(Henver et al., 2004; Peffers et al., 2007). The fundamental point of communicating this
research was to contribute to the IS body of knowledge. The Hawaii International
Conference on System Science had already accepted preliminary work concerning this
research at the 2018 HICSS Doctoral Consortium. The researcher presented this work
amongst 53 international articles, was accepted, and presented at the 2018 HICSS
Conference in January 2018. Top scholars and mentors have accepted this work as
significantly promising for future research in the IS field (Dr. Robert Biggs, Dr. Jay
Nunamaker and Dr. Stacy Petter, HICSS Mentors, personal communications, January 9,
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2018). Dissertation publication will further provide communication of the work in the
NSU and global ProQuest database. Finally, the researcher will continue to seek
opportunities to publish the work at academic and federal government conferences. The
work was also presented at the Hawaii Armed Forces, Communications and Electronics
TechNet Conference in Honolulu November 15, 2018.
The third research question was answered by analyzing the results of the expert panel
and stakeholder’s questionnaires concerning research questions one and two. The results
of the data derived from questions one and provided a path for future research explained
in chapter 4.

Resources
The resources used to perform this work was conducted on a Dell i5 laptop and a Dell
i7 XPS L702X desktop computer. Both systems used windows 10 operating systems and
office suite. Access to peer-reviewed research databases was provided via Nova
Southeastern University Sharklink Portal. Nova’s Sherman Library had the required top
ten peer-reviewed journals to execute credible dissertation worthy research as indicated
by Levy and Ellis (2006). The researcher also utilized a subscription to NVivo, a
qualitative data analysis software produced by QSR International. NVivo was utilized to
conduct the qualitative content analysis. This tool analyzed rich text-based and
multimedia information, for deep levels analysis of large volumes of data. Also,
SurveyMonkey was to collect and analyze the data from panel members (Lowry, D’Arcy,
Hammer, & Moody, 2016). Access to cyber defense analysts and senior stakeholders
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were also required to evaluate the artifact. The cyber defense/analysts were experts in
cybersecurity and defense with more than ten years’ experience or more.
Access to DISA, CYBERCOM and other CALO agencies organizational strategy and
policy were required. Access to SME’s and supporting personnel that conducts cyber
defense was required to address existing capabilities, requirements and data collection.
Several trips to Ft. Meade were conducted to collect data on cyber defenders as well.
Establishing and sustaining existing collaborative relationships with fellow
dissertation candidates was essential to this work. Finally, the support of the dissertation
chair and committee members was paramount in achieving each level of the dissertation
process.

Summary
In chapter 3 we first described design science (DS) and why this methodology was
appropriate to answer the following research questions: 1. What criteria does the CCDF
artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework
for CALOs? 2. In what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs? 3. What future areas of
research may be explored in understanding a more comprehensive approach to cyber
defense for CALOs? Design science supports a problem-solving approach that shifts
perspective between the design processes and artifacts to address a complex problem.
In the approach section, a detailed step-by-step description of how the study was
conducted included the establishment of the CCDF criteria, artifact development,
evaluation, and communication of the artifact.
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The approach section described how the design science research method was utilized
based on the problem that was identified. The problem of no standard framework for
clearly understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs was substantiated
through rigorous research. The motivation for this work was driven by research which
identified understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense as essential to specific
organizations requirements (Donaldson, 2015a).
The objective for solutions explains how the Delphi process was used to gain
consensus to address the research questions. The section explained how expert and
stakeholder panels were recruited based on at least ten years of experience in cyber
defense and information ownership respectively. The section further explained how
anonymity was achieved and how communications between the researcher and panel
members were accomplished.
The expert panel facilitated in the development of the criteria to address research
question 1. The expert panel further facilitated in the development of the CCDF artifact
to enable understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense which resulted in a 20minute presentation. The expert panel also evaluated the agreed upon criteria against the
CCDF artifact. Finally, the stakeholders’ panel evaluated the criteria against the CCDF
artifact through a distinctly separate Delphi process.
The researcher provided a demonstration of the artifact to expert panel members in the
form of a presentation of the CCDF, explaining the process of how to use the CCDF to
understand comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Expert panel members were given 5point Liker scales to evaluate the criteria, the CCDF, and how well the criteria met the
CCDF. The consensus was reached once all panel members agreed with an average score
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between 4 “Highly Effective” and 5 “Most Effective.” This process was repeated for the
stakeholder panel from an information owner perspective, providing a distinctly separate
evaluative point of view of the CCDF.
Finally, the resources utilized to conduct this study was presented. Of particular note,
the NVivo qualitative data analysis software produced by QSR International analyzed
rich text-based and multimedia information, for deep levels analysis of large volumes of
data. Also, SurveyMonkey was utilized to collect and analyze the data from panel
members (Lowry et al., 2016).
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Chapter 4
Results

Introduction
This chapter is organized sequentially by the research questions. The first section
answers research question one, presents the results of the content analysis, and the work
of the first team of cyber defense experts. Additionally, the core seven criteria areas of
the CCDF prototype are validated during phase one of the Delphi process. The second
section answers research question two and depicts the development of the CCDF artifact
based on the literature review, content analysis and feedback from the expert panel. A
subsection offers phase two of the expert panel in ensuring the developed prototype
matched the agreed upon criteria based on the phase one results and validates research
question two. The third section offers the separate stakeholder panel evaluation results of
the CCDF prototype by CALO stakeholders and further validates research question
number two. The subsection provides the results of the stakeholder’s comments and
advice for future work of the CCDF prototype. Finally, a summary is presented.
The essence of design science is development of the artifact. The CCDF artifact was
developed with the consensus of the expert and stakeholder panels. The researcher
presented the finished CCDF artifact to the expert panel during development and testing
and to the stakeholder panel for evaluation. A 25-minute narrated presentation of the
finished CCDF artifact was presented to the stakeholder panel. The translated
presentation in Appendix M contains the notes used for the narration for each of the 34
PowerPoint slides.
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The sections in this chapter are in direct correlation to the research methodology
explained in chapter 3. The research approach, Delphi iterations, and design science steps
have been embedded in the research questions as indicated in figure 4. The process
ensured rigor, continuous development, and evaluation of the CCDF artifact.
Answer to Research Question One: Development of the CCDF Criteria
This section addresses research questions 1: What criteria does the CCDF artifact have
to meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs?
To answer the research question, a literature review was conducted in chapter 2 along
with content analysis. The literature review revealed four general areas to address the
research problem: the cyber domain, cyber defense in large organizations, cyber domain
construct challenges, and cybersecurity frameworks.
Content Analysis
A content analysis was conducted utilizing the NVivo software, which facilitated keyword association with more than 200 research articles. This process allowed unstructured
data to be compiled, compared, and analyzed in an efficient, non-biased manner. Nodes
were created based on the research problem, literature review, and word frequency.
Similar terms were combined based on the analysis, which was further validated by the
expert panel.
The literature review articles were loaded into the NVivo software. Based on the
research problem and key-word search results, the researcher created nine key categories:
Behavioral and Human factors associated with cyber defense; common lexicon and
constructs; cyber policy; cyber threat based on operational requirements; defense in depth
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(virtual and physical factors); cyber roles and responsibilities; interdependency;
stakeholder buy-in and understanding; and universal applicability (figure 5).

Figure 5. Key-Word Search Initial Nine Categories
Through comparison, the cyber lexicon and policy nodes were combined due to article
and key-word associations (figure 6). Additionally, CALO operational requirements and
universal application were also combined (figure 7.).

Figure 6. CALO Operational Requirements and Universal Application Comparison
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Figure 7. Cyber Operation-Based Threats and Universal CALO
The seven remaining categories provided the baseline to present to the expert panel for
negotiations.
Operationalizing the Criteria
The seven criteria had to be operationalized for the Delph experts to understand the
research goals clearly. The researcher properly contexed the criteria in relation to the
research questions which resulted in the seven criteria areas identified below:
1. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for virtual as well as physical
threat factors.
2. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for all interdependencies of
outside organizations.
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3. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must use a common lexicon by internal and
external organizations.
4. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must be applicable to all CALOs regardless of
operation.
5. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must include behavioral factors of friendly and
malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers).
6. Stakeholders must easily understand the comprehensive cybersecurity defense
framework.
7. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must identify roles and responsibilities of
personnel responsible for defending CALOs.
Cyber Defense Expert Panel Phase 1 Round 1
The seven criteria areas were presented to the cyber defense expert team for round 1
rating. The average results for the ten responses are depicted in Appendix N. The rating
for criterion 1 yielded an average score of 4.2, criterion 2 was 3.7, Criterion 3 was 4.0,
criterion 4 was 3.2, criterion 5 was 3.6, criterion 6 was 4.4, and criterion 7 was 4.4. Four
of the seven criterion areas met the 4.0 or above average rating to be incorporated into the
CCDF prototype build.
Criterion 1 feedback – The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework must
account for virtual and physical threat factors
Criterion 1 average rating was 4.20, with 20% of respondents grading as “Effective,”
40% of respondents answered “Highly Effective,” and 40% answered “Most Effective.”
The criterion met CCDF prototype inclusion, and six respondents added comments to this

84

criterion for improvement. Respondent Cyber Alpha argued the criterion as only effective
as an organization’s ability to adjust to necessary changes within its boundary when
required and to consider organizations inability to control systems of outside
organizations, a point noted for CCDF prototype development. Cyber Bravo argued that
based on the preliminary research information provided of current security practices,
physical topologies for cyber defense were well supported. However, threats to virtual
networks were not well supported by the research. The respondent asked, “What are the
threats impacting virtual networks?”. “Why is securing the physical networks not enough
to also secure the logical one?”. “What is the demarcation point between physical and
logical?”. Schreier (2015) defense in depth argued that upper layers in the model
encompass virtual interdependencies within the lower physical and perimeter layers but
the author did not go into detail on how virtual encrypted data poses security risks. Cyber
Bravo’s remarks drove this researcher to thoroughly explain how virtual networks pose
significant security risks in the defense in depth portion of the CCDF prototype
presentation. Cyber Bravo’s comments also highlighted that further work was needed to
ensure all respondents understood the Delphi process is based on the participant’s
experience, not merely the research conducted.
Cyber Foxtrot, highlighted the fact that defense in depth model encompasses virtual
security as noted in the application and data layers. This was noteworthy as there are
varying experiences between cyber defenders. Additional comments from Cyber Ice-Man
spoke specifically to the DoD internet access points (IAP) and how encrypted virtual
networks are difficult to secure which complimented Cyber Alpha’s comments
concerning control of outside entities.
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Criterion 2 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for all
interdependencies of outside organizations
Criterion 2 average rating was 3.70. 20% of respondents rated this criterion “Slightly
Effective,” 10% rated “Effective,” 50% “Highly Effective,” and 20% “Most Effective.”
The criterion did not meet inclusion into the CCDF prototype during this round, and
seven respondents added comments for improvements. Cyber Bravo commented on the
preliminary information to validate this criterion, indicating a trend to clearly define
expectations to ensure all panel members provided ratings based on their expert opinion.
The brief preliminary research facilitated the basis of building the criterion, but some
respondents used this information solely to grade criterion areas. Cyber Foxtrot and
Cyber Ice-Man made general statements validating the importance of inter-dependencies
and provided examples where it was critical to cybersecurity in their experience but
graded this area “Effective” and “Most Effective” respectively. This, along with Cyber
Bravo’s comments was an indication that this criterion needed to be clearly explained to
the panel. Finally, Cyber India commented that policy played a significant role in interCALO agreements to achieve optimal inter-dependency for cyber defense.
Criterion 3 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must use a common lexicon
by internal and external organizations
Criterion 3 average rating was 4, with 10% of respondents grading “Least Effective,”
20% of respondents answered “Effective,” 20% “Highly Effective,” and 50% answered
“Most Effective.” Although the criterion rated at 4, it did not meet CCDF prototype
inclusion during this round. Delphi rules for this panel did not allow for any criterion
rated “Least Effective” or “Slightly Effective” be included in the CCDF prototype. Six

86

respondents added comments for improvement. Cyber Alpha responded that many
CALOs are isolated in cyber lexicology and argued that civil, federal, and other nonDOD CALOs should develop a common language. This argument substantiated the
literature review and the content analysis and was considered during CCDF development.
Cyber Foxtrot contended cyber lexicon should be driven from within CALOs and graded
this criterion “Least Effective” drastically diverting from the rest of the panel members,
resulting in the exclusion of this criterion. Cyber Hotel argued that without a common
cyber lexicon, translation of risk-based relevant context is not achievable, cyber spending
is increased, decision making is less reliable, and effects and expectations are misaligned.
Interestingly, none of the respondents mentioned any mandated organizational or general
lexicons such as the CNSS depicted in the literature review as heavily driven from NIST,
encompassing civil and government organizations (Dukes, 2015; Vijayan, 2017). While
all but one of the respondents agreed to the criticality of a cyber lexicon, none made any
recommendations towards one. This potentially indicated that most cyber experts were
not aware of a national cyber lexicon or they simply were not utilizing one. The argument
drove further consideration in the development of the CCDF prototype.
Criterion 4 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must be applicable to all
CALOs regardless of operation
Criterion 4 average rating was 3.2. 20% of respondents rated this criterion “Least
Effective,” 10% rated “Slightly Effective,” 20% “Effective,” 30% “Highly Effective,”
and 20% “Most Effective.” The criterion did not meet inclusion into the CCDF prototype
during this round, and seven respondents added comments for improvements. The wide
variation of respondents rating indicated this criterion was not adequately operationalized
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or understood by panel members and respondents’ comments validated this point. Cyber
Bravo rated this criterion “Most Effective” and commented it obtains the least amount of
support but is one of the most critical areas of cyber defense. Cyber Hotel also
commented on the significance of this criterion. Cyber Bravo further commented that a
lack of clear standardization makes it extremely difficult to defend the networks.
Developing a set of procedures that would serve as the basic requirements for every
defender would be beneficial for the successful defense of networks. Since all defenders
use a lot of the same equipment, developing guidelines on how to protect systems would
allow for a wider array of information exchange amongst cyber operators.
Cyber Bravo, Cyber Charlie, and Cyber Ice-Man required validation on the criterion.
Cyber Foxtrot rated this criterion “Least Effective” and recommended a general
framework with an operational framework to facilitate an operationally adaptable CCDF.
The researcher responded to Cyber Bravo, Charlie and Ice-Man’s comments to change
the criterion to read, “The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational
operations.” The change focused more on the CCDF opposed the cyber defense in
general. Additionally, the researcher responded to Cyber Foxtrot’s comments by
refocusing the respondent towards the goal of the research to create a better
understanding of comprehensive cybersecurity, not to solve cybersecurity defense.
Although, Cyber Foxtrot’s recommendation to map general frameworks such as NIST or
ISO/IEC 17799/2700 with more operational frameworks such as Lockheed Martin’s
Cyber Kill Chain was taken into consideration for CCDF development and substantiated
the literature review and content analysis (Donaldson et al., 2015b)
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Criterion 5 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must include behavioral
factors of friendly and malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers)
Criterion 5 average rating was 3.6. 10% of respondents rated this criterion “Least
Effective,” 10% rated “Slightly Effective,” 10% “Effective,” 50% “Highly Effective,”
and 20% “Most Effective.” The criterion did not meet inclusion into the CCDF prototype
during this round, and six respondents added comments for improvements. The 70% of
respondents rated this criterion Highly Effective or Most Effective with strong supporting
comments on behavioral aspects of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense.
Cyber India responded that this was the most important factor of the seven. Cyber
Charlie’s response varied widely from the other experts and argued the section was light
on support. The researcher responded with clarification to base ratings on expert
experience. Cyber Foxtrot rated this criterion “Slightly Effective” and argued that
CALOs must change the culture to promote security and build awareness. The researcher
responded directly to Cyber Foxtrot to clarify the goal of the research to understand cyber
defense and to change the culture of malicious hackers, or even friendly insiders were not
the goal of this work.
Criterion 6 feedback – Stakeholders must easily understand the comprehensive
cybersecurity defense framework
Criterion 6 average rating was 4.4, with 10% of respondents grading as “Effective,”
40% of respondents answered “Highly Effective,” and 50% answered “Most Effective.”
The criterion met CCDF prototype inclusion, and five respondents added comments for
improvement. The criterion was widely accepted for inclusion into the CCDF prototype.
Respondents comments were primarily complementary to stakeholder understanding of
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comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Cyber Hotel further provided further insight of
stakeholders leverage over small and medium-sized organizations. The respondent
explained that the 3rd party trusts relationships between CALOs and smaller
organizations. The associated risks drive smaller organizations to align cyber defense
methodologies with CALOs for mission-dependent services and products. A point for
future research, complimentary to criterion 2 for interdependencies, and validated by the
literature review and content analysis.
Criterion 7 feedback – Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must identify roles and
responsibilities of personnel responsible for defending CALOs
Criterion 7 average rating was 4.4, with 10% of respondents grading as “Effective,”
40% of respondents answered “Highly Effective,” and 50% answered “Most Effective.”
The criterion met CCDF prototype inclusion, and six respondents added comments for
improvement. The criterion was widely accepted for inclusion into the CCDF prototype.
All responses from panel members were complimentary to the preliminary information
provided. Cyber Foxtrot argued that identifying roles and responsibilities may not only
identify gaps in but identify duplicative efforts in cyber defense. Cyber Hotel offered
clear roles and responsibilities allow appropriate resource planning for current and future
requirements while ensuring the necessary duties are assigned to the appropriate
functions. The comments facilitated the development of the CCDF roles portion of the
CCDF prototype.
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General Comments
Respondents were allowed to correspond with the researcher for any questions or
clarification of the work. Several respondents provided insightful feedback to the
researcher, which the researcher distributed to the group during round 2. Cyber Bravo
noticed that in the description of the research the title, "Towards a Comprehensive
Cybersecurity Defense Framework" was provided yet only criterion 6 mentioned the
framework. This may have resulted in the large scoring gaps found in criterion 2, 4, and
5. For example, the goal, title, problem statement, and Delphi process clearly stated the
panel is building a framework to understand cybersecurity defense, but the criterion that
was being rated did not state “framework” in each of the criterion areas. This problem
caused several respondents to assume the goal was to solve cyber defense for CALOs
generally, vice provides a “framework” for understanding cyber defense. Panel input
proved critical, which improved clarification and ratings during round 2.
Cyber Defense Expert Panel Phase 1 Round 2
The modified criterion was presented to the expert team for round 2 based on general
respondent feedback. The ratings, shared comments of all the Delph panel members, and
the researcher’s comments were also presented in the panel spreadsheet (Appendixes O).
The average results and comparison to round 1 for the ten responses are depicted in
Appendix P. The rating for criterion 1 yielded an average score of 4.5, criterion 2 was
4.1, criterion 3 was 4.4, criterion 4 was 4.2, criterion 5 was 4.0, criterion 6 was 4.7, and
criterion 7 was 4.4. All seven criteria areas met the 4.0 or above average ratings for the
CCDF prototype build and finalized phase 1 of the Delph expert panel.
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Criterion 1 feedback - The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF)
must account for virtual as well as physical threat factors
Criterion 1 rating increased from 4.2 to 4.5, with 50% of respondents rating as
“Highly Effective” and 50% of respondents rating “Most Effective.” The group
consensus was primarily based on round 1 comments. Cyber Ice-Man rating changed
from “Effective” to “Most Effective.” Comments from other panel members provided
added insight for a two-level increase. Cyber Foxtrot highlighted encrypted tunneling and
the required ability to “break and inspect” encrypted traffic. It was noted that defenders
lack of ability to defend encrypted traffic caused some lack of awareness to include
virtual traffic defense. Government defenders are required to be aware of encrypted
traffic and to identify this to stakeholders.
Criterion 2 feedback - The CCDF must account for inter-dependencies of outside
organizations
Criterion 2 rating increased from 3.7 to 4.1 and was added to the baseline criterion for
CCDF development. 10% of respondents rated this criterion “Effective,” 70% rated
“Highly Effective,” and 20% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Alpha added supporting
comments to this criterion advocating for partnerships and collaboration with outside
organizations to defend interdependencies and the significance of supporting policy and
documentation for firm agreements between CALO partners. Cyber Bravo rating changed
from “Slightly Effective” to “Effective” based on group ratings. Cyber Bravo argued
more specificity in this criterion, adding interdependencies should not necessarily be with
the organization but the information exchange between organizations. The researcher
noted this insight into CCDF development.
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Cyber Charlie rating changed from “Slightly Effective” to “Highly Effective” based
on group input and MITRE corporation personal experience on trusted relationships
between organizations.
Criterion 3 feedback - The CCDF must use a common lexicon by internal and external
organization
Criterion 3 rating increased from 4 to 4.4 and was added to the baseline criterion for
CCDF development. 10% of respondents rated this criterion “Effective,” 40% rated
“Highly Effective,” and 50% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Foxtrot rating changed from
“Least Effective” to Effective qualifying this as a CCDF criterion. The rating change was
based on the CNSS 4009 provided by the researcher and mandated by the federal
government. All other panel members graded this criterion “Highly Effective” or “Most
Effective” in round 1 so influence from the group was also a factor. Cyber Hotel
responded utilization of a common lexicon is not just for the benefit of operations
internally, but the relative cost to external relationships. In the same way, intelligence not
shared in the context of doctrine is weakened and arguably no longer intelligence. The
collection of information for internal consumption wherein different taxonomies imply
words like stage, breach, intrusion, and malware are not equal to a global instantiation.
Ideally, even internal lexicons are mapped to global frameworks - as it enables low-cost
adoptions of externally created value-added products.
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Criterion 4 feedback - The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational
operations
Criterion 4 rating changed from 3.2 to 4.2 and was added to the baseline criterion for
CCDF development. 20% of respondents rated this criterion “Effective,” 40% rated
“Highly Effective,” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” This criterion was by far the most
challenging for group understanding and consensus. During round 1 several panel
members who had experience on specific frameworks and concepts of cyber defense
could not grasp an organizationally agnostic cybersecurity framework. Based on panel
member input the criterion changed from “operation” to “organizational operations” and
“comprehensive cyber defense” changed to “comprehensive cybersecurity defense
framework.” Cyber Bravo and Cyber Hotel both noted the term operation leans more
towards defense and government, adding the term CCDF (comprehensive cybersecurity
defense framework) to each of the criteria would keep panel members focused on the
goal towards the development of the CCDF prototype.
Cyber Alpha added supporting comments on the criticality of this criterion. Cyber
Alpha argued, stakeholder requirements drive organizational operations in defining what
is to be defended and failing to develop a CCDF that would address organizational
operations requirements across CALOs would disqualify the term “comprehensive” in the
framework. Cyber Bravo rating changed from “Lease Effective” to “Most Effective”
once confusion concerning the criterion was fully clarified and understood. Cyber Charlie
rating changed from “Slightly Effective” to “Highly Effective” and Cyber Delta rating
changed from “Effective” to “Highly Effective” due to criterion clarification. Cyber
Foxtrot rating changed from “Lease Effective” to Effective based on comments from
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Cyber Alpha and clarification of the criterion. Cyber Ironic rating changed from
“Effective” to “Highly Effective” and Cyber India rating change “Highly Effective” to
“Effective” based on aggregate panel member ratings in general.
Criterion 5 feedback - The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and
malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers)
Criterion 5 rating increased from 3.6 to 4 and was added to the baseline criterion for
CCDF development. 10% rated this criterion “Effective,” 80% rated “Highly Effective,”
and 10% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Charlie rating changed from “Least Effective” to
“Highly Effective” based on round 1 comments and rating from other panel members.
Cyber Foxtrot rating changed reluctantly from “Slightly Effective” to “Effective” based
on panel member comments and ratings. Cyber Foxtrot recognized the advanced
approaches adversaries take to gain a foothold in CALOs. A fact that would be taken into
consideration during CCDF development. Action-oriented frameworks such as Lockheed
Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain tracks enemy behavior throughout the lifecycle of an attack.
Cyber Ice-Man rating changed from “Effective” to “Highly Effective” based on
collective group influence. Additionally, Cyber Ice-Man recently saw a 72% decrease of
insiders falling victim to phishing attacks due to user awareness training in the panel
member’s CALO. Finally, Cyber India rating changed from “Most Effective” to “Highly
Effective,” the only panel member with a rating downgrade based on the input and
comments of fellow panel members.
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Criterion 6 feedback - Stakeholders must easily understand the CCDF
Criterion 6 rating increased from 4.4 to 4.7. 30% rated this criterion “Highly Effective”
and 70% rated “Most Effective”. The group consensus was primarily based on round 1
comments. Cyber Bravo and Cyber Ironic ratings changed from “Highly Effective” to
“Most Effective” based on round 1 panel members comments. Cyber India rating
changed from “Effective” to “Highly Effective” based on round 1 comments and panel
member ratings.
Criterion 7 The CCDF must identify roles and responsibilities of personnel responsible
for defending CALOs
Criterion 7 ratings remained at 4.0 although two panel members rating changed. 60%
rated this criterion “Highly Effective” and 40% rated “Most Effective”. Cyber Delta
rating changed from “Effective” to “Highly Effective” due to the round 1 comments and
criterion clarification. Cyber India rating changed from “Most Effective” to “Highly
Effective” based on round 1 ratings and comments.

Answer to Research Question Two: Development and Evaluation of the CCDF
Artifact
To capture the seven criteria areas, the prototype design is based on cyber defense
tasks, what those tasks are intended to do, where the tasks occur in CALOs, and who is
conducting the tasks. To capture the criterion requirements, the NIST RMF, the
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (LM CKC), and the defense in depth framework were
mapped to CNSS cyber defender roles.
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The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) core categories of Identify, Protect,
Detect, Respond, and Recover identified the tasks. NIST covers general topics for all
CALOS; baselining policy, asset management, and governance are general practices that
should be conducted by all CALOs. Protect, Detect and Respond core areas are more
defensive driven and outline CALO risk factors. The prototype operationalized the NIST
core tasks by mapping to more actionable frameworks such as Lockheed Martin’s Cyber
Kill Chain and the Defense in Depth model.
NIST RMF fulfills four of the CCDF criterions. It accounts for virtual as well as
physical threat factors. The identify asset management category looks at physical and
virtual accountability in the framework, identify management also looks at who has
access to make changes to virtual and physical devices in the organization, fulfilling
Criterion 1. NIST RMF also accounts for inter-dependencies of outside organizations.
Supply chain risk management under the identify core task is an example of how this
framework looks at outside interdependencies.
NIST RMF utilizes the CNSS glossary as a common lexicon for cyber security,
addressing criterion 3. Additionally, NIST RMF is applicable regardless of organizational
operations. As stated in the NIST guide, “The framework can be used in various sized
organizations regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity
sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to
improving the security and resilience of critical infrastructure” (Vijayan, 2017, p. 1). The
Framework provides organization and structure encompassing multiple approaches to
cybersecurity by assembling standards, guidelines, and practices that are working
effectively in industry today. Moreover, because it references globally recognized
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standards for cybersecurity, the framework can also be used by organizations located
outside the United States and can serve as a model for international cooperation on
strengthening critical infrastructure and cybersecurity.
Lockheed Martin’s CKC addresses “what” defenders will be doing. The CKC
provides actions defender will take based on the task. The CKC addressed criterion 4 and
was added to the prototype due to its extensive use in government and industry and its
ability to detect behaviors of adversarial actions in CALOs. The CKC fulfills criterion 5
due to the framework’s ability to address the behavior of attackers and friendly users as a
process in which defenders can see. The CKC depicts a step-by-step process taken by
adversaries to achieve objectives. Adversaries, conduct reconnaissance on networks to
determine the type of weapon to use on CALO networks. They then deliver a payload to
exploit the target. Further in the process, installation of the malware or malicious code is
conducted on the target, the adversary then commands the host/s. Finally, once all the
previous six steps are achieved in the CKC, the enemy has action on objectives or owns
the targeted host/s.
Oracle’s defense in depth model depicts the “where” defense will happen in the
CCDF. The layered approach provided by the defense in depth model accounts for
criterion 2 or interdependencies as this model, data, application, endpoint, and internal
network layers provides several defense vectors for the CCDF while, the perimeter, and
physical layers addresses outside organization defense. Virtual and physical threat factors
are also addressed in the upper and lower layers of the defense in depth model accounting
for criterion 2. Finally, the defense in depth model is widely used by industry and
government addressing criterion 4.
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The Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) provides a common lexicon for
the CCDF and addresses criterion 3. The CNSS not only clearly defines the roles in the
CCDF but explains terminology between defenders and stakeholders throughout the
CALO. Figure 8 displays the CCDF prototype artifact. Appendix M provides a complete
walkthrough mapping cyber roles, to NIST RMF task, CKC steps, and defense in depth
layers. The panel of experts were provided a 20-minute walkthrough of the framework.
Panel members provided feedback for development and improvement during phase 2,
answering research questions two, “In what ways does the CCDF meet the established
criterion?”.

Figure 8. CCDF Prototype Artifact
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Cyber Defense Expert Panel Phase 2 Round 1
The CCDF prototype presentation was presented to the expert team for round 1 rating.
The average results for the ten responses are depicted in Appendix Q. The rating for
Criterion 1 yielded an average score of 4.4, criterion 2 was 4, criterion 3 was 4.5,
criterion 4 was 4.5, criterion 5 was 4.3, criterion 6 was 4.6, and criterion 7 was 4.5. The
CCDF met all seven criterion areas at the 4.0 or above average rating. Panel members
facilitation in the development of the prototype heavily influenced the high ratings.
Questions concerning the build of the prototype were allowed before voting to ensure
members understood the artifact.
Cyber Bravo made two recommendations. The respondent first requested that the
criterion areas be explained through the presentations to allow members to evaluate the
CCDF process against the criterion areas. Cyber Bravo argued that many of the functions
of the framework was implied, but this addition to the walkthrough would make the
CCDF simpler for stakeholders to understand. Cyber Bravo also recommended to make
the matrixed relationships between CCDF simpler to map the “roles” (CNSS) to the
“task” (NIST RMF), then to the CKC “what,” and finally to the “where” (defense in
depth). This made the process simpler and less confusing visually. Before voting the
researcher mapped the roles to the NIST CCF, then to the LM CKC.
During development, Cyber Hotel recommended the researcher sample the usability of
the framework to further comprehension of the CCDF based on the mapping. The
researcher added the matrixed spreadsheet to show how the CCDF derives a
comprehensive approach through the mapping of the three key frameworks and the CNSS

100

roles. Furthermore, the researcher graphically depicted how cyber defense requirements,
capabilities, and tools are derived from the CCDF in the presentation (Appendix M).
Cyber Alpha, Bravo, Echo, and Hotel also recommended based on round 1, that the
researcher clearly describe how the CCDF accounted for virtual interdependencies which
drove modifications to the defense in depth, and the NIST RMF narration. Once the
feedback from all respondents was collected and panel members validated the CCDF
against the seven criteria areas for comprehensive cybersecurity, the researcher updated
the presentation for stakeholder evaluation. The feedback would be incorporated into the
stakeholders’ evaluation panel.
Criterion 1 feedback - Does the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework
(CCDF) prototype account for virtual as well as physical threat factors
Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.4 for criterion 1. 60% of respondents rated this
area “Highly Effective” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Hotel recommended a
requirements validation process, specifically around use-cases and capabilities to add
maturity to the validation mechanism. Additionally, as part of capabilities, an element of
mapping data sources to each threat to understand what data is required from each
capability. This assessment was based conceptually on the approach. The incorporation
of roles including physical responsibilities (admins, engineers, users/operators) was
inclusive in the CCDF mapping.
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Criterion 2 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype account for inter-dependencies of
outside organizations
Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4 for criterion 2. 40% of panel members rated this
area “Effective,” 20% rated “Highly Effective,” and 40% rated “Most Effective.”
Feedback from several panel members implied this as the most difficult to explain in the
CCDF. Cyber Bravo and Echo argued interdependencies as an implied task in the CCDF
but not explicit in the mapping. Cyber Ice-man recommended an added description of the
internet of things and artificial intelligence may need clarification in “where” defense
happens in the CCDF, a point for future research. Cyber Foxtrot added risks from
contracts which fall outside the scope of the research, but the researcher explained the
CCDF roles would map to specifically “who” is conducting the defending.
Criterion 3 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype use a common lexicon by internal and
external organization
Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.6 for criterion 3. 10% rated this area “Effective,”
20% rated this area “Highly Effective,” and “70% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Bravo
explained that use-cases should be derived not only from CALOs incident management
but from conventional sources to allow for a predictive defense based on broader risk
factors. Cyber Bravo’s input was added in the stakeholder presentation and as a point of
future work for CCDF application.
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Criterion 4 feedback - Is the CCDF prototype applicable regardless of organizational
operations
Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.5 for criterion 4. 60% of panel members rated
this area “Highly Effective” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” All panel members agreed
the true test of the prototype being organizationally agnostic was theoretical without
future studies of the CCDF against several CALOs. Although, all respondents agreed the
CCDF met the criterion and would theoretically achieve comprehensive cybersecurity
defense.
Criterion 5 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype include behavioral factors of friendly
and malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers)
Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.5 for criterion 5. 70% rated this area “Effective”
and 30% rated “Most Effective.” Panel members argued criterion 5 as primarily
theoretical until applied practically to CALOs. Although the LM CKC is a proven
behavioral model, mapping the association to cyber defense methodologies has not been
proven. Cyber Alpha, Bravo, and Foxtrot argued the CCDF not only evaluates a
comprehensive approach to cyber defense, but also provides an evaluation of the
applicability of the associated frameworks. For the purpose of this research, the criterion
did meet the objective of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Future
work applying the CCDF will provide further insight on the effectiveness of cyber
defense.
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Criterion 6 feedback - Can stakeholders easily understand the CCDF prototype
Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.6 for criterion 6. 10% rated this area “Effective,”
20% rated “Highly Effective,” and 70% rated “Most Effective.” All but one of the panel
members argued that the CCDF was easy to follow. Cyber Bravo commented on how
complicated cyber defense is and regarded the CCDF as monumental in its simplistic
approach to understanding comprehensive cyber defense.
Criterion 7 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype identify roles and responsibilities of
personnel responsible for defending CALOs
Expert defenders rated the CCDF 4.5 for criterion 7. 10% rated this area “Effective,”
30% rated “Highly Effective,” and 70% rated “Most Effective.” All panel members
agreed clearly defined standard roles and responsibilities are salient to comprehensive
cyber defense. Cyber Bravo argued that the roles used in the CCDF may be generic
enough to account for the major defense disciplines within CALOs but may not be
specific enough to capture comprehensive cyber defense. Cyber Hotel argued in some
CALOs roles may propagate across mapped CCDF disciplines. A key point for future
work was indicated by panel member although, the objective of the CCDF is to identify
the individual conducting cyber defense, not to dictate to CALOs who is doing the
defending. The CCDF as identified in the presentation may point out overlapping
defense or gaps in defense based on CALO cyber defense requirements, capabilities, and
tools. In doing so, overlapping roles, cyber defense applications, and equipment or lack
of these resources may be identified.
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Answers to Research Question Two and Three: Stakeholder Evaluation and
Communication of the Artifact
Stakeholder Panel Evaluation Round 1
The Stakeholder evaluation was similar to the evaluation of the CCDF conducted by
the team of cyber defense experts. Stakeholder code names were also similar to the expert
panel, although stakeholders were from a distinctly different demographic of information
owners, CIOs, CEOs, and other cyber executives. The CCDF presentation was modified
based on the feedback derived from Phase II of the team of experts. Particular care was
taken to ensure criterion 2, 4, and 5 were explained in the CCDF presentation. The
criteria mentioned above did not successfully pass the Expert Delph panel first round
during Phase 1.
Stakeholders were reminded that the goal of the panel was to evaluate the CCDF. No
CCDF modifications would result from the feedback although, panel member
recommendations would be used for future work. Stakeholders were presented with a 25minute presentation of the CCDF and its functionality (Appendix M). Stakeholders were
then asked to evaluate the framework based on the seven criterion areas. The stakeholder
evaluation yielded conclusive results that the CCDF met the seven criteria areas in the
first round. Criterion 1 rated 4.4, criterion 2, rated 4.2, criterion 3 rated 4.3, criterion 4
rated, 4.4, criterion 5 rated 4.4 criterion 6 rated 4.6 and criterion 7 rated 4.7 (Appendix
R). Additional comments from the stakeholders (Appendix S) are added along with the
comments from the expert panel for future research.
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Criterion 1 feedback - Does the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework
(CCDF) prototype account for virtual as well as physical threat factors
Stakeholder average ratings for criterion 1 was 4.4. 10% of respondents rated this
criterion “Effective,” 40% rated Highly “Effective,” and 50% rated “Most Effective.”
Cyber Bravo commented that the presentation effectively depicted how
interdependencies can be developed. Salient to the research, this confirms an
understanding of the framework mappings. Interdependencies are derived from mapping
the tasks, to what defenders are doing, to who is defending CALO virtual and physical
layers. Cyber Delta argued the CCDF would consistently have to be updated technology
evolves. Complimenting the expert panel comments, Cyber Golf argued the challenges of
encrypted traffic. This will be a topic for future research as the CCDF is applied
practically. Although we are not trying to defend encrypted data outside a CALO’s scope
of control for this work, we must identify the encrypted data at the proper defense layers.
In doing this, CALOs stakeholders can accept or reject the risks. What we tend to see is
the avoidance of encrypted traffic altogether because defenders cannot see the data, and
this places organizations at risks. Additionally, we capture interdependencies in the
framework to account for encrypted data. Cyber Hotel commented defense in depth and
the NIST CKC mapping accounted for interdependencies.
Criterion 2 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype account for interdependencies of
outside organizations
Stakeholder average ratings for criterion 2 was 4.2. 10% rated this criterion
“Effective,” 60% rated “Highly Effective,” and 30% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Alpha
commented practical CCDF use is needed to verify if interdependencies are defended
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although the goal of the research is to understand that interdependencies are a factor in
comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Cyber Golf argued that this criterion is hard to
defend since interdependencies may not fall under stakeholder’s control. Furthermore,
similar to expert panel comments, contract oversight may be a factor not indicative in the
CCDF mapping. This was again a comment made during the expert panel. Although
contract oversight is covered in the identify task of NIST, more practical use in a heavily
contracted CALO setting may be a potential future research area.
Criterion 3 feedback – Does the CCDF use a common lexicon by internal and external
organizations
Stakeholder average ratings for criterion 3 was 4.3. 10% rated this criterion
“Effective,” 50% rated “Highly Effective,” and 40% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Delta
warned that consistent validation of CNSS would be required. The CNSS Working Group
regularly convenes to review and update the CNSS glossary (Dukes, 2015). Cyber Echo
argued the CNSS as an authoritative lexicon source although, most organizations tend to
create their own language. CALOs that defend international cyber assets must use a
common language for comprehensive cyber defense (Manjikian, 2017).
Criterion 4 feedback - Is the CCDF prototype applicable regardless of organizational
operations
Stakeholder average rating for criterion 4 was 4.4. 10% of respondents rated this
criterion “Effective,” 40% rated “Highly Effective,” and 50% rated “Most Effective.”
Cyber Bravo was the only panel member to rate this criterion “Effective” arguing
application would be the true test. All other participants rating criterion 4 “Highly
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Effective” or “Most Effective” This would require future work in several different types
of CALOs. For example, the DOD would be a largely different organizational setting that
says a more public CALO like Facebook or any large university. Cyber Delta commented
that utilization of widely accepted frameworks covered all CALO mission space and
rated this criterion “Most Effective.”
Criterion 5 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype include behavioral factors of friendly
and malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers)
Stakeholder average rating for criterion 5 was 4.4. 10% of respondents rated this
criterion “Effective,” 40% rated “Highly Effective,” 50% “Most Effective.” Cyber Alpha
rated this criterion “Effective” and commented that although individual frameworks
indirectly addressed trusted insider but questioned the ability of the CCDF to function in
reverse order towards the roles. For example, how does a CALO detect reconnaissance?
The researcher addressed this response as a future practical study and contended a CALO
would not detect reconnaissance. For example, a user can detect latency on his host
computer as, latency, a web camera turning on, or key-logging. The user would then
report the anomaly to the system administrator or network defender. The CCDF can also
help CALOs identify tools users and system administrators can use such as systems logs,
network analysis tools, or host intrusion detection tools. Users must be engaged in the
framework to make the CCDF comprehensive. Cyber Charlie rated this CCDF criterion
“Most Effective” as the CKC helped the panel member’s organization make decisions on
whether to act or watch enemy behavior. Cyber Charlie added “This framework forces us
to address more details into where the behavior is happening in defense stages. Great
tool!”
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Criterion 6 feedback - Can stakeholders easily understand the CCDF prototype
Stakeholder average rating for criterion 6 was 4.6. 10% of respondents rated this
criterion “Effective,” 20% rated “Highly Effective” and 70% rated “Most Effective.”
This criterion was arguably the most relevant to panel members, as this portion of the
study was an evaluation of the CCDF by the stakeholders. Cyber Alpha was the only
stakeholder to rate this criterion “Effective”. The member added, “The meshing of
frameworks is easily understood; however, a database that can query based on the who,
task, what, and where would make it easier for anyone working cyber defense to find a
requirement, capability, or tool, although a database maybe outside the scope of this
research.” The researcher added; the spreadsheet depicted in the presentation was
completed utilizing the Access Database application from Microsoft Office. The
application can easily group mappings forward and backward, focus on specific roles,
tasks, CKC, and NIST Core functions. Analyzing the database is certainly an area for
future work. Cyber Bravo graded this criterion “Most Effective” and added, “Very easy
to understand and brings clarity to the more complicated frameworks in the CCDF. The
first practical approach I've seen is confusing frameworks like ISO, NIST 800-30, et al.”
Cyber Delta commented on the need for stakeholders to have some background in this
area. This is a topic for a completely different type of study, but stakeholder experience
in understanding the information systems they own and employing the proper resources
efficiently in their respective CALOs is a problem. The Chaos Manifesto speaks
specifically to CEOs assigning information owners with little experience to major cyber
projects as a serious problem (Manifesto, 2013).
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Criterion 7 feedback - Does the CCDF prototype identify roles and responsibilities of
personnel responsible for defending CALOs
Stakeholder average rating for criterion 7 was 4.7 and was the highest criterion rating
of the CCDF by stakeholders. 30% of respondents rated this criterion “Highly Effective”
and 70% rated “Most Effective.” Cyber Gold commented, “Roles vary based on
organization, and everyone should be conducting defense. I like the fact that the initial
mapping has all the roles mapped to the where, what, and the task. In many of instances,
we disenfranchise our folks by not engaging them in the defense actions.” Cyber Foxtrot
added that this criterion seems implied but is not always clear and further added:
“Excellent job of mapping the people to the tasks.” All other respondents saw this
criterion as straight forward and needed for comprehensive cyber defense.
Answer to Research Question Three: Communications of the Artifact
The narrated presentation in Appendix M represents communication of the artifact.
First to the expert panel and secondly to the panel of stakeholders. This dissertation
report represents further communications of the artifact to the dissertation chair,
committee members, and the Nova Southeastern University College of Engineering and
Computing with the intent to be published through ProQuest.
Summary
Through literature review and content analysis, seven criteria statements for
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity cyber defense were derived. The seven
criterion areas were then presented to a panel of 10 expert cyber defenders to validate and
refine during phase 1. Each criterion was required to meet an average of 4 on a Likert
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scale to be adopted as a criterion for the development of the CCDF prototype. The expert
panel completed two rounds before untimely agreeing to incorporate all seven criterion
areas into the CCDF prototype.
Phase 2 of the expert panel required members to facilitate the development of the
CCDF prototype. During phase 1 panel members were provided a spreadsheet of the most
prominent frameworks and provided feedback which drove the researcher to refine the
CCDF. The CCDF was developed by mapping the NIST RMF, Lockheed Martin CKC
and the defense in depth model. The CNSS guide was utilized as a standard lexicon for
the CCDF and to define the roles. Expert panel members were then provided with a 20minute presentation of the CCDF prototype to evaluate against the agreed-upon criteria.
The consensus was reached that the CCDF met all seven criteria statements during the
first round. Once the final comments and revisions were published, and the CCDF
prototype was complete, the researcher recruited a second and separate panel of
cybersecurity stakeholders to evaluate the CCDF.
The second Delph panel provided an objective view of the CCDF prototype by 10
CALO stakeholders. The stakeholder panel provided a consensus that the CCDF
prototype met the seven criteria statements in the first round. Analyzed comments from
the expert and stakeholder rounds provided the researcher implications for future research
and communication of the artifact.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Introduction
Atoum et al. (2014) contended that current cybersecurity frameworks defending
against cyber-attacks are fragmented and vary widely in effectiveness. Donaldson et al.
(2015a) argued there was no common framework for clearly understanding what
constitutes comprehensive cybersecurity defense. This lack of understanding causes an
inability of current cybersecurity frameworks to sufficiently capture comprehensive
organizational security requirements. The primary purpose of this research was to
understand what comprehensive cybersecurity defense is. To do this, we first identified a
criterion for comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Through the literature review and
content analysis, we derived seven criteria statements. The criteria statements were
validated and refined by a panel of cyber defense experts using the Delphi process to
build consensus. The criteria list was utilized to develop and prototype the CCDF which
the team of cyber defense experts tested against the seven criteria. A separate panel of
stakeholders then evaluated the CCDF, utilizing the Delphi process toward evaluation of
the CCDF against the criteria.
In chapter 5 the conclusion, implication, and recommendations are presented. The
conclusion addresses the research questions and the seven criteria. The implications
section addresses the relevance of this research to the information and cybersecurity body
of knowledge and potential value for CALOs. The recommendation section outlines the
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potential for practical application of the CCDF in CALOs and various additional areas for
future research. Finally, the summery is presented.

Conclusion
This section relates answers derived for the research questions addressing the
problem, the associated impact to the information systems security field, and academic
body of knowledge. The research problem is then placed into context of the existing body
of knowledge through the literature review. The third subsection will describe the
methods employed to address the research problem in terms of how the research
questions were derived and answered. The fourth subsection depicts the impact the
answers obtained to the research questions have on future research. Finally, the fifth
section explains how the answers to the research questions impact the research problem.
Impact on the Research Problem
To address the research problem of no common framework for understanding what
constitutes comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs, we built a comprehensive
cybersecurity defense framework (CCDF) artifact. Towards the development of the
CCDF, we asked three research questions. What criteria does the CCDF artifact have to
meet to be considered a comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs? In
what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a comprehensive
cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs? And, what future areas of research may be
explored in understanding a more comprehensive approach to cybersecurity defense?
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The problem of not understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense and the
impact this problem has not only on CALOs, but national security is salient to doctoral
level research inquiry. Tatar et al. (2014) argued that cybersecurity has become one of the
most serious national security concerns in the United States. Tarter et al. (2014)
conducted a correlation study which compared the national cybersecurity strategies
between the US, Turkey, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Correlation between specific properties of each nation included economic, political,
informational, and military tenants of national power. The study showed nations digital
infrastructures as a strategic national asset which largely influenced all remaining tenants
of national power. Understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense addresses the
fundamental element of protecting national interests from enemy attacks. Tarter et al.
(2014) further argued that while specifically in the military domain of national power,
clearer offensive and defensive lines are drawn between land, air, and naval forces. Yet,
in the cyber domain, both military and civil organizations struggle with understanding
‘active defense’. The US has held a position of economic and military strength for
decades, although the cyber arena provides enemy states and asymmetric advantage
which places all tenants of US national power at risks. Healey (2012), contended that
cyber defense is enormously expensive, involves massive investments of fanatical and
human resources, technologies, processes, and even basic human behavior to comply
with proper information security procedures. The developing a framework for
understanding cybersecurity defense provides a more definitive means of protecting
CALOs and closes the gaps between the informational and other tenants of national
power.

114

Impact on the Body of Knowledge
The literature review reveals compelling evidence of the gaps in cybersecurity
defense. Donaldson et al. (2015b) argued current frameworks and security processes used
to date are beneficial, but does not address a clear understanding of what comprehensive
cybersecurity defense is. Furthermore, current frameworks do not address what
constitutes comprehensive organizational cybersecurity defense based on CALO strategic
objectives. Most frameworks address general control and compliance for organizations
without consideration to the scope, size and operational context of cybersecurity defense
(Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Donaldson et al., 2015a).
The literature further revealed cybersecurity frameworks were systemically
categorized towards certification, specific privacy or risk management guides, and
regulatory means to conduct organizational practices (Donaldson et al., 2015b). Atoum
et al. (2014) contended that current cybersecurity frameworks defending against cyberattacks were fragmented and vary widely in effectiveness. Table 1 presented a
comparative overview of the most widely used frameworks, the pros and cons of each,
peer-reviewed articles and contributions to the body of knowledge. Table 1 further
provided the researcher and panel participants an overview the disparate frameworks, and
referenced why understanding comprehensive cyber defense is critical to defending
CALOs.
The content analysis conducted utilizing the NVivo software facilitated key-word
association for hundreds of research articles. The software processed unstructured data to
be compiled, compared, and analyzed in an efficient, non-biased manner. Nodes were
created based on the research problem, literature review, and word frequency. Similar

115

terms were combined based on the analysis, which was further validated by the expert
panel.
The content analysis provided objective development and a starting point for the
CCDF criteria based on the literature review (Coakes & Coakes, 2009). The content
analysis further allowed the researcher to put cyber defense criteria into meaningful
categories, which were further validated by cyber defense experts.
Methods Employed to Address the Research Problem
Design science was used as the research approach, and developmental research was
utilized to develop the CCDF artifact. The research was comprised of two panels. The
first panel of experts refined the criteria for the CCDF based on the literature review and
content analysis, and secondly to facilitate the development of the CCDF, and ensure the
prototype met the established criteria. The second panel was comprised of cybersecurity
stakeholders to evaluate the CCDF developed by the expert panel.
The literature review and content analysis supplemented by the cyber defense experts
answered the first research question, “What Criterion does the CCDF artifact have to
meet to be considered a comprehensive defensive cybersecurity framework for
CALOs?”.
The seven criteria statements provided a baseline for the CCDF for what needed to be
considered for comprehensive approach to cyber defense. The implications of defining a
criteria for the CCDF and appropriately scoping the criteria for CALOs provides
researchers a new way of looking at and potentially developing information and
cybersecurity frameworks. As stated previously, traditional frameworks are more
specified towards compliance, risk management, certification, and controls.
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A developmental approach was used to construct the artifact and address the second
research question, “In what ways does the CCDF meet the criteria established for a
comprehensive cybersecurity defense framework for CALOs?”. The CCDF met the
criteria through rigorous expert and stakeholder panel interaction and analyzing the
discussions between panel members during Phases 1 and 2 as well as the stakeholder
panel evaluation round. The panel rounds influenced the build of the CCDF prototype
and how the prototype addressed the criteria statements. Respondents heavily influenced
the mapping of prominent frameworks to create the CCDF prototype. Respondents also
added risk management and threat analysis as driving factors of general applicability for
the CCDF prototype. The CCDF leverages "what" defenders must do to understand cyber
defense by mapping core NIST RMF "tasks." Furthermore, we operationalized the CCDF
by adding the CKC for understanding enemy behaviors as a process. The CCDF also tells
us where to defend the behavior in the defense in depth model and who is explicitly
responsible for the defense action utilizing the CNSS (Smith, 2019).
To adopt cyber defense methodologies and apply manning and monetary resources to
any cybersecurity program requires the buy-in of the CALO stakeholders (Asti, 2017;
Hua & Bapna, 2013; Manifesto, 2013). The motivation behind this work is based partly
on the challenges of stakeholders to grasp a clear understanding of cybersecurity defense
and the associated operational risks involved. Stakeholder feedback of the CCDF
demonstration was positive, and several requests were made to put the CCDF to use in
stakeholder respective CALOs. The stakeholder evaluation culminates rigorous testing
and evaluation as part of the design science and developmental research process (Ellis &
Levy, 2010).

117

The third research question was, “What future areas of research may be explored in
understanding a more comprehensive approach to cybersecurity defense?”. The research
question was answered by analyzing the results of the expert panel and stakeholder’s
questionnaires concerning research questions one and two. The results of the data derived
from the first two research questions provided a path for future research.
Communications of the artifact is the final step in design science and publication of
this work in the ProQuest dissertation database will be the first release of the completed
study. The researcher was selected to 2018 the Hawaii International Conference on
System Science doctoral fellowship for preliminary work concerning a comprehensive
approach to cyber defense. Top scholars and mentors have accepted this work as
significantly promising for future research in the IS field (Dr. Robert Biggs, Dr. Jay
Nunamaker and Dr. Stacy Petter, HICSS Mentors, personal communications, January 9,
2018). The work was also presented at the Hawaii Armed Forces, Communications and
Electronics TechNet Conference in Honolulu November 15, 2018. Finally, the researcher
will continue to seek opportunities to publish the work at academic and federal
government conferences. The impact of this work is promising in the area of new and
more holistic approaches to cybersecurity frameworks.
Answers to the Research Questions
Based on the literature review, content analysis, and the expert panel, seven criteria
statements were established below to answer research question one, “What Criterion does
the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive defensive
cybersecurity framework for CALOs?”.
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1. The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) must account for
virtual as well as physical threat factors (4.5)
2. The CCDF must account for interdependencies of outside organizations (4.1)
3. The CCDF must use a common lexicon by internal and external organizations
(4.4)
4. The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational operations (4.2)
5. The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious users
(trusted insiders and hackers) (4)
6. Stakeholders must easily understand the CCDF (4.7)
7. The CCDF must identify the roles and responsibilities of personnel responsible
for defending CALOs (4.4)
The criteria were heavily scrutinized through two expert panel consensus rounds of cyber
defenders. Panel members rated the criteria based on a Likert scale rating of 1 to 5, 1
being “Least Effective” and 5 being “Most Effective”. The final consensus-based scores
are applied to each criterion above. Criteria rating rules required each statement to meet
an average of 4 or better to be accepted as a CCDF criterion.
Once the criteria were established, the CCDF artifact was developed based on the
agreed upon criteria, and the help of the expert panel members. Panel members has at
least ten years of cybersecurity and framework experience. The expert panel members
then completed an additional phase of the Delphi consensus process to evaluate the
developed artifact against the criteria. The second phase of the Delphi process concluded
that the CCDF artifact met the established criteria statements in just one round identified
below with the associated scores.

119

1. Does the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) prototype
account for virtual as well as physical threat factors? (4.4)
2. Does the CCDF prototype account for interdependencies of outside
organizations? (4)
3. Does the CCDF use a common lexicon by internal and external organization?
(4.5)
4. Is the CCDF prototype applicable regardless of organizational operations? (45.)
5. Does the CCDF prototype include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious
users (trusted insiders and hackers)? (4.3)
6. Can stakeholders easily understand the CCDF prototype? (4.6)
7. Does the CCDF prototype identify roles and responsibilities of personnel
responsible for defending CALOs? (4.5)
The second, and separate ten-person stakeholder panel further scrutinized the criteria
against the CCDF artifact. Stakeholders were comprised of federal and civil leadership
for effective representation of CALOs. Stakeholder consensus took only one round to
validate all seven criteria statement against the CCDF artifact with the scores below.
1. Does the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) prototype
account for virtual as well as physical threat factors? (4.4)
2. Does the CCDF prototype account for interdependencies of outside
organizations? (4)
3. Does the CCDF use a common lexicon by internal and external organization?
(4.5)
4. Is the CCDF prototype applicable regardless of organizational operations? (45.)
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5. Does the CCDF prototype include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious
users (trusted insiders and hackers)? (4.3)
6. Can stakeholders easily understand the CCDF prototype? (4.6)
7. Does the CCDF prototype identify roles and responsibilities of personnel
responsible for defending CALOs? (4.5)
The Impact of the Research Questions
The Impact of the research question to the information systems security body of
knowledge opens up new areas to explore for design science and security frameworks.
Establishing an answer based on literature review, content analysis and expert
practitioners on a criteria for understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense opens
the door for more holistic approaches to research pertaining to cyber defense. Research to
address the overall cyber defense has been viewed as unobtainable (Donaldson et al.,
2015a). By narrowing this work to explicitly cyber defense for CALOs, we achieve a
significant milestone in the information security body of knowledge. Future work may
become available in offensive cyber areas, and defense of medium, and smaller
organizations based on the CCDF.
Developing a CCDF artifact answered the question of how the seven criteria areas
addressed the problem of the lack of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense.
The artifact provided a step-by-step approach that not only addressed the criteria but
provided a simple method of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense
according to two separate panels. Furthermore, the CCDF provided a breakdown of cyber
defense capabilities based on general CALO use-cases, and provided applicable tools
based on the identified capabilities. A clearer representation of cybersecurity defense
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allows stakeholders to adequately apply equipment and personnel resources as well as
eliminate latent, oversaturated defense mechanisms for a more efficient cybersecurity
posture.
Communication of the artifact by publishing the dissertation may produce new areas
of research in the offensive cyber realm. The evaluated CCDF has yet to be tested against
a CALO thus, there are opportunities for more practical research experiments.
Additionally, the CCDF could be tested in medium and even small organizations for
feasibility.

Implications of the Research
This section covers implications based on the conclusion discussed above in four
sections. The first subsection explains cybersecurity defense efficiencies of utilizing the
CCDF. The second section discusses the practical implications of the CCDF, and the
third section explains the implications of more actionable frameworks. Finally, the fourth
section explains contributing factors to the information systems security body of
knowledge.
Cybersecurity Defense Efficiencies
There is a growing need to understand and identify overarching organizational
requirements for cybersecurity defense in large organizations. Applying proper
cybersecurity defense will ensure that the right capabilities are fielded at the right
locations to safeguard critical assets while minimizing duplication of effort and taking
advantage of efficiencies. Exercising cybersecurity defense without an understanding of
comprehensive foundational requirements instills unsubstantiated defense tactics and
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does not capture fundamental organizational requirements. Organizations must be
synchronized across federal and civil agencies to achieve adequate cybersecurity defense.
Understanding what constitutes comprehensive cybersecurity defense will ensure
organizations are better protected and more efficient.
The CCDF provides cybersecurity details that allow CALOs to baseline defense
capabilities according to use-cases or well-known attack vectors. The CCDF matrix then
allows the CALO to visually see what capabilities are applied to defend organizations
based on the seven criteria areas. The capabilities can then be matched to the current tools
utilized by the CALO. A database of the mapped CCDF allows CALOs to see where gaps
are in the organization and where there is overlap.
Implications of personnel allocation and efforts toward CALO cybersecurity defense
is a benefit of CCDF use. Organizations traditionally are segregated in their defense
efforts, more particularly CALOs that facilitated global enterprises. It is not uncommon
for CALOs to have segregated IT departments with different policies and defense
mechanisms. The stove-pipped organizational and personnel structures with common
interests that fall under a broader CALO mission creates inefficiencies (Kelic et al., 2013;
S. Shackelford & Bohm, 2015; Tisdale, 2015). The CCDF criteria illuminate
interdependencies of internal and external partners through the NIST RMF and the
defense in depth mapping of "who" is conducting defense. The CCDF allows CALO
stakeholders to weigh the cost benefits of having an enterprise or segregated approach to
cybersecurity defense, based on the comprehensive view of the organization. CALOs
may find they have analysts defending at the perimeter between two field offices across
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regional network centers and decide it is a waste of resources. This concept works for
cyber defense capabilities and ultimately tools used by CALOs as well.
Practical Implications of the CCDF
Practical use of the CCDF will allow validation of this work by CALOs. During the
stakeholders’ panel, three stakeholders requested the researcher pilot the CCDF in their
respective organizations. The CCDF is "straight forward" as one stakeholder put it and
easily understood. Traditional frameworks are not intended to provide a process towards
active cyber defense but to provide guidance on compliance, risk management, threat
analysis or certification (Donaldson et al., 2015a). The CCDF provides a mapping of
several popular frameworks innovatively to better understand cyber defense and leverage
use out of the more general frameworks. Effective use will provide evidence of the
CCDF's ability to be applicable regardless of CALO operations. The frameworks utilized
by the CCDF are already in use independently throughout civilian agencies and industry
across several operational disciples. Single use of general frameworks such as NIST
RMF, CKC, and defense in depth is not in question. The mapping of these three
frameworks to achieve an understanding of CALO comprehensive cybersecurity defense
is. Further implications should leverage the CCDF's ability to capture capabilities and
tools to defend CALOs actively.
Government CALOs are also challenged with budget constraints, leaving Information
Technology Acquisitions (ITA) scrutinized (Manifesto, 2013). Senior government leaders
are aggressively attempting to streamline programs, create efficiencies, and forego
unnecessary costs for cyber defense. Saving the needed resources and ultimately
balancing those resources with the associated operational security requirements is
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difficult to manage if stakeholders are not fully cognizant of the comprehensive
cybersecurity defense requirements (Hua & Bapna, 2013). For example, the Electrical
Grid Delayed Hacker Insertion was suspected during the 2011 Honolulu major power
outage costing millions. Security experts noted that Oahu's power grid system did not
have adequate fail-safe information protection to avert hacker ownership of the power
grid, which made it not only difficult to identify the culprit, but made them helpless
during the event, and post investigation (Haggard & Lindsay, 2015).
The Case for more Actionable Frameworks
Traditional cybersecurity frameworks are not intended to provide a process for cyber
defenders and stakeholders but a means of standardizing security, risk management, or to
certify CALOs for operating in some functional regions (Donaldson et al., 2015a). For
example, HIPPA is required for medical privacy, and PCI DSS is required to certify
CALOs for credit card security (Donaldson et al., 2015a). The CCDF utilizes the benefits
of general models like NIST RMF, CKC, and defense in depth by leveraging the
strengths of these independent frameworks towards a better understanding of cyber
defense and ultimately, actionable cyber defense practices for CALOs. The literature
review conducted in this dissertation argues that Cybersecurity frameworks are
fragmented, vary in effectiveness, and a comprehensive approach is needed (Atoum &
Otoom, 2016; Atoum et al., 2014; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Donaldson et al., 2015a;
Tatar et al., 2014; Tisdale, 2015). Donaldson (2015b) contended that mapping several
popular frameworks could provide a more active means of cybersecurity. This work
should provide a starting point for new, innovative ways to approach security frameworks
not only as compliance and certification for CALOs during an annual inspection or to
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meet security certification requirements but as methodologies to build more
collaborative, active means of defending CALOs.
Contributions to the Information Systems Security Body of Knowledge
This study involved active participants of expert and stakeholder panel members
utilizing the Delphi process. A significant contributing factor for this type of study
potentially closes the gap between academia and practitioners. Additionally, Simon
(1996) argued that the vigorous eruption of information systems and the dynamic changes
that occur in this discipline leans towards a more problem focused research methodology.
Henver et al. (2004) argued that the artifact may enable the solution of an unsolved
problem by either extending the knowledge base or applying existing knowledge in new
innovative ways. For this study we applied the existing knowledge of cybersecurity
frameworks and innovatively mapped the frameworks to address the research problem
based on a criteria for understanding cyber defense. Henver et al. (2004) contended the
artifact as the center of design science research. The artifact can be in the form of a
construct, model, method, or an instantiation. For this work, we developed the CCDF
artifact.
Recommendations
This section explains areas of future research towards understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity defense for a large organization. This first subsection addresses future areas
for CALOs and the second subsection provides areas of future research for the CCDF.
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Future research for CALOs
Kiper (2008) describes "a Company, Agency, or Large Organization" as CALO.
CALOs facilitate thousands or tens of thousands of personnel in its workforce.
Kiper (2013) contended CALOs conduct hundreds of more business processes in
comparison to smaller organizations. In addition, CALOs consist of a diverse workforce
that may include a multitude of job families, various levels of experience and globally
located offices, factors that make cybersecurity defense more challenging compared to a
smaller organization (Kiper, 2008, 2013).
The real test of dissertation worthy research, contributing to the community body of
knowledge must answer three questions: It is true? Is it new? Is it interesting? (Gregor &
Hevner, 2013). This work entailed a CCDF for better understanding of comprehensive
cyber defense. Utilizing traditional frameworks in a new, innovative way, we established
seven criteria for capturing comprehensive cybersecurity defense. Future work must test
the CCDF in a simulated laboratory or an active CALO to glean potential efficiencies of
delineating cyber defense resources and defending CALOs. Additionally, a comparative
study of the CCDF between two separate and divers CALOs may be beneficial.
Future work with a CALO that has foreign offices would also be a good test of the
CCDF. Applicability and the challenges of foreign cybersecurity standards should be an
area of future work. Although NIST RMF is inclusive of international frameworks such
as ISO/IEC 17799/2700, an actual experimental study of the CCDF must entail
international rigors such as the European Safe Harbor Act. Theoretically, the CCDF
should work in any organizational atmosphere, but additional future work could entail the
practices of foreign cyber defenders and stakeholders towards the CCDF. Additionally, a
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comparative study between the CCDF efficiencies of foreign and US-based CALOs
would be beneficial.
Future research for the CCDF
The CCDF facilitates understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense, but as
depicted in Appendix M, mapping capabilities to cyber defense tools was an added
benefit of the framework. Future work in developing an enterprise-based automated
database to capture use-cases, requirements, capabilities, and tools would be beneficial
and simplify the process for stakeholders. We used a spreadsheet for the mapping
between the CCDF tasks, roles, and CKC processes. Finally, CCDF facilitated the
research gap based on clearly defined criteria of cyber defense and provided opportunities
for future work towards cyber offense, cyber response and other disciplines defined in
cyberspace such as offensive cyber operations.

Summary
This work addressed the problem of no common framework for clearly understanding
what constitutes a comprehensive cybersecurity defense for CALOs. This lack of
understanding causes an inability of current cybersecurity frameworks to sufficiently
capture comprehensive organizational security requirements. The research argued that
cybersecurity frameworks are fragmented, vary in effectiveness, and a comprehensive
approach was needed (Atoum & Otoom, 2016; Atoum, Otoom, & Abu Ali, 2014; Dhillon
& Torkzadeh, 2006; Donaldson, Siegel, Williams, & Aslam, 2015a; Tatar, Çalik, Çelik,
& Karabacak, 2014; Tisdale, 2015). Traditional cybersecurity frameworks created for
specific functions often generalize cybersecurity. Frameworks such as NIST 800-30 and
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ISO/IEC 2700 are used to ensure more effective cybersecurity, but optimal cyber defense
is difficult to achieve without a clear understanding of what comprehensive cybersecurity
defense is (Vijayan, 2017). Most technical cybersecurity solutions fail to consider cost,
operational tradeoffs, and the ability of adversaries to adapt to vulnerabilities.
The goal of this work was the development of a Comprehensive Cybersecurity
Defense Framework (CCDF) artifact to address the lack of understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity defense for companies, agencies or large organizations (CALOs). We
specifically addressed CALOs in this research as organizations with thousands of
employees, and in some cases, international dependencies incur unique challenges in
cybersecurity defense. CALOs incur diverse cybersecurity defensive operational needs
for several reasons. CALOs rely heavily on outside associated or international agencies,
which introduces security risks. Additionally, the size of CALO organizations incurs
trusts and interdependency with similar and smaller organizations, introducing even more
security risks (Kiper, 2008). Asti (2017) argued that small and medium-sized
organizations face different challenges than CALOs. Asti (2017) explained that merely
due to the size and scope of CALOs cybersecurity defense is more critical to
stakeholders. Kiper (2013) contended CALOs conduct hundreds of more business
processes in comparison to smaller organizations, which is salient to cybersecurity
defense criticality. Also, CALOs often manage smaller organizations that may have
different operational functions. Challenges often arise when CALO statues, regulatory
guidelines, and operation procedures do not capture comprehensive cybersecurity defense
requirements for subordinate organizations (Kiper, 2013). Finally, CALOs consist of a
diverse workforce that may include a multitude of job families, various levels of
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experience and globally located offices, factors that make cybersecurity defense more
challenging compared to a smaller organization (Kiper, 2008, 2013). Three research
questions were posited to address the problem:
1. What criteria does the CCDF artifact have to meet to be considered a comprehensive
defensive cybersecurity framework for CALOs?
2. In what ways does the CCDF meet the established criteria for a comprehensive
defensive cybersecurity framework for CALOs?
3. What future areas of research may be explored in understanding a more comprehensive
approach to cybersecurity defense?
A systemic literature review was conducted to identify the gaps in a comprehensive
approach to cybersecurity defense for CALOs. Through the literature review, a table of
prominent frameworks was created for consideration by an expert panel utilizing the
Delphi Technique. Following the literature review, a content analysis was conducted to
analyze the existence and frequency of concepts in the research to construct the
foundational recommended activities and questions to serve as a criteria set for an expert
panel. The researcher utilized the NVivo analysis tool to conduct critical words to
research associations.
NVivo was utilized to assemble more than 200 research articles. This process allowed
unstructured data to be compiled, compared, and analyzed in an efficient, non-biased
manner. Nodes were created based on the research problem, literature review, and word
frequency. Similar terms were combined based on the analysis, which was further
validated by the Delphi expert panel. The literature review articles were loaded into the
NVivo software. Based on the research problem and key-word search results, nine key
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categories were created. Behavioral and Human factors associated with cyber defense,
common lexicon and constructs, cyber policy, cyber threat based on operational
requirements, defense in depth (virtual and physical factors), cyber roles and
responsibilities, interdependency, stakeholder buy-off and understanding, and universal
applicability. Through node comparison, the cyber lexicon and policy nodes were
combined. Additionally, CALO operational requirements and universal application were
also combined. The seven remaining categories were then operationalized to present to
the expert panel for consideration:
1. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for virtual as well as physical
threat factors.
2. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for all interdependencies of
outside organizations.
3. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must use a common lexicon by internal and
external organizations.
4. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must apply to all CALOs regardless of
operation.
5. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must include behavioral factors of friendly
and malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers).
6. Stakeholders must easily understand the comprehensive cybersecurity defense
framework.
7. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must identify the roles and responsibilities
of personnel responsible for defending CALOs.
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Utilizing the design science research methodology, an artifact for understanding
comprehensive cybersecurity was developed. Design science was used as the research
approach, and developmental research was utilized to develop the CCDF artifact. The
research was comprised of two panels. The first panel, comprised of experts, completed
two phases of Delphi rounds. First, to refine the criteria for the CCDF based on the
literature review and content analysis, and secondly to facilitate the development of the
CCDF and ensure the prototype met the established criteria. The second panel was
comprised of cybersecurity stakeholders to evaluate the CCDF developed by the expert
panel.
The expert panel conducted two rounds to develop a criteria list and only one round to
facilitate the development of the artifact for a comprehensive cybersecurity defense
model. Based on the information derived from the expert panel during criterion
development, the researcher developed the artifact through a systems development
prototyping methodology. A 20-minute narrated presentation explained how to use the
CCDF to better understand comprehensive cybersecurity defense. The presentation was
then evaluated by the expert panel during the second phase and was approved in the first
round for presentation to the stakeholder panel. The revised presentation was 25 minutes.
Evaluation and consensus that the CCDF prototype met the seven criteria areas were
concluded in just one round by the Delphi panel of stakeholders.
Future research opportunities were presented. One area of future work was to test the
CCDF in a simulated laboratory or an active CALO to glean potential efficiencies of
delineating cyber defense resources and defending CALOs. Conducting a study in a
foreign country with different cybersecurity policy was presented as a challenging
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approach to the CCDF. Also automating the CCDF mapping through an SQL database
was recommended by an expert panelist to study resource efficiencies of the CCDF was
presented. Finally, a comparative study was also recommended to evaluate the CCDF
between two separate and divers CALOs.
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Appendix A
Informed Consent Form

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
College of Engineering and Computing
General Informed Consent Form
NSU Consent to be in a Research Study Entitled
A Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework for Large Organizations
Who is doing this research study?
College: College of Engineering and Computing
Principal Investigator: Willarvis “Dee” Smith, M.S. Telecommunications, B.S. Workforce
Education and Development
Faculty Advisor/Dissertation Chair: Dr. Timothy J. Ellis
Co-Investigator(s): None
Site Information: 91-1012 Hoomaalili Street, Ewa Beach HI, 96706
Funding: Unfunded
What is this study about?
The goal of this work is to conduct design research towards development of a Comprehensive
Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) to address the lack of understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity defense in large organization. This work intends to study understanding what is
considered comprehensive cybersecurity defense for large organizations and how to meet the
goals of optimizing the organizational cyber defense environment. Understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity defense is essential to identify the specific requirements of organizations based on
mission objectives and to ensure those requirements are meeting cybersecurity needs. Current
cybersecurity frameworks defending against cyber-attacks are fragmented and vary widely in
effectiveness. When organizations have a comprehensive oversight, decisions become clearer
and interdependent stakeholders are aware of what is happening during an attack.
According to research, large organizations lack of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity
defense not only affects operations but also acquisitions of cyber defense technologies. Large
organizations often unnecessarily compartmentalize cyber defense along operational funding
lines, resulting in overlapping defense methodologies. This type of organizational patchwork
incurs millions and in some cases billions of wasted funding. The operational implications of an
inadequately defended network in certain federal agencies could affect the safety of military
members on the battlefield or critical national infrastructures such as power grids, water/sewage,
and financial institutions.

3301 College Avenue • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7796
(954) 262-2000 • 800-541-6682, ext. 2000 • Fax: (954) 262-3915 • Web site: www.cec.nova.edu
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Why are you asking me to be in this research study?
You are being asked to be in this research study because you have at least 10 years of
experience as an information owner, Chief Information Officer, Senior Executive, General Officer
or you are an operational stakeholder in your organization of information technology, information
systems or cyber systems data. This study will include about 10 people.
What will I be doing if I agree to be in this research study?
You will be agreeing to participate in a 10-member expert panel. You will be evaluating the CCDF
prototype. The effort will take about an hour a week for six weeks. All of the work can be done
from your home or office. It will not be necessary to attend meetings in person. Anonymity of all
team members will be strictly adhered to and interaction between team members will be
coordinated through me.
Team members will receive the following for artifact development:
•
A CCDF prototype model based on the criterion developed during the first rounds of team
interaction.
•
A brief description of the model and instructions on its use.
•
A Questionnaire about the prototype grading the model and instructions on a scale of 1 to
5 with comments.
The prototype will be graded on a scale from 1 to 5 (4 or better on a scale of 1 to 5 is required
for consensus and no single score may be less than 2). Team members may make comments.
Each team member will complete the questionnaire pertaining to the CCDF prototype and
return it to the researcher in one week.
The researcher will review all of the comments and prepare a matrix that includes all of the
comments by question. Additionally, the researcher will act on the comments and revises the
prototype.
Round 2
Prior to Round 2 each participant will receive the following:
•
The Matrix that shows by call sign all of the comments each team member made. The
purpose of this matrix is to show each team member his or her comments were noted
and action was taken. Members with similar comments will be color-coded.
•
A revised CCDF prototype based on team feedback.
•
Questionnaire about the prototype.
The team members will evaluate the artifact and be allowed to change any previous comments
based on the feedback from other experts. Within one week, the team members will return the
comments and questionnaire.
The researcher will review all comments and complete a new comment matrix and revised
prototype and instructions.
Additional rounds
Round 3 proceeds in the same way as Round 2. Team members will take the prototype and
answer the questionnaire rating from 1 to 5. Consensus is reached when all team members rate
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all the criteria 4 or 5. The process will end after five rounds to respect the time of team members.
At this point, the process is completed.
Are there possible risks and discomforts to me?
The risks to you are minimal. It is possible that someone other than the principle investigator (PI)
could see your name and answers compromising your confidentiality. In order to prevent this, the
researcher will keep the personal information of team member names strictly confidential in
stand-alone computer. Only the PI will handle correspondence with each team member. If you
have questions about the research, your research rights, or if you experience an injury because
of the research please contact Mr. Willarvis "Dee" Smith at (808) 859-0348. You may also contact
the IRB at the numbers indicated above with questions about your research rights.
What happens if I do not want to be in this research study?
You have the right to leave this research study at any time or refuse to be in it. If you decide to
leave or you do not want to be in the study anymore, you will not get any penalty or lose any
services you have a right to get. If you choose to stop being in the study before it is over, any
information about you that was collected before the date you leave the study will be kept in the
research records for 36 months from the end of the study and may be used as a part of the
research.
What if there is new information learned during the study that may affect my decision to
remain in the study?
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate to whether
you want to remain in this study, this information will be given to you by the investigators. You
may be asked to sign a new Informed Consent Form, if the information is given to you after you
have joined the study.
Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study?
There are no direct benefits from being in this research study. We hope the information learned
from this study will contribute to the body of knowledge of information security.
Will I be paid or be given compensation for being in the study?
You will not be given any payments or compensation for being in this research study.
Will it cost me anything?
There are no costs to you for being in this research study.
How will you keep my information private?
Information we learn about you in this research study will be handled in a confidential manner,
within the limits of the law and will be limited to people who have a need to review this
information. The questionnaire will not ask you for any information that could be linked to you.
The materials will be kept in a safe place and participant names will be separated from the
study documentation. The records containing your names will be destroyed (deleted) 36 months
after the study ends. It is required to maintain study records for three years after the
study ends. All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is
required by law. Dr. Ellis, the IRB or regulatory agencies may also review research records.

This data will be available to the researcher, the Institutional Review Board and other
representatives of this institution, and any regulatory and granting agencies (if
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applicable). If we publish the results of the study in a scientific journal or book, we will
not identify you. All confidential data will be kept securely on a stand-alone computer.
Whom can I contact if I have questions, concerns, comments, or complaints?
If you have questions now, feel free to ask us. If you have more questions about the research,
your research rights, or have a research-related injury, please contact:
Primary contact:
Willarvis “Dee” Smith, M.S. Telecommunications can be reached at 808-859-0348.
If primary is not available, contact:
Dr. Timothy J. Ellis can be reached at 954-663-8463
Research Participants Rights
For questions/concerns regarding your research rights, please contact:
Institutional Review Board
Nova Southeastern University
(954) 262-5369 / Toll Free: 1-866-499-0790
IRB@nova.edu
You may also visit the NSU IRB website at www.nova.edu/irb/information-for-researchparticipants for further information regarding your rights as a research participant.
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Appendix B
Invitation to Participate in Delphi Procedure
Dear _______________________,
This is a written invitation to participate on an expert panel known as a Delphi team.
As part of my doctoral dissertation at Nova Southeastern University, I am forming this
team to gain expert counsel to develop a criterion and create a framework for
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense. The goal of this work is to address
the lack of understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense for large organizations.
This research first requires experts to agree on a criterion of comprehensive cybersecurity
defense as well as support the design of a framework that allows a separate panel of
cybersecurity stakeholders to easily understand a comprehensive approach.
The effort will take about an hour a week for six weeks. All of the work can be done
from your home or office. It will not be necessary to attend meetings in person.
Anonymity of all team members will be strictly adhered to and interaction between team
members will be coordinated through me.
Prior to beginning the work, you will be provided:
•
•
•
•

A one-page description of the research problem
A description of the Delphi team process
A matrix of major cybersecurity frameworks (limitations, pros, and cons)
A preliminary criterion for understanding comprehensive framework based on
literature review and content analysis

According to research, large organizations lack of understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity defense not only affects operations but also acquisitions of cyber defense
technologies. CALOs often unnecessarily compartmentalize cyber defense along
operational funding lines, resulting in overlapping defense methodologies. This type of
organizational patchwork incurs millions and in some cases billions of wasted funding.
The operational implications of an inadequately defended network in certain federal
agencies could affect the safety of military members on the battlefield or critical national
infrastructures such as power grids, water/sewage, and financial institutions. Your
contribution to this work could lead to future innovations in cybersecurity defense for
large civil and federal organizations.
Thanks in advance for your support!
Sincerely,
Willarvis “Dee” Smith
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Appendix C
Research Description for Delphi Team Members
Problem
There is no common framework for clearly understanding what constitutes
comprehensive cybersecurity defense for large organizations. This lack of understanding
causes an inability of current cybersecurity frameworks to sufficiently capture
comprehensive organizational security requirements. Cybersecurity frameworks are
fragmented, vary in effectiveness, and a comprehensive approach is needed.
Premise
Defending organizations from cyber incidents is more challenging than ever,
particularly for large organizations. Currently, no “comprehensive” cybersecurity
requirements are imposed on the entire US critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity
regulations do exist for specific sectors, leaving the status quo a complicated patchwork
of often ambiguous state and federal regulations overlaying applicable common
doctrines. The proposed study does not intend to solve obligatory cybersecurity for the
entire US but more specifically, improve understanding of the multi-varied cybersecurity
defense requirements for large civil and government organizations. Traditional
frameworks do not address the interdependency of external organizations, psychological,
social, and associated risks. A better understanding of what is a comprehensive cyber
defense is needed.
Based on the peer-reviewed research, there are many general frameworks and security
processes in use to date. Although beneficial, they do not address what constitutes
comprehensive organizational cybersecurity defense. Most frameworks address general
control, certification, and compliance for organizations without consideration to the
scope, size and operational context of cybersecurity defense. With your help, we will
explore what exactly is “comprehensive” cybersecurity defense and create a model
simple enough for information owners and stakeholders to grasp associated cybersecurity
defense objectives.
Goal of this Research
The goal of this work is to develop a Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense
Framework (CCDF) artifact to address the lack of understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity defense for companies, agencies and large organizations (CALOs).
Delphi Informed Consent Statement
You are invited to participate in a research study to define a criterion and facilitate the
creation of a CCDF artifact. You have been selected because of your unique experience
in cybersecurity defense and leadership credentials. There will be no audio or video
recording for this study and your information (email, phone number and other contact
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information) will remain private. You have the right to leave this study at any time or
refuse to participate. If you decide to leave or not to participate, you will not experience
any penalty. Please respond to this email that you concur/non-concur to be a part of this
study.
Thank you for support and time.
Sincerely

Willarvis “Dee” Smith

140

Appendix D
Delphi Team Process
Overview
Your help is needed to develop a criteria set for understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity defense and developing a model that allows information stakeholders the
ability to grasp cybersecurity defense in their organizations. The Delphi technique
research is focused on the use of expert opinion to obtain the most reliable consensus.
Consensus will be obtained by a series of questionnaires interspersed with controlled
opinion feedback. Team members never assemble nor do they know the identity of the
other members of the group. After receiving the decision-making task, members will
develop their own solutions to the problem.
The Delphi Process is divided into rounds. The rounds will first include development
of the criterion, followed by development of the artifact based on the established criterion
agreed upon by panel members. Prior to each round team members will receive
information to begin consensus building. After the information has been evaluated, team
members will return feedback in the form of a completed questionnaire. Consensus will
be achieved when an average rating from all team members for each question is 4 or
better on a scale of 1 to 5 and no single score less than 2. Once consensus is achieved, the
process is completed.
Each team member will fill out the questionnaire about the criteria and return it to the
researcher. Once the criteria for understanding comprehensive cybersecurity consensus is
obtained, the researcher will develop a model based on the criteria and an additional
questionnaire will be distributed to team members for consensus of the model (CCDF
artifact).
Round One
Prior to round one each team participant will receive the following for criterion
development:
• A brief description of the research.
• Delphi team process
• Table of major current cybersecurity framework based on peer-reviewed research
• Draft criteria based on the peer-reviewed research
• Questionnaire about the criterion with comments.
• A call sign for each of the team members which may be based on the International
Maritime Organization (Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, etc.) or voluntarily selected by each
team member. Call sign will be communicated via email.
Each team member will complete the questionnaire pertaining to the criterion for
understanding comprehensive cybersecurity defense, add appropriate comments, and
return it to the researcher in one week.
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The researcher will review all of the comments and prepare a matrix that includes all
of the comments from panel members by question. Additionally, the researcher will act
on the comments and revise the criterion.
Round 2
Prior to Round 2 each participant will receive the following:
• The Matrix that shows by call sign all of the comments each team member made. The
purpose of this matrix is to show each team member that his or her comments were
noted and action was taken.
• Draft criteria for understanding cybersecurity defense based on panel member
feedback.
• Questionnaire about the criteria. The criteria will be rated 1 to 5, with 1 meaning
“Least Effective”, 2 meaning “Slightly Effective”, 3 meaning “Effective”, 4 meaning
“Highly Effective”, and 5 meaning “Most Effective”.
The team members will evaluate the criteria and be allowed to change any previous
comments based on the feedback from other experts. Within one week, the team
members will return the comments and questionnaire. The researcher will review all
comments, completes a new comment matrix, and revises the criteria.
Additional rounds
Round 3 proceeds in the same way as Round 2. Team members will take the criteria
and answers the questionnaire rating from 1 to 5. Consensus will be reached when all
team members rate all the criteria 4 or 5. The process will end after five rounds to respect
the time of team members. At this point, the process is completed.

Artifact Consensus Rounds
Once team members develop the artifact criterion, development of the artifact (CCDF)
consensus building will begin.
Round 1
Prior to Round 1, team members will receive the following for artifact development:
• A CCDF prototype model based on the criterion developed during the first rounds of
team interaction.
• A brief description of the model and instructions on its use.
• A Questionnaire about the prototype grading the model and instructions on a scale of
1 to 5 with comments.
The prototype will be graded on a scale from 1 to 5 (4 or better on a scale of 1 to 5 is
required for consensus and no single score may be less than 2). Team members may
make comments.
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Each team member will complete the questionnaire pertaining to the CCDF prototype
and return it to the researcher in one week.
The researcher will review all of the comments and prepare a matrix that includes all
of the comments by question. Additionally, the researcher will act on the comments and
revises the prototype.
Round 2
Prior to Round 2 each participant will receive the following:
• The Matrix that shows by call sign all of the comments each team member made. The
purpose of this matrix is to show each team member his or her comments were noted
and action was taken. Members with similar comments will be color-coded.
• A revised CCDF prototype based on team feedback.
• Questionnaire about the prototype.
The team members will evaluate the artifact and be allowed to change any previous
comments based on the feedback from other experts. Within one week, the team
members will return the comments and questionnaire.
The researcher will reviews all comments and complete a new comment matrix and
revised prototype and instructions.
Additional rounds
Round 3 proceeds in the same way as Round 2. Team members will take the prototype
and answer the questionnaire rating from 1 to 5. Consensus is reached when all team
members rate all the criteria 4 or 5. The process will end after five rounds to respect the
time of team members. At this point, the process is completed.
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Appendix E
Criteria for Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Round 1
1. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for virtual as well as physical
threat factors.
2. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must account for all interdependencies of
outside organizations.
3. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must use a common lexicon by internal and
external organizations.
4. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must be applicable to all CALOs regardless of
operation.
5. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must include behavioral factors of friendly and
malicious users (trusted insiders and hackers).
6. Stakeholders must easily understand the comprehensive cybersecurity defense
framework.
7. Comprehensive cybersecurity defense must identify roles and responsibilities of
personnel responsible for defending CALOs.
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Appendix F
Content Analysis Sample
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Appendix G
Delphi Panel Scoring and Comment Matrix Sample
Criteria

Respondent
Cyber Alpha

1. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must account for virtual
as well as physical rick
factors.

2. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must account for all
interdependencies of
outside organizations.

3. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must use a common
lexicon by internal and
external organizations.

4. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must be applicable to all
CALOs regardless of
operation.

5. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must include behavioral
factors of friendly and
malicious users (trusted
insiders and hackers).

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

6.Stakeholders must easily
understand
comprehensive
cybersecurity defense.

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

7. The CCDF must identify
roles and responsibilities
of personnel responsible
for defending CALOs.

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette

Round 1 Rating
LE

SE

E

HE

E

Respondent Comments

First round
Avg.
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Appendix H
Delphi Panel Scoring and Comment Response Matrix Sample
Criteria

Respondent
Cyber Alpha

1. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must account for virtual
as well as physical rick
factors.

2. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must account for all
interdependencies of
outside organizations.

3. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must use a common
lexicon by internal and
external organizations.

4. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must be applicable to all
CALOs regardless of
operation.

5. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must include behavioral
factors of friendly and
malicious users (trusted
insiders and hackers).

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

6.Stakeholders must easily
understand
comprehensive
cybersecurity defense.

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

7. The CCDF must identify
roles and responsibilities
of personnel responsible
for defending CALOs.

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette

Round 1 Rating
LE SE

E

HE

E

Respondent Comments

Facilitator Comments

First round
Avg.
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Appendix I
Proposed CCDF Artifact Based on the Criteria
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Appendix J
Feedback on the CCDF Prototype Matrix Sample (see the matrix for
following rounds 2, 3 et al.)
Criteria

Respondent
Cyber Alpha

1. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must account for virtual
as well as physical rick
factors.

2. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must account for all
interdependencies of
outside organizations.

3. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must use a common
lexicon by internal and
external organizations.

4. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must be applicable to all
CALOs regardless of
operation.

5. Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense
must include behavioral
factors of friendly and
malicious users (trusted
insiders and hackers).

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

6.Stakeholders must easily
understand
comprehensive
cybersecurity defense.

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette
Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

7. The CCDF must identify
roles and responsibilities
of personnel responsible
for defending CALOs.

Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber
Cyber

Delta
Echo
Foxtrot
Golf
Hotel
India
Juliette

Round 1 Rating
LE SE

E

HE

E

Respondent
Comments

Facilitator
Comments

Round 1 Rating
LE SE

E

HE

E
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Appendix L
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Appendix M
CCDF Artifact Demonstration
Slide 1

Hello panel members!
I’m Dee Smith and I am pleased to introduce you all to phase 2 of our work in
building a more comprehensive approach to cyber defense and understanding of
what comprehensive cyber defense is.
Before we even get started let me say how please I am to be working with all of
you from across the federal government, academia, and industry. This is truly a
diverse, very qualified and committed group of professional.
I truly thank all of you for your efforts and I’m excited to be a part of this team.
Now, without further delay…Let’s get into it.
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We are first going to briefly go over the problem. You all have seen this in the
preliminary information I provided you in Phase 1 but its always a good idea to
keep everyone focused on what we are trying to achieve. There is a lot of
brainpower in our group and we could solve a lot of the variables in cyber
defense. Unfortunately, we don’t have a lot of time and I’d really like to graduate
this year so I’m going to make sure we stay focused.
Next, we’ll go over the goal of the research, again discussed and provided in the
preliminary documents.
Then we will get into the research questions, one of which we just finished by
establishing a criteria for our framework.
We’ll go over the seven criteria areas and the ratings achieved in phase 1
I’ll talk briefly about the many frameworks currently in existence which is part of
the problem we have a convoluted approach to getting at comprehensive cyber
defense. If you remember I provided a matrix of frameworks that discuss the
many frameworks in existence. You can refer to that spreadsheet anytime.
I’ll get into the prototype and provide a walkthrough of how it is used as well.
Finally, you can always shoot me a message if you have questions about this
presentation or the work we are doing in general.
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And lastly it will be time to vote on the prototype. The same rules apply as in
Phase one to move our work the next phase of stakeholders panel.

Slide 3

He is the problem again.
Remember we are not trying to solve overall cyber defense, just cyber defense in
large organizations also known as CALOs
When we think of CALOs, it’s important to remember that many are global
organizations with different functions like productions, logistics, advertising,
public affairs etcetera.
Many of them have segregated enclaves, operate in foreign countries, and rarely
communicate. This make comprehensive defense challenged but vital.
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For the goal, we should remember to stay focused on “understanding”
comprehensive cybersecurity defense.
Our framework will help not only stakeholders but defenders better understand
what, who, where and how they should defend organizations. I say better
because there will be improvements to our work after my dissertation. As a
matter of fact, I’d be willing to work with experts and scholars to continue this
work
Slide 5

156

We have completed research question number one during phase 1 of our Delphi
rounds. For phase 2, we will be focused specifically on determining in what ways
does the CCDF prototype meet the criteria based on your expert opinion. We
should remember that research says that current frameworks are segmented and
does not meet the needs of CALOs comprehensive cyber defense. I will also ask
how can the framework be improved but please remember our timeline.
Slide 6

Here are the seven approved criteria areas:
The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) must account
for virtual as well as physical threat factors.
The CCDF must account for inter-dependencies of outside organizations.
The CCDF must use a common lexicon by internal and external organizations.
The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational operations.
The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious users
(trusted insiders and hackers).
Stakeholders must easily understand the CCDF.
The CCDF must identify roles and responsibilities of personnel responsible for
defending CALOs. (4.4)
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Slide 8

Myself and a team of experts in the DOD looked at a lot of security frameworks. I
have conducted research on the many frameworks over the past two years and
for cyber defense we should ask the following questions: How should it be
conducted? What should defenders be doing? Where is defense happening?
And, who is doing the defending?
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Through these simple questions, we get specifically at not only addressing our
cretiera, but answering questions about cyber defense requirements, capabilities,
and tools we use to defend cyber. These are areas that stakeholders can easily
understand an operationalizes cyber. Now our goal is not to answer the
requirements, capabilities and tools questions but I make that point because our
criteria includes stakeholder’s understanding and operational flexibility that are
both key to making cyber defense comprehensive.
Slide 9

We are going to use three major and well known frameworks for our prototype:
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain and Oracle’s
Defense in Depth Model. The CNSS glossary is a federal government guide used
by CYBERCOM and the Department of Homeland Security covering Civil and
Government defense. A CALO can use any lexicon and there are many but the
CNSS is the most widely used in the US for cyber. Some universities, Nova case
in point subtribes to CNSS as this university is a CNSS academic center of
excellence.
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NIST RMF is generally a risk management framework driven by Presidential
order 13636. Development included more than 3000 individuals from government
and industry. NIST RMF also includes several certification and compliance
frameworks (required for government compliance, highly recommended by
industry).
Slide 11
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The framework core and categories are identified.
As you can see, NIST covers general topics for all CALOS; baselining policy,
asset management and governance are general practices that should be
conducted by all CALOs. Protect, Detect and Respond core areas are more
defensive driven yet, the application of these core areas are risk driven in NIST.
What our framework will do is operationalize these core areas by mapping them
to more actionable frameworks.
-NIST CFC gets at four of our seven criteria areas:
1. The Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense Framework (CCDF) must account
for virtual as well as physical threat factors.
The Identify asset management category looks at physical and virtual
accountability in the framework, Protecting identify management looks at who
has access to make changes to virtual and physical devices in the organization
2. The CCDF must account for inter-dependencies of outside organizations.
Supply chain risk management looks at outside interdependencies. For example
the Huawei Chinese company is a good example of bad organization
understanding of inter-dependencies which included the DOD. I could tell you
details but I’d have to kill you after
3. The CCDF must use a common lexicon by internal and external organizations.
As stated before NIST is a mandated framework that includes civil and
government organizations and drives the CNSS glossary, which is reference in
the NIST guidance serval times.
4. The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational operations.
As stated in the NIST guide “The framework can be used in various sized
organizations regardless of size, degree of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity
sophistication – to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to
improving the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. The Framework
provides organization and structure to today’s multiple approaches to
cybersecurity by assembling standards, guidelines, and practices that are
working effectively in industry today. Moreover, because it references globally
recognized standards for cybersecurity, the Framework can also be used by
organizations located outside the United States and can serve as a model for
international cooperation on strengthening critical infrastructure cybersecurity.”
* NOTE * NIST also accounts for user-awareness and training which is part of
criterion #5 “The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious
users (trusted insiders and hackers).”
“The Framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing cybersecurity
risk for critical infrastructure. Organizations will continue to have unique risks –
different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances – and how they
implement the practices in the Framework will vary.” (Charllette, 2013)
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Our framework will target the core NIST disciplines into an approach to
Comprehensive cyber defense for organizations
Slide 12

Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain is one of those more actionable frameworks.
The CKC looks at behaviors of attackers. And I use term hackers loosely as
some friendly insiders participate in malicious hacks through remote access tools
(RAT), social engineering, phishing etc.
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Slide 13

The CKS addressed criterion 4 and 5
***NOTE*** Read, each of the CKC steps
4. The CCDF should be applicable regardless of organizational operations.
Since the framework focuses on TTP behaviors of actions towards CALOs, this
general approach can be used on all organizations.
Research claims that most defenders and analyst are currently using the cyber
kill chain. Again, DOD, DHS and all US intel agencies live by this framework.
5. The CCDF must include behavioral factors of friendly and malicious users
(trusted insiders and hackers).
The actual reason the CKC was created was to better understand advance
persistent threats (APT) but the framework detects friendly anomalies such as
scripts, etc. from insider friendly users.
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Now let’s look at where we defend, were going to use the defense in depth model
to do that.
One of the fundamental philosophies of security is the defense in depth model;
overlapping systems designed to provide security even if one of them fails. An
example is a firewall coupled with an intrusion-detection system (IDS). Defense
in depth provides security because there's no single point of failure and no single
assumed vector for attacks. Also known as the Castle Approach, security controls
are placed throughout an information technology (IT) system. The idea behind
the defense in depth approach is to defend a system against any particular attack
using several physical and virtual independent methods. This tactic was
conceived by the National Security Agency (NSA) as a comprehensive approach
to information and electronic security. Defense in depth does not address
operational levels found in the ISO framework as well as social and behavioral
aspects of cybersecurity.
Now let’s take a closer look at the Defense in depth model. The top layer also
known as the data layer is where we conduct data security, Content security,
Message level security and information rights management. The application layer
is where federation or identify management, triple A and coding practices are
defended. At endpoint or host layer, we have the operating systems, desktop
protection, and patching. The internal network and perimeter layer share the
same items but they are distinctly different layers: transport layer security,
firewalls, network address translation, denial of service, messaging parsing and
validation both sit at the internal network and perimeter layer but those resources
are used differently in their respective layers since they are at different defense
levels. Your internal network may contain local area network, VLANS, internal
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firewalls, and access switches with provide connection to core services such as
email and file servers while the perimeter layer contains Aggregate equipment
that allows or denies external traffic from sources outside your organization. A
good example would be external or gateway routers, gateway firewalls, and other
devices that may connect with an outside service provider. Enterprise network
defense is primarily conducted at this layer. The distinction between the internal
and perimeter layers are very important as they identify the internal network and
outside interdependencies. This is one of our CALO criteria’s. The physical layer
is not traditionally an IS function as fences, walls, guards, locks, and facility
access control fall under facility management and physical security. Although, this
should be considered part of “comprehensive” cybersecurity defense. A comm
closet, generator, or any device connected to CALO cyber resources are part of
CALO risk management and prone to cyber threats.
Slide 15

The Committee on National Security Systems is a United States
intergovernmental organization that sets policy for the security of the US security
systems.
he CNSS holds discussions of policy issues, sets national policy, directions,
operational procedures, and guidance for the information systems operated by
the U.S. Government, its contractors or agents that either contain classified
information, involve intelligence activities, involve cryptographic activities related
to national security.
The bottom line: the CNSS provides a baseline language for various parts of
CALO roles, functions, and cyber language so everyone on the same page.
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We’ll first start with the core concepts contained in the NIST CCF as the tasks we
are trying to accomplish to defend our CALO. Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond
and Recover.
Slide 17

We then add the what we will be defending in the Cyber Kill Chain.
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We then map what we are defending to specific layers in our organization. This
explains “where” we are conducting defense.
Slide 19

Finally, we add the roles of who will be responsible for defending organizations
at each particular layer. It’s important to note that several roles do and should
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overlap as security is everyone role but not everyone will have access or
privileges to conduct certain defense measure.
As you can see, we should achieve criterion #6 by creating a framework that is
relatively simple for stakeholders and defenders alike to understand.
Hopefully, I will convince you all that this framework exceeds or criterion in this
walkthrough of the prototype.
Although, I welcome your comments and suggestions.
Slide 20

As we build out our framework, I’ll sample the overall framework by explaining
the Detect task, but all the core disciplines map concurrently in the same manner
to collect comprehensive cyber defense requirements. We will then validate
those requirements based on use cases, apply capabilities to those validated
requirements and ultimately tools to those capabilities.
So, first we apply a role in our framework. For this walkthrough, we will apply the
most viable in cyber defense, Users, administrators and analysts. Mission
owners and engineers of course have roles as well but limiting this demonstration
to these three will keep this demonstration simple and provide all experts enough
information to assess the framework.
First we map that users, administrators and analysts conduct the task of
detection.
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As we build into the framework, users, administrators and analysts detect
reconnaissance.
Slide 22

Building out even further, users, administrators, and analysts detect
reconnaissance at the physical, perimeter, internal network, and endpoint layers.
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A fully messed framework collects requirements across the board, hence it’s
comprehensive. The detect task is repeated for each phase in the cyber kill chain
to each layer in the defense in depth model.
This process is then repeated. Each role is matched to each NIST task, then to
each cyber kill chain level and each defense in depth layer.
BUT. We have to scale this back to get explicit CCDF requirements for each
particular CALO. We’ll get to that in a few minutes.
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Here is a spreadsheet of the general requirements derived in the matrix. This
notional spreadsheet, only shows the users, administrators and analysts’ roles
but I think you get the point.
If you notice, the spreadsheet is fully populated and not validated yet so some of
the tasks would appear sporadic at first glance.
For example, users would not detect reconnaissance at the perimeter layer of an
organization but network administrators would.
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Use cases are pulled from trouble management systems and/or reporting
methods based on CALOs daily operations. They are basically the roles we do
every day.
By gleaning the use-cases with the generic requirements of the framework more
explicit requirements are derived based on CALOs operational needs. This
provides a better understanding of comprehensive requirements. It also points
out where critical requirements are being met and were requirements overlap
based on roles and whether or not you have capabilities to meet defensive
measures.
Please remember these are notional and CALO based. Although some
administrators may not have a requirement to detect weaponization at the
applications layer, users may. The key point is CALOs and see where they are in
defending and if they need to address a gap if no role is assigned to a defense
requirement or address an overlap that wastes resources.
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As I explained in the previous slide, based on CALO validated requirements
exclude erroneous requirements.
Slide 27

Now that we have validated requirements, we add the capabilities to those
requirements.
We now see what we need to carry out in each defense tactic. We also see what
we don’t need. This is where a lot of overspending in CALOs can be addressed.
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Now that we have the required capabilities derived from validated requirements
and use cases, we can begin to see what specific tools we are using or not using
to defend our CALO.
Slide 29

I didn’t include the tools name since defenders get nervous about classification
although this information again is notional, I don’t want to put any specific tools
on blast to highlight any CALO that using them but some common off-the-shelf
tools like putty, Wireshark, Netcool are a few. Even command line interface can
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be considered a tool. The key to this framework is you can visually see defense
in action to clearly understand what tasks are happening, who is doing those
task, and where are the tasks happening in the network based on friendly or
adversarial behaviors. This approach is a far cry from simple policy or
compliance.
By mapping out the CCDF you optimize not only defense but procurement and
acquisition of cyber defense personnel and equipment resources. You can
visually see that you may have no one detecting weponization at the perimeter
and/or you may have the person but it the wrong discipline, or you may have the
right person with the wrong tool.
This framework was very well received at the Hawaii international Conference on
System Sciences, getting me a doctoral consortium fellowship. It was also well
received at the Defense Information Systems Agency, Department of Homeland
Defense and Cyber Command. The question is…what do you think…..
Thank you, team…Now it’s time to vote!
Slide 30
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Appendix N
Expert Panel Phase 1 Round 1 Results
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Appendix O
Expert Panel Phase 1 and Phase 2 Rating and Comment Matrix
Criteria

Respondent

Round 1 Rating

Respondent Comments
Although this method is effective, it is only
effective as the organizations ability to make
necessary changes within its boundary when
required. A noted concern is that
organizations can not control systems
outside of their control or purview.

Cyber Alpha

Cyber Bravo

Facilitator Comments

LE SE E HE E

Updated Rating
LE SE E HE E

X

Your argument of current security practices
based on physical topology is well supported
based on current cybersecurity
architectures. However, your argument of
the threats to virtual networks is not well
supported. What are the threats impacting
virtual networks? Why is securing the
physical network not enough to also secure
the logical one. You may need to better
define physical and virtual in the context of
cybersecurity defense. What is the
demarcation point between physical and
logical? This could also help support your
argument on defense in depth.

X

Moved from Effective (E) to
Most Effective (ME). Based on
comments and criteria
clarification.

I'm finding that the experts are
using my short research narratives
to rate the 7 criteria areas for
understanding CCSD. I'm asking
network defenders for their expert
opinion regardless of the research.
You should rate the seven criteria
areas based on your expert
experience not the optional and
very brief preliminary research.
You can add your reasoning based
on your expert opinion. Sorry that
wasn't clear. My proposal has 60
pages of research that I would
rather not bore the experts with.

X

Cyber Charlie

X

X

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo

X

X
A step further is to perform application layer TRUE
inspection of the traffic to ensure it's
legitimacy.

Cyber Foxtrot

Cyber Ice-Man

Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

Cyber Hotel

Cyber India

X

As effective as the level of encryption and True, and we are not just talking
dedication that is leveraged at each IAP and DoD, consider the larger global
internal connections.
topologies that are tied into the
DoD. The VPNs that are
unacounted for because they are
encrypted. Comprehensive
Cybersecurity should account for
the virtual traffic that is part of
the larger phsyical infastructure.
That's one point behind this
criteria.

X

No change.
No change.
X No change.
No change. Cyber Ice-Man's
comment about encryption
made me think about the
ability to break and inspect
content (e.g. TLS 1.3).
The recent FireEye article IRT
DNS Hijacking siad the
attackers used Let's Encrypt
X
Certificates to reduce the
risk of detection.
A final thought on this is
coud based solutions. The
low barriers to spin up
systems in AWS or Azure
make's it hard to keep track
of systems and data.
Changed from Effective (E)
to Most Effective (ME).
Working in commercial
industry has opened my eyes
WRT how interconnected all
X vendors are. In the DoD only
so many circuits are
dedicated in FOUO. VPN is a
constant management
challenge.

X

1. The Comprehensive
Cybersecurity Defense
Framework (CCDF) must
account for virtual as well
as physical threat factors.

No change.
X

X
Appropriate risk management requires a
TRUE
complete understanding of the operational
terrain, which continues to evolve with
X
service-provided infrastructure as well as
technological advancements in compute,
data handling, and transmission.
Internal policies are neither virtual or
True! And that is certainly implied
physical elements and must be also
in this criteria.
X considered.

First round Second round
Avg.
Avg.

No Change. ADDITIONAL
COMMENTS: This is/was
one of my greatest
arguments and concerns as a
Net Defender, how do we
protect info in the cyber
domain? I understood that
we could contain most
physical threats in a timely
fashion, but virtual was new
and presented its own set of
unique challenges. In the
end, it's really about
risk/reward.

True, and they can control
ports/protocols that are allowed
access through their own
boundaries.

X

Remarks

No change.
X

No Change. I will maintain
my vote given that some
X people who indicate less
than 4 did not provided good
arguments

4.2

4.5
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Cyber Alpha

Cyber Bravo

Inter-dependencies are critical towards the TRUE
successful defense of networks. Moreover,
organizations must take proactive stances
and partner with one another in order to
better secure networks. Also, how we
protect global systems must be defined and
how we defend those systems must evolve
with the current and future threats.
Additionally, we must become more
proactive in how we guard these systems
and ensure that countermeasures are in
place to prohibit access to our systems

X

X

2. The CCDF must account
for inter-dependencies of
outside organizations.

Cyber Charlie

Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)
Cyber Hotel

Cyber India

This section is somewhat amphibious. How
do you define inter-dependencies? What are
the factors that contribute to this interdependency work? As a brief description as
to what the literature say and how you plan
to facilitate it.

Please rate ths area based on your
expert experience not the optional
and very brief preliminary
research. Sorry that wasn't clear.
Consider trusts and partnerships
with service providers and outside
organizations that are
interconnected. Are there risks
associated with these
interdependencies? Are those
risks salient enough to warrant
this area as a criteria for
understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity. My lit review says it
is.

X

X

X

X

X

No change.

X
It's critical to understand not just the
I agree!
X external interdependencies, but the internal
interdependencies as well.
This reminds me of the 2013 Target breach. Thanks for this insight!
The initial attack was against Target's
refrigeration vendor not massive Target
organization. It exploited that relationship to
get a foothold and ultimately own 40 million
Target credit cards.

Cyber Echo

Cyber Ice-Man

Please rate ths area based on your
expert experience not the optional
and very brief preliminary
research. Sorry that wasn't clear.
Consider trusts and partnerships
with service providers and outside
organizations that are
interconnected. Are there risks
associated with
interdependencies? Are those
risks salient enough to warrant
this area as a criteria for
understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity. My lit review says it
is.

X

Cyber Delta

Cyber Foxtrot

Not sure that you were able to clearly
support your argument. The key take away
is that inter-dependencies with outside
organizations increases risk to the network
because not all outside organizations
execute cybersecurity to the same standard.
Establishing a common cybersecurity
standard across the varying organizations
could improve the overall security posture.
Hence the need for comprehensive
cybersecurity defense.

No Change. ADDITIONAL
COMMENTS: Partnership
and collaboration with
outside organizations is
instrumental towards
successful cyber defense.
However, understanding the
requirements of my
organization and our
customers was key in
developing strategic
alliances. Also, when
developing these
partnerships, we met
periodically with other
defenders to develop
standard operating
procedures to ensure that
we all were operating
according to an agreed upon
standard to protect our
asset.
Moved from Slightly
Effective (SE) to Effectuve
(E). I think this criteria could
be a little more specific. It is
not so much the
interdependencies with
outside organizations as it is
the information exchange
requirements between
organizations that must be
accounted for. From this
perspective you can better
articulate the confidentiality,
integrity and availability
requirements providing a
more comprehensive
approach to your
cybersecurity defense
framework.
Change Slightly Effecitve
(SE) to Highly Effective.
Based on discussion and
review of comments.

It’s relative to know the interdependencies
and the level of protection
interdependencies employ to adequately
protect data.

X

X

X

TRUE

X

No change.

Changed from Effective (E)
to Highly Effective (HE). I
bumped it up because I
revisited the Mitre ATT&CK
and it listed trusted
relationships as under initial
access.
https://attack.mitre.org/tech
niques/T1199/
No change. See my
comments on 1.

No change.
X

X
X No change.
No change. I maintain my
decision which is similar to
the average.

X

X

Certainly, it is required. At the country level I agree!
is easy to implement because it depends on
the agreement of two parties, nevertheless,
inter-companies agreements are more
complicated and costly because it is a big
investment for two parties, and to gather a
big number of participants involves
leadership.

X

3.7

4.1
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How we communicate in the cyber domain I agree! Thanks for the insight.
is crucial for successful defense. A common
language amongst cyber defenders should
be developed for proper defense of our
networks. Additionally, we should partner
with other civil, federal, and other non-DoD
entities to develop common operating
X
procedures whereby we are communicating
in effective manners versus non-effective.
From my experience, much of the time we
spend with other cyber operators is
centered upon ensuring that we are saying
the say thing in a way that we accomplish
our objectives.
Agreed, a common lexicon is essential to
Thanks!
X understanding comprehensive cybersecurity
defense

Cyber Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

X

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo

X
X
The context behind cyber lexicon should
internally driven within an organization or
vertical.

Cyber Foxtrot

3. The CCDF must use a
common lexicon by
internal and external
organizations.

Cyber Ice-Man
Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

X

True, you have to be on the same
page internally but consider the
challenges dealing with
interdependent organizations
when communicating
cybersecurity and acting on
incidents without a common
language amongsts trusted
agencies. In addition, creating a
standard lexicon (such as CNSS)
provides better collaboration
among CALOs during an attack.
Finally, please consider the rating
and comments of your partner
experts on this panel. Thanks!

No Change.

X

X

X No change.
X No change.
No change.
X
Changed from Least
Effective (LE) to Effective
(E). I moved it up one after
reading CNSS 4009. It's good
to have but then the S hits
the F, there will be no
ambiguity in language or
X
lexicon when actions need to
be taken. DHS dropped its
first emergency cyber
directive and there was
pretty clear.

X No change.
Changed from Effective (E)
to Highly Effective (HE).
X

X Yes
X

No change. Additoinal
comments to Cyber Foxtrot:
The utilization of a common
lexicon is not just for the
benefit of operations
internally, but the relative
cost to relating externally. In
the same way intelligence
not shared in the context of
doctrine is weakened and
arguably no longer
intelligence, so to is the
X collection of information for
internal consumption
wherein different
taxonomies imply words like
stage, breach, intrusion, and
malware are not equal to a
global instantatiation.
Ideally, even internal lexicons
are mapped to global
frameworks - as it enables
low-cost adoptions of
externally created value-add
products.
Changed from Effective (E)
to Highly Effective (HE). I
change my opinion to 4
because I see that is a good
average, specifically for
those who answered with
comments.

The establishment of a shared
I agree!
lexicon/vocabulary enables the accurate
translation of risk based on relevant context.
Without commonly defined language, the
cost for action increases, the effects may not
align with expectations, and decision making
overall is less reliable.

Cyber Hotel

Cyber India

X

X

A common lexicon is very important. I agree
that the easiest way to achieve this goal is to
collect the understanding and languages of
SMEs and scale it up to academia and
regulations. In a down-top approach, the
minority will have to learn the terms. In a
top-down approach, the majority will have
to learn the terms and not always is willing
to.

No Change.

The Committee on National
Security Systems (CNSS) Working
Group utilized authoritative
sources to resolve US national
differences between constructs
used by the DoD, Intelligence
Community (IC), and Civil Agencies
(e.g. NIST), enabling all three to
use the same glossary. The CNSS
glossary allows consistent
terminology in documentation,
policy, and processes across the
aforementioned communities. The
glossary began in 2010 with 29
references and has grown to 150
in the current 2017 version
(Dukes, 2015).

X

4

4.4
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Cyber Alpha

Cyber Bravo

4. The CCDF should be
applicable regardless of
organizational operations.

I think this is one of the most critical areas
that obtains the least amount of support or
attention. Over the span of my career, I
noticed that each organizations seemed to
operating according to their parent
organization's guidelines (i.e., Air Combat
Command, Air Force Communications
Agency, etc). A lack of clear standardization
makes it extremely difficult to defend the
networks. As the research indicates above,
this is not only a problem in governmental
agencies, but also civilian organizations.
Developing a set of procedures that would
serve as the basic requirements for every
X defender would be beneficial for the
successful defense of networks. Since we all
use a lot of the same equipment, developing
guidelines on how to protect these systems
will allow for a wider array of information
exchange amongst cyber operators.

I agree! Thanks for the thorough
insight. This part of my research
was derived during the content
analysis. I found that many of the
general cybersecurity models said
pretty much the same thing for
various organizations but were
difficult for stakeholders to
impliment and understand . Yes,
there are specialized CALO
cybersecurity frameworks based
on the operations (Health, finance,
etc.) but these specified
cybersecurity models failed to
outline general security practes
inherit in all enclaves (physical
architechtur, awareness, etc.). This
is why I proposed to understand
comprehensive cybersecurity
organizations should apply some
fundamental security practes
across the board. I made changes
to the criteria statment in the
remarks section

The initial statement says that
"cybersecurity defense must apply to all
CALOs regardless of operation". If this is true
then operational applicability is not relevant
to understanding comprehensive
cybersecurity.

I can try to make this statement
clearer but the basis of needing a
comprehensive framework for
defending CALOs is driven from
the stovepipped variations of
defending CALOS which happened
over time and causes a lot of
segregated protective measures.
Based on your expert opinion, do
you believe that organizations
that use the same IP, transport,
end user equipment shouldn't
share a common understanding of
what comprehensive defense is? I
made changes to the criteria
statment in the remarks section.

X

X

Cyber Charlie

X

Cyber Delta

The question in this section is confusing. You
speak about cybersecurity defense, but refer
to operational applicability. You may want
to change the 'operational applicability' to
'cybersecurity defense applicability'.

Great suggestion, I will change the
language. A few other experts
agree this is a bit confusing. I
made changes to the criteria
statment in the remarks section.

I believe operational applicability guides
where resources are directed to based on
prioritized assets, but a comprehensive
framework provides the baseline to ensure
overall efforts aren't overlooked.

I made changes to the criteria
statment in the remarks section.

X

Cyber Echo

This section reminds of the quote "All
models are wrong; some models are useful".
There isn't a panacea framework, a
generic/baseline/vanilla framework could be
used to start, and other more operation
specific frameworks could be sprinkled on as
applicable.

Cyber Foxtrot

X

Cyber Ice-Man
Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

X

X

Not all operations are equally sensitive,
awareness of this allows for leveraging
resources.

I made changes to the criteria
statment in the remarks section
Thanks for the insight. This work is
the build a comprehensive
cybersecurity defense framework
but it starts with building a
criteria. Operational applicability is
the reason we have so many
variations of frameworks. The
question is, can we build a better
means of understanding
comprehensive cyber defense
reguardless of operation. Looking
at the many various framworks
developed over time and the
research it appears we can. Based
on the criteria, we build a more
amiable means to getting closer to
a comprehensive approach. I
made changes to the criteria
statment in the remarks section
That’s true! I made changes to the
criteria statment in the remarks
section
I made changes to the criteria
statment in the remarks section

No change. ADDITIONAL
COMMENTS: From my
experience, every
stakeholder possessed
unique requirements. As
such, we understood that risk
management was crucial in
our roles as net defenders.
For example, the person
logging in at the gym did not
require an indepth
understanding of how to
login to the network and
how to protect physical
X
assets. However, individuals
that were assigned to my
organization had to not only
understand the person at the
gym requirements, they had
to know how to protect the
boundary of the entire
installation and our outside
stakeholders. To sovle this
dilema, we had resources
that enabled us to scale our
tasks according to our
customers and their unique
requirements.
Change from Lease Effective
(LE) to Most Effective (ME).
Agreed, a framework should
be universal and would apply
to all organizations.

X

X

Cyber India

No change.

X

Changed from Least
Effective (LE) to Effective
(E). I moved it up one after
reading the comment about
risk. My issue with risk is that
is often miscalculated. USCC
has the JRAM but in simple
terms Risk = threat x vuln x
impact. The risk value is only
as accurate as its input. If the
operational or revenue
generating organizations
don't provide impact, you
won't get Risk right.

X

No change.

X

Changed from Effective (E)
to Highly Effective (HE).

X

No change.

X

I made changes to the criteria
statment in the remarks section

X

Changed Effective (E) to
Highly Effective (HE). Due to
clarification

X

The identification of risk to an organization I agree! I made changes to the
is directly or indirectly a measure of assuring criteria statment in the remarks
delivery of it's core mission/business
section
functions or stakeholder requirements.
Operational applicability is the mechanism
X within which these functions are executed
and requirements met, and their
applicability would be necessary in
understanding what the comprehensive
security requirements are for a given CALO.

Cyber Hotel

Changed from Slightly (SE)
Effective to Highly Effective
(HE). "Comprehensive
cybersecurity defense should
be applicable reguarles of
organizational operations"

X

Changed from Highly
Effective (HE) to Effective
(E). I change my decision to 3
based on the average of
answers and the comments
made.

3.2
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Cyber Alpha

No change.

The insider threat is often not thought of
Thanks for the insight.
until something drastic happens (i.e. Edward
Snowden). However, the insider threat does
not only happen in the cyber domain, but
also in the physical domain. Moreover,
personality profiles are limited in scope
when trying to ascertain what personality
types would be susceptible to insider
threats. Understanding various personalities
is only one component of understanding
which personality would succumb to various
pressures resulting in an insider threat. Also,
other mechanisms must be in place to
prevent individuals from having the ability
to be an agent of insider threat. Most
literature is often vague as it relates to this
subject matter and future research on this
subject matter should take place

X

X

Agreed, human behavior plays a significant TRUE
role in cybersecurity defense.

X

X

Cyber Bravo

This section is rather light on support. You
have a single study to suggest relationship
and another two to show the impact of old
frameworks. You need at least a couple of
studies to support the 'behavioral' factors.

X

5. The CCDF must include Cyber Charlie
Cyber Delta
behavioral factors of
Cyber Echo
friendly and malicious
users (trusted insiders and
hackers).

Cyber Foxtrot

Please base your response on
your personal experience. Also,
see my previous comments and
those of fellow experts. Thanks!

X

Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)
Cyber Hotel

X

No change.

X

X

No change.
Changed from Slightly (SE)
Effective to Effective (E). I
moved it up but this
statement is still very
squishy. As a society we have
gotten better with
recognizing these threats but
the adversary has also gotten
better.

MITRE ATT&CK covers initial attack vectors Thanks for the insight!
but in order to change behavior, you need a
culture that promotes security AND build
awareness.

X

X

X

X

X

Changed from Effective (E)
to Highly Effective (HE). I
recently participated in a
targeted phishing test and
the results after user
awareness in top ranks for
Business email compromise
proved an increase in 72% in
users not falling victim  
No change.

X
X
I think this is the most important factor.
Thanks for the insight! Its
There are people that will never try to attack extermetly important to
and other that will try in every case.
understand what the behaviors
are to properly defend against
X
them.

Cyber India

Changed from Least
Effective (LE) to Highly
Effective (HE). Changed
based on discussion and
review of others' comments.

X

Thanks for the insight!
User ease of use hasn’t typically been a
common DoD concern. User awareness DOES
assist with empowering users to champion
cyber security on a routine basis.

Cyber Ice-Man

No change. More specifically
a CCDF must account for all
types of threats internal and
external.

X No change.
Changed from Most
Effective (ME) to Highly
Effective (HE). I change my
vote to 4 based on the other
X
opinions and because the
average is closer to 4 than to
my initial opinion.

3.6
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Cyber Alpha

X

Cyber Charlie

X

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo

X

X

Moved from Highly
Effective (ME) to Most
Effective (ME). Yes, the
CCDF must be easily
X
understandable to senior
leaders to facilitate decisions
making and risk acceptance.
X No change.
X No change.
X No change.
No change.

X
This needs to be driven from the top. The
White House Cyber Czar would author the
X
policy that drive the strategy across
organizations.

Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Ice-Man
Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

I agree!

X

X

Changed from Highly
X Effective (HE) to Most
Effective (ME).
No change.

CALOs and small to medium sized
I agree, thanks for the thourough
organizations play a role in the posture of insight!
the defense of each other (re: interdependency). 2018 saw a continuation and
escalation of the trend wherein trusted 3rd
parties exploited trust relationships to gain
access to their targets (APT10 reporting as
per US & Japan CERT). Smaller and medium
sized organizatiosn are most likely
motivated differently then larger
X organizations/agencies/CC/S/As (reputation,
ability to operate) but if they are relied on
by larger organizations must understand
their posture to avoid the worst case risks as
service providers. 1. Their infrastructure is
compromised and leveraged to gain
unauthorized access to their customer
environments. 2. Their infrastructure is
compromised and no longer able to provide
mission-dependent services/products to
their customers.
True, a framework will include all
the criteria areas

X

No change.

X

X

Cyber Hotel

Cyber India

No change.

X

Cyber Bravo

6. Stakeholders must
easily understand the
CCDF.

No further comments as you clearly
Thanks
articulated that in order to benefit from a
united cyber force, all parties must work
together. Moreover, stakeholders are
integral in the development of processes
that will assist in adequately defending their
networks as well as funding future
endeavors.
Agreed, understanding is essential in
Thanks
supporting a comprehensive cyber defense
capability.

A common understanding is always good.
Nevertheless, it is a pre-requisite for interdependencies.

X

X

Changed from Effective (E)
to Highly Effective (HE). I
change my initial opinion to 4
given that is closer to the
average.

4.4
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Cyber Alpha

X
X

Cyber Bravo

Cyber Delta

I believe the framework will dictate the
various responsibilities ("what" needs to be
done) and management will allocate the
"who".

X

Cyber Echo
7. The CCDF must identify Cyber Foxtrot
roles and responsibilities
of personnel responsible Cyber Ice-Man
for defending CALOs.
Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)
Cyber Hotel

X

This is not only important in identifying gaps TRUE
but it can also identify duplicative efforts
that may not provide additional value.

X

X No change.
Changed Effective (E) to
Highly Effective (HE). Due to
clarification

X No change.
No change.

X
X

X No change.
No change.

X
X
X

No change.

TRUE
Clear roles & responsibilities allow for
appropriate resource planning for current
X and future requirements, while ensuring the
necessary duties are assigned to the
appropriate functions.
It is very important to define who is doing TRUE
what. That is for sure.

X

Cyber India

Thanks but we havn't built the
framework yet. Once we establish
the criteria we will build a
prototype. How important to
comprehensive cybersecuirity
defense to you view
roles/responsibilities as?...

No change.

X

X

Cyber Charlie

No change.

X
Agreed, identifying roles and responsibilities Thanks
aids in understanding cyber defense.

X

X

Changed from Most
Effective (ME) to Highly
Effective (HE). I will change
my vote to 4 because it is
closer to the average
evaluation from those who
wrote an explanation.

4.4

4.4
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Appendix Q
Expert Panel Phase 2 Round 1 Comment Matrix
Rate how well the CCDF prototype
meets each below criteria area

Respondent
Cyber Alpha

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo

Cyber Foxtrot

Cyber Ice-Man
1. Does the Comprehensive
Cyber Ironic
Cybersecurity Defense Framework (formerly Cyber
(CCDF) prototype account for
Golf)
virtual as well as physical threat
factors.

Cyber Hotel

Cyber India

Round 1 Rating
LE SE E HE E

How can the CCDF prototype be
improved?

Although you did not specifically mention
virtual, the proposed framework could be
X
adjusted (based on user requirements) to
handle such requests.
The threats are not only covered by the
X framework but also covered by the usecases.

Remarks
I updated the Defense in Dept slide
to explain this better for the
stakeholders. Thanks for the input.

Averages

True!!

X
X

X
It's a little confusing because there are many In a large organizations there are
variables to account for.
many variables. That's the
problem. The framework attempts
to collect all the variables, identify
the waste and the defense gaps in
an organized manner. To date, this
has not been done in CALOs.

X

X
X

X

4.4
Recommend including as part of the
Requirements Validation Process, specifically
around use-cases and capabilities, leveraging
an existing Framework to add maturity to
the validation mechanism. Additionally, as
part of capabilities, there should be an
element of mapping data sources to each
threat to understand what data is required
from each capability to act appropriately.
This assessment is based conceptually on
the approach. The incorporation of roles
including physical responsibilities (admins,
engineers, users/operators) becomes
inclusive of the notion. That said, the
capabilities and use-cases as examples don't
clearly indicate if there is a thorough set of
each to accommodate.

Very prudent to future work. Our
goal for this work is the simply
identify if the framework captures
the criteria identified. I look
forward to future research to find
out the answers to your questions
in applying this methodology to
an actual CALO (required for
validating the framework). The
mapping is notional.

By integrating NIST Cybersecurity

Thanks!!

X Framework and Oracle´s Defense in Depth
Model it covers a broad range of threats.
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Cyber Alpha

Cyber Bravo

X

X

Cyber Foxtrot

Thanks!!

board.

Although understood, the interdependencies are not explicitly called out.
X
Doing so might reduce varying
interpretation.
Contracts and relationships should explicitly
be identified to avoid confusion during crisis.

X

Cyber Ice-Man

X

Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

X

X

Good point. I explained in in the
revised narrative for the
stakeholders.

Contract are not part of cyber
defense but it is identified in the
NIST "Identify" core task.
Contracts are out of scope for this
work but very important to
identifying limitations in the work
force. This may be identified once
the framework is applied in an
actual CALO. Let's look into this
for future work.
Taking into perspective, industry; we are not Good point. It may be a good idea
closed off to IoT and require our system
to apply the framework in a
tools to have an AI approach.  When or will similar CALO for future research.
Federal Govt be of need is uncertain but I
suspect it should be considered as an
interdependency

Would recommend revisiting the NIST
component to ensure there is an element
within Identify that covers 3rd party service
consumption (so that they would also be
X covered under risk
assessment/management). Not explicitly,
but there is opportunity as highlighted
within the framework to do so.

Cyber Hotel
Cyber India

Multiple framework are interrelated to

X

Cyber Echo

2. Does the CCDF prototype
account for inter-dependencies of
outside organizations.

I better explained the
interdependency narration but
you are correct. It is inferred.
Thanks for the input.

X account for interdependencies across the

Cyber Charlie

Cyber Delta

You would have to deliberately add a step to
either the validation process to account for
interdependencies or you would have to add
another mission dependency framework to
map the existing 4 criteria to. This is not
explicitly accounted for. However it can be
inferred based on the framework.

I think that this is the weakest point of the
proposed framework.

This is similar to the contracting
question addressed by Cyber
Foxtrot. Very good point and NIST
most certainly does address 3
party service under risk
management. Not explicit in the
general framework but NIST
explains this in detail under the
"identify" core task.
I re-accomplished this in the
defense in depth narrative. Thanks
for the input.

4
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Speaking the same language is key.
Additionally, understanding roles and
X
responsibilities is invaluable in the cyber
domain.
Use-cases would have to be derived from a
common source across all organizations in
order to retain a common lexicon. You may
want to consider utilizing a common source
of use-cases and not solely rely upon the
event tracked and discovered by that
organization.

Cyber Alpha

X

Cyber Bravo

Cyber Charlie
X

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo

Cyber Foxtrot

Cyber Ice-Man
Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

Cyber Hotel

Cyber India

Good on both points. The lexicon
must first be understood by all
sub-organization in the CALO. That
said, the CNSS is standard for
most government organizations
(required) and used widely by
commercial organization that deal
in cyber. For example, DHS is the
government agency responsible
for the .com community use by
most commercial companies, so
those companies understand
CNSS. Educational institutions
may also be certified as an
academic center of excellent under
CNSS. Nova case in point.
CNSS is a standard lexicon for DOD
and most commercial CALOs for
cyber.
While there may be some
variation in certain organizations,
the FW provides a baseline
standard for identifying actions
and events.

X

3. Does the CCDF prototype use a
common lexicon by internal and
external organizations.

True!!

X
This works as long as the reference are
identified (e.g. NCSSI 4009)

X

They are explicitly identified in the
framework. That is the reference
depicted in the demonstration
that defines not only the roles the
cyber language used by the CALO.
CNSSI is widely used by both
government and industry.

X
X
The inclusion of established frameworks
That's why we need a standard
inherits this, but there is a risk when
lexicon. CNSS.
contextualizing NIST "tasks" around threat
X
that the full meaning may not translate
initially well (specifically, the items within)
each NIST framework category.
Yes, the framework is integrated by other Thanks for the input!
X well-known frameworks in the CALOs sector.

4.6
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Cyber Alpha

X

Cyber Bravo

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo

X

Cyber Foxtrot

X

Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)
Cyber Hotel

It's scalable framework but it need to be
implemented at the right size organization.

X

X

Cyber Bravo

Probably the "inter-dependencies of outside I added this information to the
organizations" are required to say that
defense in depth slide narrative.
highly inter-dependent organizations will
benefit from the proposed framework. Yes.
Specially the tables indicate specific task and
responsibilities that may be applied
regardless of organizational operations.

Cyber Echo

I'll add more info to the
stakeholders in the narrative.

True! I've added that comment to
the narrative as well. Thanks!

X
X

Cyber Foxtrot

X

Cyber Ice-Man

X

Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

X

As in #2, although understood, the
prototype might benefit from explicitly
calling out internal and external threats.
Indicators of compromise of all adversaries
are mapped to detect from NIST CSF, across
the cyber Defense Layers BUT I don't clearly
see the distinction between inside/outside
threats. So, yes it includes behavioral factors
to identify inside threats.
Awareness and training were covered, if
logging was expanded upon with reference
to DLP solution (technology) yes fully

I added this information to the
defense in depth slide narrative.

Not explicitly, but there is evidence this is

True. And may be tested in future
research.

X covered within the use-cases driving

Cyber Hotel
Cyber India

Although, this prototype does briefly engage
the topic of trusted insiders and hackers, it
does not have enough info on these areas.
Would suggest adding a few lines on
behavioral factors since that is the highlight
of this area.
The process of an attack is generally the
same regardless if it is an insider or a hacker.
X
This process is well captured by the Cyber
Kill Chain.

X

Cyber Charlie

5. Does the CCDF prototype
include behavioral factors of
friendly and malicious users
(trusted insiders and hackers).

4.5

X

Cyber India

Cyber Delta

The framework is only for large
organizations as identified in the
problem statement: CALO are
large companies, agencies and
organizations. Such as the DOD,
SAIC, DHS, NSA, Target, Walmart,
etc.
Most of the frameworks identified
in the CCDF are widely used by
industry. NIST, the CKC, Defense in
Depth were created by industry
and government.

X

X

Cyber Alpha

Thanks for the input!

X

With Federal government, yes

Cyber Ice-Man

Good point. This is only for CALOs
and future research is the test for
the unknowns.

X

Cyber Charlie

4. Is the CCDF prototype applicable
regardless of organizational
operations.

I rated HE in this category, because this is a
theoretical product. Moreover, it is difficult
to state that this product would be
applicable to every organization as there
many unknowns.
This framework is suitable to ensure that
any organization would be able to
X understand where and how to apply
defensive capabilities based on their mission
needs.

X

capabilities for each "requirement".
Yes. The main contribution is by
incorporating the Oracle's Defense in Depth
Model

I added this information to the
defense in depth slide narrative.

This is more specific to detailed
functions of the general
framework. For future research
applicability will be explored.

Thanks!!

4.3
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Cyber Alpha
While the concept of cyber defense is
Thanks!!
complicated and the guidance currently in
existence is monumental there has not been
X
a better more simplistic approach to
understanding the complexities than this
framework.

Cyber Bravo

X
X
X
X

Cyber Charlie

6. Can stakeholders easily
understand the CCDF prototype.

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Ice-Man
Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

X

Cyber Hotel

X

Cyber India

X

X

X
X
X

Cyber Charlie

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo

Cyber Foxtrot

X

Cyber Ice-Man
Cyber Ironic
(formerly Cyber
Golf)

Cyber India

The concept is clear, but the walk through of
the requirements because of the multiple
dimensions can distract from the messaging,
leading to issues with buy-in.

Well see in the stakeholders panel.
This is a hard one to predict. The
intent was for you to put yourself
in the stakeholders shoes for this
criteria.
Thanks!!

It is self-explanatory in the tables and the
general framework.

X

Cyber Bravo

Cyber Hotel

Thanks!!

4.6

X

Cyber Alpha

7. Does the CCDF prototype
identify roles and responsibilities
of personnel responsible for
defending CALOs.

Mapped very clearly, the logic is easy to
follow

Thanks!!
Awesome flow. I thought it was very
intuitive.
While the roles used in this framework may True, we'll have to see for future
be generic enough to account for the major research.
roles within your typical organization it may
be worth noting that during the application
of this framework to a specific organization
the roles can be modified to better align
with that mission.

It's pretty clear but organizations may not
If they use this framework. They
have defined roles with the same titles. Easy will have to standardize the
fix.
names. If the descriptions do not
match what's in CNSS….they may
not be doing those defense
actions.
Without exception the roles were mapped
Thanks!!
X
and defined.

X

X

"I would recommend in the next stakeholder
group a discussion occur around answering
the following: 1. What if a role only applies
to a task (detect against all threats) for one
requirement, is a full matrix the best
approach? 2. How do you account for roles
that have responsibilities that could very
easily be a capability (i.e., vigilant
User/Operator self-reporting ? 3. How do
these roles interact with one another, and is
it the CCDF's role to quantify the interdependencies of these interactions?" Roles
are defined well and appropriately for this
effort, but I'm not certain I agree fully with
the application of responsibility as currently
applied.
The roles are clear, specially by integrating
X
the CNSS's Cyber Lexicon

This is an application question for
future research the roles for CNSS
are widely used and agreed upon
by government and industry for
cyber.

Thanks!!

4.5
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Stakeholder Panel Round 1 Results
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Appendix S
Stakeholder Evaluation Comment Matrix
Rate how well the CCDF prototype
meets each below criteria area

Respondent

Round 1 Rating

Respondent Comments

Cyber Alpha

X

Cyber Bravo

X

X
X

X

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
2. Does the CCDF prototype
account for inter-dependencies Cyber Foxtrot
of outside organizations.

Good Copy, alhtough, we are not
trying to defend VPNs or
encrypted data outside CALO
scope of control, simply trying to
identify them at the proper
defense layers. In doing this
CALOs stakeholders can accept
or reject the risks. What we tend
to see is avoidance of virtual and
encypted traffic altogther, simply
because defenders cant see the
data. This places organizations at
risks. Additionally, we capture
interdependencies in the
framework as well.

4.4

You cover this in the D.I.D and the NIST
Thanks!
RMF under identify. This is why the
mapping overlaps. I liked the way you used
only the core areas in NIST which is weak
X at explaining where the risk is but simply
states to identify the risk. The key factor is
you use each of the three frameworks for
what they were intended to do.

Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Kilo

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

First round
Avg.

Presentation effectively shows how inter- Thanks!
dependencies can be developed!

You do explain the pysical and virtual
factors are covered in the framework,
although its difficult to defend
virtual/encrypted data that falls outside an
organizational scope of control.

Cyber Alpha

Remarks

Yes, futuer work will require
It is currently good but will have to
X consistently be updated due to the nature futher updates. Thanks for the
input
of its purpose.

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot

Cyber Golf

M
LE SE E HE E

X

Cyber Charlie

1. Does the Comprehensive
Cybersecurity Defense
Framework (CCDF) prototype
account for virtual as well as
physical threat factors.

Updated Rating
Facilitator Comments

M
LE SE E HE E

X
X

I see its implied but the true test is putting Yes, practical us will be part of
the CCDF into practical terms. You epxlain futuer research.
this very well in the presentation but it's
really hard for me to understand since I've
havn't practically perfromed cyber defense
in a long time.

X

X
X
X No improvement necessary

Thanks!

X
4.2

X

Cyber Golf

X

Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Kilo

X

Hard to obtain interdependcies since outside That falls under the identify task in
organizations do not fall under stakeholder the NIST RMF but this comment
controls. Maybe add contract oversight and was part of the expert panel as
agreements/policy to the mapping
well. A separate study with a
heavy contract workforce and
dedendency will certainly be an
area for futuer work.

X
X
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Cyber Alpha

X
X
X

Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

X

Cyber Delta
3. Does the CCDF prototype use
a common lexicon by internal
and external organizations.
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Kilo

X

4. Is the CCDF prototype
applicable regardless of
organizational operations.

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
Exactly, why we chose those
It appears to be since it is based on a
common framework for organizations that specific frameworks.
X operate in this mission space.

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Kilo

X

5. Does the CCDF prototype
include behavioral factors of
friendly and malicious users
(trusted insiders and hackers).

Cyber Bravo

X
X
X
X

X

X
We use the CKC to help my orgnaization
make decisions on wheater to act, or watch
enemy behavior. This framework forces us
X
to address more details into where the
behavior is happening in defense stages.
Great tool!

Cyber Charlie

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Kilo

4.4

X

The individual frameworks indirectly
address trusted insiders; however, can the
framework map in a reverse manner
toward the who. For example, how does a
CALO detect reconnaissance at the
endpoint by a user (trusted insider)?

Cyber Alpha

4.3

X

Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Consistent validation as new terms evolve The CNSS is reviewed continually
and can be misinterpreted.
CNSS is an athoritative source but most The key is to institutionalize the
organizations tend to end up creating their language. The more CALOs that
own language. That said, this brings to light use the same language, the
the question. Are my cyber defenders
better collaboration between
across the globe using a universal
those CALOs and cyber
language.
defenders.

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

That's much further into the
practical sense of the CCDF and
for future research but, a CALO
wouldn't detect reconnassiance
but a user could detect
reconnasiance. For example, a
user can detect latency on his
system, a web camera turning
on, or key-logging. The CCDF can
also help CALOs identify tools
user and sys ads can use such as
systems logs. Again, if you dont
engage users, you will only have
defence performed by part of
your orgainzation.

4.4
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Cyber Alpha

The meshing of frameworks is easily
understood; however, a database that can
query based on the who, task, what, and
where would make it easier for anyone
working cyber defense to find a
requirement, capability, or tool, although a
database maybe outside the scope of this
research

X

Very easy to understand and brings clarity Thanks!
to the more complicated frameworks in the
CCDF. The first practial approach I've seen to
confusing frameworks like ISO, NIST 800-30
X ect.

Cyber Bravo

6. Can stakeholders easily
understand the CCDF prototype.

X I'd love to try this out in my command! Looking forware to it
Yes, if they have some background in this It is implied that CIOs and other
area.
cyber stakeholders know what
they are in charge of and/or own
but duely noted. Some
stakeholders of cyber may be
have oversight but not know
enough to fully understand the
CCDF
X

Cyber Charlie

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot
Cyber Golf
Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Kilo

Cyber Alpha
Cyber Bravo
Cyber Charlie

Cyber Delta
Cyber Echo
Cyber Foxtrot

7. Does the CCDF prototype
identify roles and responsibilities
of personnel responsible for
defending CALOs.
Cyber Golf

Cyber Hotel
Cyber India
Cyber Kilo

It is, as a matter of fact. I have
been workign with the DISA DCO
team to build out the tools,
capabilites and requirements for
DISA proper using an SQL
database.

4.6

X
X
X
X
X
X A lot to take in but yes, I get it!

Thanks!

X
X
X
X
X
X
Roles vary based on organization and
Great point and this is the intent
everone should be conducting defense. I like of the framework!
the fact that the initial mapping has all the
X roles mapped to the where, what and the
task. In a lot of instances, we disenfranchise
our folks by not engaging them in the
defense actions.

X
X
X

4.7
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